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ABSTRACT
In the past two decades, media consumption has changed not only in terms of breadth and
amount, but also in terms of availability and accessibility. Shows that once could only be viewed
at their scheduled time on their scheduled network may now be streamed across several
platforms at almost any time. Further, audiences have begun to connect with characters beyond
the shows and films they inhabit, building websites, following related social media pages,
recording podcasts and more to continue and expand these parasocial relationships. The social
scientific community has only begun to scratch the surface of how these changes affect audience
members and society at large—particularly regarding the political impact of entertainment

media. Through focus groups, a survey experiment, media content analysis, and a laboratory
experiment, I explore the impact of entertainment television media on political attitudes and
social perceptions within the context of contemporary media consumption patterns. In particular,
I examine the efficacy of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact within the context
of single exposure, accumulated exposure to outgroup members, and binge watching. I find that
mediated intergroup contact appears to have a much stronger impact on audience members than
narrative persuasion, regardless of exposure amount. I also find that binge watching episodic
shows—watching multiple episodes back-to-back in one sitting—leads to different media effects
on political attitudes and social perceptions in viewers than watching the same episodes in the
traditional weekly format. Overall, my findings suggest that contemporary consumption patterns
of entertainment media render it less influential in terms of narrative persuasion of political
attitudes, but the regular consumption of entertainment media may still have lasting effects from
mediated intergroup contact regardless of whether the contact is positive or negative.
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1

INTRODUCTION

In the first quarter of 2020, the video content streaming platform Netflix gained nearly 16
million new subscribers, bringing them to a global total of 182.8 million subscriptions (Lee
2020). While the 2020 pandemic led to unprecedented numbers of individuals staying home and
out of work beginning during this time period, the numbers overall point to a major shift in
recreation over the past few decades toward entertainment—specifically streamed entertainment
television. The Nielsen Company (2020) reports: “Year-over-year, streaming among people 2554 has increased almost 100%.” Even before shelter-in-place orders popped up around the U.S.,
Nielsen reported that American adults over 18 spend more than 11 hours per day connected to
linear and digital media (Nielsen 2018). Nearly four of the approximately six hours American
adults spend each day watching video content is dedicated to watching live and time-shifted
television (Spangler 2020). Additionally, consumers used a streaming platform for 19 percent of
all TV viewing in the fourth quarter of 2019—up from ten percent in the first quarter of 2018—
and Netflix made up 31 percent of all connected-TV viewing (Spangler 2020).
Put simply, Americans watch a lot of video content, and they increasingly watch that
content online and through streaming services like Netflix, Amazon Prime, and Hulu. While
some streaming platforms offer access to news programming via live TV (e.g. Hulu 2020),
Netflix and others only provide entertainment shows and movies. Not only are consumers
watching more media overall and watching more entertainment than news content, they are also
increasingly engaging in binge watching multiple episodes of a show in one sitting (Netflix
2017). A 2018 Morning Consult survey of 2,044 TV watchers indicates rates of “73 percent of
TV watchers ages 18-29 and 69 percent of those ages 30-44 binge-watching television at least
once a week” (Sabin 2018). How does this shift toward greater consumption of entertainment
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media over news media, and especially the shift toward binging on entertainment media, affect
its influence over our social and political attitudes?
Markus Prior (2005) observed that increased choice in media would also increase the gap
in political knowledge between those with interest in politics and those without. He argued that
entertainment media has little to offer its viewers in terms of political information. Matthew
Baum (2004) rejected this notion, pointing to non-traditional, “soft” news programs that do
include political information. Not only do soft news programs like daytime and late night talk
shows garner much higher viewership, they can influence viewers on public policy and vote
choice (Baum and Jamison 2006). As Baum and Jamison (2011) point out, “television allows
individuals to learn passively,” and “individuals are more likely to accept information presented
in a non-conflictual manner that does not arouse excitement”—a much different scenario from
the arguing pundits we see on entertainment news and infotainment shows (124-125; see also
Otto, et al. 2017).
Because more individuals engage with non-news/entertainment media, and because these
media hold significant influence over their viewers, researchers must continue to explore
entertainment media effects and dramatic narrative persuasion. The communication field has
spent decades understanding the causal mechanisms behind narrative persuasion, but only a
small percentage of these studies—either in communication or political science—are dedicated
to understanding how entertainment media affects political attitudes. Political science, in
particular, has been slow to examine the effects of entertainment media on political attitudes.
Entertainment media effects research in other fields provide clear evidence of priming (Holbert
2003; Holbrook and Hill 2005), framing (Holbert, et al. 2005; Lane, et al. 2013; Mulligan and
Habel 2011; Slater, et al. 2006), and behavioral influence (Gierzynski and Eddy 2013; Hether, et
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al. 2008; Paluck and Green 2009) over political attitudes and values. However, only a few of
these studies have been published by political science journals (e.g. Paluck and Green 2009 in
the American Political Science Review).
Following the trailblazing efforts of political scientists such as Donald P. Green, who
worked with psychologist Elizabeth Levy Paluck to study the effects of dramatic, fictional radio
programming on political behavior in post-genocide Rwanda (Paluck and Green 2009), and
Anthony Gierzynski, who published Harry Potter and the Millennials with help from sociologist
Kathryn Eddy (Gierzynski and Eddy 2013), this manuscript seeks to further our knowledge of
how dramatic narratives in fictional entertainment influence political attitudes in the
contemporary media environment. As a culture, Americans are no longer limited to a few
programs on the radio or television. We are no longer limited, even, to a specific provider or to
accessing programs from a single device. As the media landscape available to consumers,
namely the American electorate, grows and diversifies, it becomes increasingly important to
understand the effects these changes have on public opinion. Furthermore, to understand the full
breadth of media’s influence today, we must include the effects of entertainment media and
dramatic narrative persuasion.
1.1

Why Dramatic Entertainment Media?
I use the term dramatic entertainment media to refer to non-news media consumed for

entertainment purposes that would be categorized in the drama genre. Entertainment media
covers the gamut of genres and motivations for engaging with media—from escapist media like
action movies and first-person-shooter video games to mood-boosting media like music and
situational comedy shows. However, the literature provides greatest evidence for dramatic shows
and films influencing their audience members through narrative persuasion, which Hamby,
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Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) conceptualize as a process by which a dramatic narrative, or story,
may alter audience members’ beliefs, attitudes, and/or intentions.
Deictic shift theory states that absorption into the narrative and reflection following the
narrative are necessary for narrative persuasion to occur (Hamby, et al. 2018; Hamby, et al.
2017). Further research provides evidence that certain perceptions of the media, such as
identification with a character and high perceived realism of the story, also play key roles in
increasing both absorption and reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and
counterarguing, which are forms of resistance to messaging embedded in storylines (Hamby, et
al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). However, individuals do not engage with dramatic
entertainment media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their screens not only
with specific motivations for engaging with media but also with personal circumstances, current
mindsets, and myriad potential distractions (Oliver and Raney 2011). They may leave their
media experience with certain impressions to reenter their own lives, often moving straight into
engagement with other narratives and other media formats.
What is the key component to holding a viewer’s attention and inducing enough
retrospective reflection to evoke narrative persuasion? More importantly, which factor will
encourage a lasting attitude change? While examining the extant literature, I notice that many
studies reveal statistical results with small coefficients, and very few studies look at lasting
change (e.g. Bahk 2010; Hether, et al. 2008; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; Slater, et al. 2006).
Moreover, we tend to examine specific attitudes rather than perceptions of social norms; one
exception being Paluck and Green’s (2009) longitudinal study of a dramatic radio program’s
effects on Rwandans’ acceptance of dissident behaviors in a political context. This provides
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evidence that exposure longer than a single episode or two, as with Paluck and Green’s (2009)
study, may be key to understanding greater, accumulative effects.
1.2

Mediated Intergroup Contact
In addition to inducing reflection and decreasing reactance to narrative persuasion,

dramatic narratives in entertainment media may diminish prejudice through facilitating mediated
intergroup contact. Building upon Allport’s social contact hypothesis and the subseuent
intergroup contact theory, contemporary social scientists have begun to examine intergroup
contact depicted in entertainment media for its potential to diminish intergroup bias. This
mediated intergroup contact has been shown to decrease intergroup prejudice in majority
members who watch a dramatic narrative that depicts a fellow ingroup member having positive
interactions with an outgroup member (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). Moyer-Gusé and Ortiz (2019)
find that mediated intergroup contact both reduces anxiety toward interacting with an outgroup
member and increases empathy toward the depicted outgroup.
This manuscript examines two potential benefits of understanding the impact of mediated
intergroup contact to political science research. First, I explore whether political attitudes toward
policies that affect a specific outgroup may also be affected by mediated intergroup contact.
Second, I explore the impact of contemporary consumption patterns on narrative persuasion and
mediated intergroup contact: Accumulative effects and binge effects.
1.3

Contemporary Consumption Patterns
One episode of a show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers

very little, though including an epilogue may increase immediate effects (Lane, et al. 2013).
Continued messaging in one show or across multiple shows increases the likelihood that
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narrative persuasion will occur, as evidenced by studies of accumulative effects (e.g. Hether, et
al. 2008). What happens, though, when you watch multiple episodes at once?
Binge watching, that is consuming audio-visual media for greater than two hours in one
sitting and/or watching an entire season of a multi-episode program in less than seven days, has
become increasingly popular—especially with young consumers (Netflix 2017). In 2013 Netflix,
which considers itself an “internet television network” (Neflix 2016), revealed survey results that
indicate 73 percent of users have favorable views toward and engage in binge watching, which
survey respondents collectively defined as “watching between 2-6 episodes of the same TV show
in one sitting” (Netflix 2013). By 2016, Netflix could pinpoint the average watch-times of
bingers for entire seasons, noting that bingers consume sci-fi and horror shows like “American
Horror Story” or “Breaking Bad” in four days, while political thrillers such as “House of Cards”
or “Homeland” take six days (Neflix 2016). In a more extreme example, the Nielsen Company
confirmed that 824,000 Netflix users binged the eight one-hour episodes of the third season of
sci-fi show Stranger Things on the first day it was released (Tassi 2019).
Although the literature offers insight to explain the effects on political attitudes of
engaging regularly with episodic dramas (i.e. cultivation theory or “drip, drip” effects; e.g.
Hether, et al. 2008; Paluck and Green 2009) or engaging with high-impact media (i.e. the drench
hypothesis: e.g. Bahk 2009; Slater, et al. 2006), we have yet to explore the impact of these
theories in a contemporary media context. Do bingers demonstrate the same accumulative effects
reported in traditional weekly watchers? Do they report the same levels of absorption, reflection,
and identification? If there is evidence of narrative persuasion after binge watching, do these
effects last? These questions are imperative to understanding how the contemporary media
environment affects consumers’ social and political attitudes.
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1.4

Dissertation Layout
This dissertation seeks to use empirical research to more deeply understand the

relationship between narrative persuasion, the way we consume entertainment media, and our
sociopolitical attitudes. The next chapter discusses the interdisciplinary literature related to my
theory of binge effects. Much of the research on narrative persuasion, even as it relates to
political attitudes, lies in the communication literature. I explore the previous research of the
interdisciplinary literature and tie the theories and assertions made in communication, social
psychology, and other social sciences to similar concepts in political science. In Chapter 3, I
build upon the deictic shift theory and cultivation theory to explore accumulative effects and
consumption type effects regarding entertainment media and present my theory of binge effects.
I posit that binge watching episodic dramas (television and streamed shows) is the least likely
method to induce lasting attitude change on viewers, making Prior’s forecast of a public with a
steadily increasing political knowledge gap ever more prophetic.
To examine the effects of dramatic entertainment media in the contemporary media
environment, I begin by exploring the findings from two focus groups to assess the internal
process of narrative persuasion and its effect on intergroup bias (Chapter 4). These findings
inform the design and analysis of two experiments I conduct to investigate the impact of
mediated intergroup contact, accumulative effects, and binge watching on sociopolitical attitudes
related to counterterrorism policies and perceptions of Muslims. The first study (Chapter 5)
surveys the broader effects of dramatic entertainment media consumption—via cultivation
theory—on political attitudes and social perceptions. The second study, a seven-week laboratory
experiment (Chapter 6) scrutinizes the more specific effects of dramatic shows depicting
outgroup members on individual attitudes and perceptions over time. This experiment features
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random-assignment of participants to four groups with two conditions: Watching one of two
treatment shows and watching episodes weekly vs. binge watching.
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the combined efforts of these studies and
offers recommendations for continued research. This manuscript presents a very small step in
understanding the importance of consumption method and time spent engaging with dramatic,
entertainment media. It is but the first piece of a rapidly expanding puzzle that is media
consumption in contemporary society. However, it is an incredibly important piece of that puzzle
and could serve to unlock a multitude of research pathways moving forward.
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2

Reviewing the Interdisciplinary Literature

Markus Prior (2005) made an astute observation in the early years of the massive changes
in technological advancement in the 21st century: As media choice grows, interest in—and,
therefore, knowledge of—political information wanes. Although his own initial study offered
marginal results, his overall premise may prove frighteningly true, albeit due to a slightly
different causal mechanism. Rather than simply more channels distracting Americans from
watching the news, the growing choice in types of media and in means of consuming said media
make it less likely for Americans either to seek out political information from reputable news
sources or to absorb political information from news and non-news sources alike. This
manuscript focuses on how dramatic, fictional media affects political attitudes, which
contemporary changes in media consumption patterns may alter most.
When I note that the types of media and means of media consumption have changed, I
refer to the fact that Americans—really, most of the world—can now access news and non-news
media through many formats on multiple devices. Nielsen’s (2019) Total Audience Report for
2018 notes that U.S. adults have maintained an average of ten-and-a-half hours of media usage
per day for several years. Around 40 percent of that usage is spent watching live and time-shifted
television (Nielsen 2019). However, an additional 34 percent is spent engaging with media on
tablets, smartphones, and other internet-connected devices through streaming services and
applications. In fact, in the past year, time spent watching live television has decreased while
engaging with internet-connected devices and smartphones has increased to seven and 14
percent, respectively (Nielsen 2019).
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2.1

Why Does Media Matter?
As a mediator of information, news media can have strong effects on audiences by

highlighting some pieces of information while ignoring others, and by framing that information
in a certain way (see Iyengar and Kinder 2010). The introduction of Fox News Channel, for
instance, increased voter turnout and raised Republicans’ share of the vote in towns across
America at the end of the twentieth century (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). In another example,
news media’s use of abstract frames and unfavorable language to discuss U.S.-Mexico
immigration encourages unfavorable attitudes toward Latinos (Mastro, et al. 2014). As Iyengar
and Kinder (2010) put it, the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people
what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (2). These
agenda-setting and framing effects influence the political attitudes and perceptions of social
norms of their audience members. Yet, we live in a world where traditional hard news media are
not the only purveyors of information.
Strömbäck, Falasca, and Kruikemeier (2017) explain how using mixed media to shape
one’s news repertoire influences political participation. This is similar to Prior’s (2007)
description of the differences between “news junkies” and the rest of the populace. And both
theories are reflected in Djerf-Pierre and Shehata’s (2017) evidence that high-choice media
environments have decreased the ability of news media to influence the political agenda in
Sweden. However, this does not render news media’s influence entirely impotent. Far from
Bennett and Iyengar’s (2008) prediction that the stratification and fragmentation of the American
public through selective exposure in a newly high-choice media environment would lead to a
“new era of minimal effects,” we see instead an active, polarized public (Prior 2013). Mass
media remains influential at the societal and individual levels (see Shehata and Strömbäck 2013).
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Prior pointed out early on that consumers would decrease the number of news programs
they watched on television as the number of entertainment media options increased. However, he
had no way of knowing just how many forms of non-traditional news and entertainment media
options there would be. Nor did he recognize the impact of these media formats on Americans’
political knowledge and attitudes. Non-traditional, soft news programs like daytime and latenight talk shows can encourage voter turnout and consistency (Baum 2004; Baum and Jamison
2006), increase political knowledge (Baumgartner and Morris 2006), and influence voters’
opinions of candidates (Baumgartner, et al. 2012). Primetime fictional shows can affect viewers’
political and sociopolical attitudes (Hether, et al. 2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Quick 2009; Quick, et
al. 2013) and even inspire political activism (Kearns and Young 2017).
Why examine dramatic, fictional media? Though political science has largely focused on
news in its media research, other social science fields have found that dramatic, fictional media
shows an impressive ability to persuade audiences (see Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018;
Moyer-Gusé 2008b; Moyer-Gusé 2015). Similar to news media, dramatic narratives use priming
and framing to impact audiences (e.g. Holbrook and Hill 2005; Mulligan and Habel 2011). In
contrast to news media, dramatic narratives display increased evidence of diminished
counterarguing in viewers (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). I use the term dramatic media effects
throughout this manuscript to refer to media effects present in audiovisual programming that is
viewed primarily for entertainment and classified within the drama genre. Although the term
could apply more broadly, I choose to limit this term as a subclassification of entertainment
media effects, which include all media accessed for the purpose of entertainment. The literature
includes both terms when addressing the attitudinal effects of dramatic films and shows, the key
concept in my theory. More regularly, however, neither are used, as many authors opt instead to
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speak around this concept instead of giving it a term. I choose to utilize the term to simplify its
discussion. As such, I am condensing “entertainment media effects present in dramatic
audiovisual programming” to “dramatic media effects,” and provide context throughout
explaining to which dramatic media I am referring. I find it imperative to separate first news
from non-news media, and then to narrow non-news media into the subcategory entertainment
media. While all media can affect attitudes, political science offers news media studies with
greater depth and breadth than non-news media, giving even less attention to entertainment
media. Considering individuals are far more likely to select a news program when looking for
political information, this not only makes sense, but it also means entertainment media effects on
political attitudes are more likely to be altered by these changes in media consumption patterns.
Television viewing comprises the bulk (40 percent) of media consumption (Neilsen
2019), news audiences have long been declining (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2017), and evidence
indicates that dramatic shows are particularly adept at persuasion (see Hamby, et al. 2018).
Because of this, my dissertation focuses on the media effects present in dramatic, fictional
audiovisual programming, which I refer to as dramatic media effects or entertainment media
effects in dramatic narratives. This situates the term within the political science literature on
media effects while making clear connections to the study of narrative persuasion in
communication and social psychology. This review of the interdisciplinary literature delves into
the known effects of dramatic, fictional media consumption on political attitudes and political
knowledge, and it exposes the need for deeper exploration of the role consumption patterns play.
In particular, this chapter provides key background information from the political science,
communication, and social psychology fields exhibiting important persuasive effects present in
dramatic, fictional shows and films that may be lost when binge watched.
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2.2

Dramatic Media Effects
Much like news media effects, entertainment media effects present in the dramatic

narratives within films and shows impact viewers by exposing them to specific topics in a
specific context, thereby making the information accessible (agenda-setting and priming) and
then providing a way to apply that information in a real-world context (framing). Whereas the
news media does this through compelling fact-based stories, dramatic film and shows provide
fictional narratives that viewers may relate to situations in their own lives. Both affect viewers
through three basic models: Agenda-setting, which describes how when media highlight certain a
topic, the topic becomes a primary talking point in the public arena; priming, which refers to
when the media highlights a certain topic, it can become the standard the public uses to evaluate
a political actor or group; and framing, which explains how the context provided by media when
discussing a certain topic can shape viewers’ opinions on that topic (see Iyengar and Kinder
2010; Scheufele 2000; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). These models are examined in depth in
the news media effects literature (see Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), but have also begun to be
studied in non-news media content like satirical or humorous political content, various
entertainment media like video games and music, and dramatic narratives present in films and
television.
2.2.1

News Media Effects

In their updated edition of News That Matters, Iyengar and Kinder (2010) look back over
more than two decades of advancements in political communication since their ground-breaking
1987 book of the same title, and they affirm that “agenda-setting, priming, and framing seem to
be thriving” (135). These primary concepts used to describe media effects models can be
categorized in terms of how individuals process the mediated information provided and how they
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store it in their memory (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). This section on news media effects
looks at the first piece of the puzzle: How individuals process mediated information—or,
information previously sorted through, repackaged, and delivered by the news media to the
public. The second piece of this assertion will be discussed at greater length in the section on
attitude change, which covers how new information is compared with previously held beliefs
before being stored in one’s memory.
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), in an introduction to a special issue of the Journal of
Communication, examine agenda-setting, priming, and framing as belonging to models of either
accessibility or applicability, which provides a deeper understanding of how the processes these
models portray actually work in an individual’s mind. Although scholars in political science,
communication, and psychology may use these terms differently, there is general agreement that
the underlying mechanisms of media effects are accessibility and applicability (Druckman and
Bolsen 2011; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Because this manuscript builds upon models
situated in the communication literature, I will be using definitions for these terms provided by
communication scholars as well as political science scholars. Where these two fields differ, I will
explain to the best of my ability their differences as well as my decisions to prefer one context to
another.
2.2.1.1 Accessibility: Agenda Setting and Priming
Accessibility models assume memory-based information processing, meaning that people
will express opinions based on what they can remember about the topic at a given point in time
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Iyengar and Kinder (2010) consider that “a person’s judgment
depends in part on what comes to mind—on considerations that are, for whatever reason and
however briefly, accessible” and that “what information is accessible… and what is not is a
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matter of circumstance” (65). In other words, whatever information is cognitively accessible to
an individual in a given moment will have greatest priority when they express an opinion (Zaller
1992). Television news makes such information accessible through frequent coverage and
context. Because of this, television news can play an important part in what happens to be
circumstantially on a citizen’s mind (Iyengar and Kinder 2010). News media affects this
circumstantial information through setting the agenda and priming (i.e. Cappella and Jamieson
1997; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Pfau, et al. 2001; Scheufele and
Tewksbury 2007).
Agenda-setting, put simply, explores how “the content that we are most exposed to
shapes our view about the world around us (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018, 58). More specifically, it
is “the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on
certain issues… and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences” (Scheufele and
Tewksbury 2007, 11). Agenda setting is grounded in memory-based models of information
processing, like that of Zaller’s (1992) RAS model. The RAS (Receive-Accept-Sample) model
asserts that people will receive new information, accept or reject it based on whether it complies
with their predispositions, and then provide an opinion on a given topic based on information at
the “top-of-the-head” that they can readily sample from their memory at the given moment. Like
Zaller’s RAS model, agenda-setting influences the information an individual will recall from
memory by first bringing up the topic and second continuing to address it. By focusing on a
certain topic and continuing to address it, media makes it easier for the individual to recall more
information about some topics than others (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).
What we are exposed to through the media, much like exposure through experience,
affects what we believe about the world. For example, the more news media covers crime stories,
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the more likely audiences are to believe crime is on the rise in America (Alitavoli and Kaveh
2018). While other factors do influence individual opinion (i.e. personal life circumstances,
where the story is placed in the news hour, and how detailed or vivid the story is), the stories that
news media choose to focus on versus those they choose to ignore influence what the American
public believes is most important on the political agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 2010).
Priming, while similar to agenda setting in its capacity to affect the focus of audience
attention, is discussed in the field of communication as pertaining specifically to the standards by
which individuals may evaluate a political actor or group. Political scientists Iyengar and Kinder
(2010) reflect this perspective when they define priming as referring to “changes in the standards
that people use to make political evaluations” (63). They note that the topics on which television
news choose to focus influence the standards individuals will use when judging governments,
presidents, public policies, and political candidates (63).
The media, therefore, may set the agenda by continually discussing certain topics over
others. In doing so, they may also prime audiences to judge political players based on how well
they believe those players are handling that topic. To continue using the crime example, media
may set the public agenda through continually reporting on crime—either locally or nationally.
Alitavoli and Kaveh (2018) presume that the media’s focus on crime stories has influenced
Americans into believing that crime in the country has increased when in fact crime rates have
decreased. However, when an issue—in this example, crime—becomes the most frequently
mentioned problem area in the news, audiences are then primed to “incorporate what they know
about that problem into their overall judgment of the president” or other political entity (Iyengar
and Kinder 2010, 65).
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In a natural experiment studying the difference in voter turnout and choice between
presidential elections in 1996 and 2000, when the Fox News Channel became available in 20
percent of the U.S., DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) found that “Fox News exposure induced a
generalized ideological shift, as opposed to a candidate-specific effect” (1217). Their study
compared changes in voting patterns between districts who did not have access to the Fox News
Channel and those that did. They saw significant shifts in favor of the Republican Party in
districts who had received access to Fox News. They used recall rates of media viewing to
provide evidence that their results depict not only more previously Republican voters coming out
to vote but also persuasion in three to eight percent of the Fox News audience, shifting from
previous voting patterns toward the Republican Party (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007, 1223).
These results would appear to show both agenda setting, in that more voters went to the polls
following their exposure to Fox News Channel, and priming, in that what they saw on Fox News
led them to evaluate candidates in a way that favored Republicans.
Exposure alone cannot account for these shifts, however, nor for a willingness in some
voters to change party preference. Miller (2007) asserts that in order to set the agenda,
individuals also must be paying attention to the content of news stories, and “to the extent that
the content arouses negative emotions, national importance judgments follow” (689). Miller
points to what she calls importance judgments as a key factor in whether individuals give
importance to a topic. These judgments come from whether an issue is given importance by a
politician in the story or the journalist relating the story, a cue to audience members as to
whether the issue is worth their attention (Miller 2007). Iyengar and Kinder (2010) similarly
point to placement of the story as a key factor in garnering audience members’ attention,
claiming that placement is a cue for how important editors believe a story to be. Emotion
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(Bartsch, et al. 2014; Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Miller 2007) and personal circumstance
linking an issue to one’s own situation (Iyengar and Kinder 2010) play arguably the largest roles
in whether a story will set the agenda or prime its audience. In the epilogue added to their
updated edition of News That Matters, Iyengar and Kinder (2010) admit that “Priming effects are
augmented when television news coverage frames problems in such a way as to imply that an
official or institution is responsible either for causing a problem or for failing to solve it” (135).
2.2.1.2 Applicability: Framing
Once news media have made a topic accessible to the public, they may also affect how
individuals apply this new information. By providing a specific context, or frame, they make
certain aspects of the topic or pertaining to the topic more salient. Framing “is based on the
assumption that how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is
understood by audiences” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). Framing is applied in media by
using existing schemas to portray complex ideas, and is used by individuals to break down
information to form an impression of the complex topic (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). In
other words, at the macrolevel the way journalists characterize an issue influences their
audience’s understanding of it. At the microlevel, framing occurs when individuals consider
various aspects of an issue, giving more weight to a particular aspect, before expressing an
opinion.
Chong and Druckman (2007a) state that framing effects occur “when (often small)
changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of
opinion” (104). It is not necessarily that media induces a change in its audience members’
values, but that framing affects the weight, or priority, they may give to different aspects of an
issue (Chong and Druckman 2007b). The way an issue is framed may evoke certain
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considerations. Chong and Druckman (2007a) give the example associated with Nelson,
Clawson, and Oxley’s (1997) study in which participants are asked about whether a hate group
should be allowed to hold a political rally. In the study, 85 percent of respondents said yes when
the question was associated with free speech, but only 45 percent said yes when the question was
associated with public safety. Depending upon which frame the question is set within—free
speech versus public safety—respondents answer with that frame in mind (Nelson, et al. 1997).
To put it very simply, agenda setting effects demonstrate the media’s ability to shape
what we think about, but framing effects model the media’s ability to shape how we think about
something. Priming has been linked by communication scholars more closely with agendasetting (see Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), while it is often conflated with framing by political
scientists (see Chong and Druckman 2007a). When first used in political science, however,
priming was linked to agenda setting in that both affect issue accessibility (Iyengar and Kinder
2010). Because of this, and because the study of dramatic media effects occurs largely within the
communication field up to this point, I also link priming more closely with agenda setting while
keeping the terms distinct. To put it very simply, then, priming effects exhibit the media’s ability
to shape what we use to evaluate our political leaders and groups.
2.2.2

Moving Beyond Traditional News Media

Considering the current hyperpolarized American political climate (Iyengar and
Westwood 2015; Levendusky 2013; Prior 2013), and the ambivalence of young voters in the
Millennial generation (Maniam and Smith 2017), addressing media effects in entertainment,
particularly dramatic television, could represent an important step in understanding how media
on the whole affects change in individual political attitudes. Traditional news media are not the
only means by which Americans receive political frames. Between 2013 and 2017, the average
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American aged 15 and older watched 2 hours and 46 minutes of television per day, making up
more than half of time spent on leisure activities(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Yet, Prior
(Prior 2005) notes that the upsurge in media choices has pushed many Americans to opt out of
news entirely, especially with regard to political news.
Baum and colleagues argue that political content does not only come in the form of
traditional news media, however, but also in what he terms soft news (Baum 2004; Baum and
Jamison 2006). Soft news media refers to talk shows like Oprah and infotainment like The Daily
Show that bring political information into the public eye through avenues that either are not
usually political (e.g. Oprah) or are satirical (e.g. The Daily Show). However, even non-news
media is increasingly important for understanding political attitude formation and change.
2.2.3

Entertainment Media Effects

Similar to news media effects, entertainment media primes its audiences using non-verbal
cues and frames complex topics through dialogue and narrative. Unlike news media, however,
consumers turn to entertainment media for very different motivations and with very different
expectations. Where news is expected to provide real-world information, entertainment is
expected to offer an escape, a thrill, a shift in mood, or food for thought. This does not, however,
mean that entertainment avoids affecting its audience. Quite the opposite, in fact. Many
narratives are written and produced specifically to be though-provoking and/or to critique
societal and political norms (e.g. George Orwell’s 1984 or Jordan Peele’s Get Out). Yet, research
indicates that even media produced solely for entertainment purposes may still affect social and
political attitudes.
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2.2.3.1 Priming Effects in Entertainment Media
Taber and Lodge (2016) see priming as the “key mechanism” to activate the deliberation
process that informs our conscious and unconscious choices. Primes are the spark for the
considerations the audience thinks about during engagement with a piece of media. Primes can
influence generalized feelings toward the government (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Holbert
and al 2007) or a particular office or administration (Holbert 2003; Holbert, et al. 2005)They can
also influence more specific concerns about public policy (Holbrook and Hill 2005; Pfau, et al.
2001).This is evident across several forms of entertainment (and dramatic) media with regard to
influencing political attitudes in myriad ways.
For instance, The Daily Show is a satirical soft news show with a cynical outlook on the
government, its policies, and the traditional news media that covers it. Baumgartner and Morris
(2006) executed an experiment which asked participants to watch a news clip of the 2004
presidential campaign, either from the traditional hard news source, CBS Evening News, or the
soft news source, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. They found that although the coverage was
edited to be very similar in time and content, the group who watched The Daily Show had a
significantly higher likelihood of cynicism toward the electoral system (Baumgartner and Morris
2006). Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001) saw similar correlations between watching various
television genres and perceptions of the federal government. For example, they saw a consistent
negative correlation between individuals who watched science fiction shows, like the conspiracyfilled show The X-Files, and confidence in different arms of the federal government.
The dramatic fictional show The West Wing, which ran for seven seasons in the early
2000s and depicted the lives of key figures in the Bartlet1 presidential administration, inspired

1

Josiah Bartlet is a fictional character on the show The West Wing played by Martin Sheen. During the seven-year
run of the show, Bartlett is elected to the American presidency and serves two terms as president. Other key offices
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quite different effects on viewers who watched a single episode (Holbert 2003). Holbert et al.
(2003) asked participants to take a pretest questionnaire the morning of the original airing of an
episode before attending the viewing treatment that evening. Directly after watching the episode,
participants completed a posttest questionnaire designed to compare responses to their pretest
questionnaire regarding their thoughts on character traits of the fictional president, the real-life
sitting President George W. Bush, and former President Bill Clinton. The authors found that the
positive images of fictional President Bartlet primed audience members to view the real-life
presidents more positively. However, these effects were not only related to political leaders.
Scholars have also noted the impact of these types of shows on increasing trust and positive
perceptions of health professionals. For instance, repeated viewing of medical dramas correlates
with more positive perceptions of medical personnel in real life (Quick 2009). However, as
Holbert et al. (2003) point out, the priming effect observed toward characters only relates to
personality traits and not to actual policy.
Slater, Rouner, and Long’s (2006) study of two dramas gives mixed evidence for priming
effects on policy attitudes. The experiment involved participants watching either one episode of
the crime drama Law and Order or the short feature film If These Walls Could Talk II, which
primed its audience to consider the death penalty or same-sex marriage, respectively. The
authors saw an increase in support for the death penalty among participants who watched Law
and Order relative to those who watched If These Walls Could Talk. However, the results were
more nuanced regarding views on same-sex marriage, where ideology was a stronger indicator
than if the participant watched If These Walls Could Talk. The authors submit that suppression of
ideology could be key in producing a persuasive effect. The results themselves do not discount

portrayed are that of the White House chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, press secretary, communications directors
and speechwriters, national security advisors, aides, etc.
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the priming effects of both dramas, but rather support the theories of attitude change as a
complex process with various pathways of persuasion (see Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Hamby,
et al. 2017; ; Slothuus 2008; Milton Lodge 2013).
Chory-Assad (2004) explains that verbal aggression depicted on a show can influence
aggressiveness in members of the audience, similar to the study of Rwandans emulating the
political discourse they heard on the radio program (Paluck and Green 2009). This prime serves
as an activation of aggressive thoughts, but does not necessarily result in aggressive behaviors.
Holbrook and Hill (2005) see a comparable priming effect in their examination of exposure to
the crime drama Law & Order. They find that being exposed to a single episode alters
participants’ opinions on crime in America, believing it is more prevalent than do participants
who were not exposed to the show.
2.2.3.2 Framing Effects in Entertainment Media
As previously discussed, framing effects are similar to priming in that both shape how we
think about a topic at the individual level. A key example of framing effects in dramatic
narratives on political attitudes is Mulligan and Habel’s (2011) experiment on frames in the film
Cider House Rules. In the experiment, participants were asked to watch the film Cider House
Rules, which depicts several points in a man’s life where he takes firm stances regarding
abortion. As a boy, an aspiring physician is taught that life is sacred, and upon learning that his
mentor performs illegal abortions to ensure the safety of the mothers, he is appalled and vows to
never perform an abortion under any circumstance. However, as a young adult he is faced with
the difficult situation of a young woman who becomes pregnant after repeated incestuous
encounters with her father. After much deliberation, he decides that this is an extenuating
circumstance and performs the abortion himself. The authors refer to this explicit message as the
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abortion frame. Throughout the film, there is also what they call the morality frame, which is a
more implicit message about needing to follow one’s own conscience in making day-to-day
moral decisions—moral relativism as opposed to moral absolutism. Mulligan and Habel (2011)
find that views in favor of legalized abortion were 17 percent higher in the treatment group over
the control group. Views in favor of moral relativism were 11 percent higher in the treatment
group over the control group. In all, both frames showed a significant impact on the audience.
This is especially noteworthy because abortion is a deeply entrenched political issue and one that
is not easily swayed.
Although framing effects in dramatic narratives have not been extensively examined in
political science, the Mulligan and Habel (2011) study provides clear evidence that framing
effects in dramatic narratives are important to the study of political attitudes. Furthermore, the
Slater, Rouner, and Long (2006) study demonstrates the importance of understanding why
certain frames and primes are more influential than others. Mechanisms discussed in the
psychology and communications literatures could be used to examine why, for example, the
abortion frame in Cider House Rules was more effective than the same-sex relationship prime in
If These Walls Could Talk.
2.2.4

Dramatic Media Effects: TV and Film

This dissertation manuscript looks more specifically at the role of media effects in
dramatic narratives, using episodic shows as the primary context to examine the factor of time.
Up to this point, television shows—I prefer the term episodic shows as many are watched online
through streaming platforms rather than on a television set—are discussed in the literatures in
their capacity to have immediate effects on attitudes toward America’s most important problem
(typically crime: e.g. Holbrook and Hill 2005), perceptions of political roles (Holbert 2003;
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Holbert, et al. 2005), or specific policy issues (Kearns and Young 2017; Mulligan and Habel
2011; Quick, et al. 2013; Slater, et al. 2006). They examine the potential for attitude shifts in
individuals who have been exposed to messaging through dramatic shows and films.
Dramatic media effects make up a large part of communication’s study of how
entertainment affects attitudes because dramas are more likely to induce this change than other
forms of entertainment, and possibly even news media. To fully examine this assertion, this
literature review continues on to briefly address the attitude change literature in political science
and the entertainment-education literature on decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion in
communication.
2.3

Attitude Change
This manuscript centers on the idea that dramatic narratives can influence audience

members to change their attitudes toward a topic or object. First, however, it is important to relay
the definitions and developments involved in this process as they are discussed in both the
political science and communications literatures regarding attitude formation and attitude
change. As with many concepts in this dissertation, the two fields are very similar in their study
of attitudes and attitude change, but they are not identical and, at times, use different terminology
for akin concepts.
While the study of attitudes goes back much further, I will begin this discussion in the
field of psychology with Martin Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action, which political science
built upon in more recent decades. Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action, expanded from
expectancy value theory (EVT), avers that attitudes are a factorial function of an individual’s
beliefs and values; or, as Palmgreen (1985) explains, they are the result of an individual
weighing their expectations that a given object or behavior will provide a certain result against
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their positive or negative affective evaluations of those results. Fishbein and Azjen (1972) build
upon the EVT to assert that it is not simply a matter of evaluations, but of behavioral intentions
toward potential action. This theory of reasoned action (TRA) states that an individual’s
intention to execute a certain behavior is comprised of both their own attitude about that
behavior and their perception of social norms regarding the behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 2008).
The intention is further determined by the weight, or significance, the individual assigns to
each—attitude vs. norm.
In political science, Chong and Druckman (2007b) build on the EVT assertion to say that
an attitude is the sum of all considerations regarding the topic times the weight the individual
gives to each consideration. Much like Fishbein’s TRA, the authors claim that the weight, or
significance, given to a specific consideration is a key factor in the opinion that will be
expressed. Attitudes, which I will use interchangeably with opinions, are therefore a collection of
EVT’s considerations (expectations considered with affective evaluations/predispositions) times
the weight that the individual gives to each of these considerations available at the “top of the
head” (see: R-A-S Model, Zaller 1992) based on the present information externally provided.
Combined, these theories could be depicted as the following attitude formula:2
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = Σ(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
where weight is
𝑓(𝑛) = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
More plainly stated, an attitude is a function of the collection of previously held values
and beliefs on a subject added to the current information being considered and how important

2

This formula is a combination of the aforementioned theories on attitude formation, but its key basis comes from
Chong and Druckman’s (2007b) preference formation model (𝑨 = Ʃ𝒗𝒊 𝒘𝒊 ) with the factor of weight (𝒘) broken
down to reflect Zaller’s (1992) explanation of attitudes as a combination of information and predisposition.
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each consideration is to the individual at the moment they are providing the attitude. Political
attitudes, then, are attitudes that relate to the role of government and other political topics,
objects, and actors.
2.3.1

Attitude Formation

Zaller (1992) states that opinions are “a marriage of information and predisposition” (6).
Each attitude or opinion presented by an individual is the result of combining the incoming
information that the individual has been given with their predisposition toward the topic at hand.
Zaller’s work maintains that opinions are given based on information available at the “top of the
head” at the time of producing the opinion. Attitudes, then, are not stable tenets that individuals
carry with them from conversation to conversation, but are instead nuances of stable values and
are subject to change based on the current conversation.
The formation of an attitude, political or otherwise, is “the initial change from having no
attitude toward a given object to having some attitude toward it, either positive or negative”
(Oskamp and Schultz 2005, 161). Theories on political attitude formation center on the idea that
political socialization begins in the years of childhood and is primarily absorbed through
exposure to the attitudes of close family members (Oskamp and Schultz 2005). This exposure
and acceptance of new attitudes extends to political values, party identification, and interest in
politics in general. Beyond the family unit, schools offer additional exposure to new political
attitudes, as do a child’s peers and community. In the formation stage of political socialization, it
is these first instances of exposure that may result in initial political attitudes. However, exposure
to political attitudes that differ from those already held cannot result in attitude formation, as an
initial attitude has already been formed.
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2.3.2

Attitude Change

Attitude change, on the other hand, requires first that an individual holds an existing
attitude toward the given object, and second that something occurs which causes the attitude to
become a different one. Druckman and McGrath (2019) state that there are three potential
reactions to receiving new information: “no effect (that is, no movement of belief),
persuasion/learning that involves updating in the direction of the information… or a back-lash
effect, where belief moves in the direction opposite to the new information” (111). This
resembles Zaller’s (1992) RAS model in that Zaller posits that new information will be accepted
(persuasion) or rejected (no effect), but adds the additional layer of the potential for a “back-lash
effect. This stipulates that the recipient not only rejects the new information but also updates his
current belief to be stronger/closer to the previous information. Bonnette (2015) extends Zaller’s
model to entertainment media, specifically music. She notes that incoming information via lyrics
may either bolster a previous attitude when the new information concurs or invoke Zaller’s
accept-or-reject step to attitude change, wherein the listener may choose to override their prior
beliefs by accepting the new or to reject the new information in favor of prior beliefs.
As Oskamp and Schultz (2005) explain, the processes of attitude formation and attitude
change are often discussed synonymously, and indeed the processes can be similar. However, the
literature on attitude change includes methods and theories quite distinct from attitude formation.
Theories of attitude change include consistency theories, dissonance theory, and reactance
theory. Consistency theories are cognitive-based and center on the presumption that people try to
maintain consistent attitudes. New, inconsistent attitudes are likely to be met with skepticism and
criticism because attitude inconsistencies tend to make individuals feel uncomfortable (Oskamp
and Schultz 2005) This is not to say that individuals only hold congruent attitudes. Converse
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(1964) explores the erratic nature of belief systems in the American public, asserting that most
Americans hold logically inconsistent attitudes within their political ideology. Whereas the
highly politically sophisticated hold belief systems largely unidimensional along the traditional
left-right spectrum, mass attitudes tend to be more complex and less constrained by liberal and
conservative ideologies (Lupton, et al. 2014).
Cognitive dissonance theory, first proposed by Leon Festinger in 1957, states that when
individuals hold two or more differing—dissonant—thoughts about a given object, they will feel
discomfort; however, CDT does not imply that individuals will always revert back to initial
attitudes. Instead, they will “resolve this state by altering their cognitions”—either compromising
or changing their initial attitudes (Hinojosa, et al. 2016, 171). Individuals may also resolve this
state by complying with new cues from party elites (Converse 1964) or softening under influence
from their social network (Lupton, et al. 2015). Reactance theory, on the other hand, insists that
when cognitive dissonance arises from multiple contradictory explicit attitudes, it will only
bolster the individual’s initial attitude. Psychological reactance theory was initially developed to
explain why individuals are attracted to those things that are “forbidden” to them (Van Petegem,
et al. 2015). However, reactance theory has since been used to examine why individuals resist
outside pressure toward attitude change, even in cases where the new information may be highly
beneficial (Andersen, et al. 2017; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011; Taber
and Lodge 2016).3
In political science, reactance is discussed instead within the context of motivated
reasoning. Taber and Lodge (2016) discuss motivated reasoning as the process underlying

3

Reactance theory later fed into self-determination theory, which claims that individuals push back against new
information out of a need for autonomy (Van Petegem, et al. 2015). However, the studies foundational to my theory
reference reactance and not SDT, so I chose to omit it from this paper.
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confirmation and disconfirmation biases. When processing new information, individuals may be
influenced not only by their previous attitudes and opinions related to the information, but also
their attitudes and opinions about where the information is coming from. Taber and Lodge
(2006) note that individuals form opinions about new information—whether as part of attitude
formation or attitude change—with either a directional or an accuracy goal. Motivated reasoning
involves a directional goal, in that individuals perceive the new information through a lens that
pushes them toward a specific direction, like aligning with their favored party; whereas an
accuracy goal involves individuals seeking to find the “right” answer (Bolsen, et al. 2013;
Druckman and Bolsen 2011).
Further, Taber and Lodge (2006) see rational skepticism as being different from
motivated reasoning, questioning the tipping point between skepticism and irrational bias. It is
this irrational bias, as motivated by political partisanship, which has most captivated political
scientists. Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014) explain that partisan motivated reasoning
happens when “individuals interpret information through the lens of their party commitment”
(235). A democrat may not trust new information when it is relayed by a member of the
Republican Party, or a republican may not trust new information when it is heavily associated
with the Democratic Party. As is noted in studies of reactance, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook
(2014) find that overt cross-partisan endorsement of a particular policy leads individuals to
disagree with the policy. Their solution was to trigger an accuracy motivation to cancel out the
directional goal, and their results led them to acknowledge that “the motivation driving opinion
formation clearly matters and this has been a topic lacking in study” (Bolsen, et al. 2013, 252).
The topic is not lacking in study in other social sciences, however. Entertainmenteducation studies have shown success in reducing reactance through dramatic narrative (e.g.
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Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010; 2011), for
example, found that teens who watched a video portraying a dramatic narrative that included
negative consequences for the protagonist’s risky sexual behavior were more likely to express
intent toward safe sex practices than those who watched an informational video on the
consequences of risky sexual behavior. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012) show evidence that
individual who viewed a dramatic television program with implicit messages to discourage
drinking and driving did not express reactance to these messages. Furthermore, the authors note
reactance remained diminished even after the explicit appeal made in a PSA following the
program. It is this potential for reducing reactance, thereby potentially reducing directional
motivated reasoning, that makes dramatic narratives a key conduit to consider when studying
media effects on political attitudes.
2.4

Narrative Persuasion
Dramatic narratives in films and shows can play a pivotal role in influencing political

attitude change through the weight factor of the attitude formula. Chong and Druckman (2007a)
make the case that framing effects change the weight of this formula by placing a specific frame
around the communication, thereby making certain associated thoughts more important in that
given moment. Dramatic narratives, like news media, frames the messages it contains (Bahk
2009; Bartsch, et al. 2014; Mulligan and Habel 2011). Through frames and the use of narrative
techniques that decrease reactance, dramatic narratives can affect attitudes through narrative
persuasion.
One of the primary reasons for examining dramatic narratives for their persuasive effects
is that explicit persuasive messages—like those discussed by Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2011) in
educational videos—can elicit reactance and promote motivated reasoning in viewers. The

32
advantage of dramatic narratives regarding persuasion is the difference in how individuals
engage with the media and process the messages therein. Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard’s (2018)
thorough examination of narrative persuasion explains the framework through which attitude
change is possible. They use the psychology and communication literatures to build a model of
the narrative persuasion process. Within this process, two deictic shifts occur: One of the viewer
placing himself into the story via absorption (strongly related to the concepts of transportation,
narrative engagement/parasocial interaction, and identification) and one of the viewer removing
himself from the story to reflect upon it within his own life (which is enhanced by the perceived
realism of the narrative). Much like news viewers need to be able to relate a campaign speech to
issues they care about in order to be moved by the speech (Iyengar and Kinder 2010), it is the act
of reflection that allows narrative persuasion to induce attitude change (Hamby, et al. 2018).
A deictic shift occurs when “readers shift their deictic center from themselves to a locus
in the narrative in order to comprehend and be absorbed by the story” (Hamby, et al. 2018); a
deictic center is a reference point for understanding context, “typically the present time, location,
participant role, and so forth of the speaker” (SIL International 2005). An individual’s primary
deictic center, or deixis, is herself at the exact location and moment in time she is currently
experiencing. Shifting her deictic center into a narrative involves imagining herself as being a
particular character (identification) or being in the time and place where the story is set
(transportation). In American colloquial terms, this is sometimes called “putting yourself in
someone else’s shoes.”
Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) suggest that the deictic shift into the story
(absorption) and then back into one’s own life while relating the two deictic centers (reflection)
is the key process for inciting persuasive outcomes. In their model absorption, or losing oneself
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in the narrative, is necessary for comprehension of the story and requires a “willing suspension
of disbelief” (3). This “uncritical approach,” they note, decreases the desire and ability to
“scrutinize messages in the narrative and to generate counterarguments” (Hamby, et al. 2018, 3).
In other words, people turn to entertainment as a means of escape or with the motivation of
feeling deeply (Oliver and Bartsch 2010; Oliver and Raney 2011), not with the desire to mentally
argue against explicit, or implicit, messages embedded in the narrative. Hamby, Brinberg, and
Jaccard (2018) aver that the first step, absorption, occurs via three potential mechanisms:
Transportation, identification, and narrative engagement. Although these terms are sometimes
used interchangeably and are represented by different terms in different fields and subfields, I
will maintain use of the word absorption to refer to the deictic shift of an individual into a
narrative.
For additional terms, I refer to Moyer-Gusé’s (2008b) definitions, as they relate
specifically to audio-visual narratives (movies, shows, etc.). She maintains Green and Brock’s
definition that transportation, or narrative involvement, refers to the “notion of being swept up
into the storyline” when an individual’s mental capacity is fully focused on the events within the
story (Moyer-Gusé 2008b, 409). Identification, on the other hand, is one form of involvement
with characters in the narrative. In a later study, Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) break down the
broader category of involvement with characters into identification (with a chosen character,
often the protagonist), wishful identification (with a preferred character), perceived similarity
(between himself and a certain character), and parasocial interaction (PSI, in which a viewer
feels as personally connected to a character as she might feel connected to a friend). In each
version of identification, the viewer’s deictic shift allows him to cognitively and emotionally
associate himself as a specific character in the narrative. He will perceive the storyline through
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what he imagines as the lens of that character (Bahk 2009; Hamby, et al. 2018; Lather and
Moyer-Guse 2011; Moyer-Gusé 2008a; 2008b; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2011; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi
2011).
The second deictic shift, back into one’s own life in the real world, ignites reflective
processes in the viewer’s mind. Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) are firm that absorption is
the starting point of the persuasion process; absorption alone—even long-term memory of a
story—does not inherently result in persuasion. Narrative reflection, the authors posit, is the
potential result of narrative processing, “drawing inferences from actors engaged in goals, and
then extrapolating to one’s life,” and finding meaning from those inferences in one’s own life
(Hamby, et al. 2018, 7). It is this intentional reflection, relating the messages of the narrative to
one’s own life, that creates space for persuasion (Bartsch, et al. 2014; Hamby, et al. 2017;
Hamby, et al. 2018; Oliver and Bartsch 2010).
This explanation of deictic shifts into the narrative (absorption) and back into reality
(reflection) is directly comparable to much of the work on narrative persuasion. For example,
Bartsch, Kalch, and Oliver (2014; see also Oliver and Bartsch 2010) note that the two processes
of absorption into a dramatic narrative and of reflection afterward are imperative to spark the
cognitive elaboration process and potentially elicit attitude change. Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010;
2011; see also Moyer-Gusé 2008a) use similar concepts within their updated Elaboration
Likelihood Model to show an extensive breakdown of how absorption into a narrative and
reflection after viewing can affect attitudes toward risky sexual behaviors in teens. Furthermore,
engaging in this process of absorption and reflection has been noted for its potential to affect
politically-relevant attitudes (Bahk 2010; Slater, et al. 2006) and may reduce stigma toward
marginalized groups (Igartua, et al. 2014; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019).
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2.5

Mediated Intergroup Contact
Mediated intergroup contact is discussed in two primary ways: As vicarious intergroup

contact in which the viewer observes an onscreen member of their ingroup interacting with an
outgroup member, or as mediated intergroup contact in which the viewer identifies with an
onscreen member of the outgroup through parasocial interaction/parasocial contact. This can be
an interaction based in reality or part of a fictional narrative. The interaction may be positive,
negative, or mixed. It also matters whether the onscreen outgroup member interacts with a
member of their own group, a majority group member, a member of the viewer’s ingroup, or a
member of a different outgroup. Sometimes the viewer is only able to reduce their prejudice
toward the outgroup character, considering them an exception, but other times the viewer is able
to expand that decreased prejudice to the entire real-world outgroup.
2.5.1

Building on Contact Theory

Social cognitive theory (SCT) claims that humans learn not only through personal
experience, but also through observation (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). This observation is not
confined to the immediate world of the observer, but extends to the world as portrayed through
media (Bandura 2001). In terms of diminishing intergroup bias or conflict, SCT would assert that
continued exposure to seeing ingroup and outgroup members engaging in positive contact and
relationships will shift their view toward accepting these interactions as the societal norm. It
would also posit that viewing these positive interactions will decrease prejudice toward the
outgroup member and allow the viewer to generalize their positive perception of the outgroup
member to the entire outgroup.
Intergroup contact theory, based on Allport’s contact hypothesis, instead suggests that
engaging with an outgroup member will be far more effective in diminishing prejudice than
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simply observing intergroup interactions. Early intergroup contact research indicates that
intergroup contact may reduce or exacerbate prejudice; however, Pettigrew et al (2011) instead
attribute the mixed results of early research to “[1] Their incomplete samples of relevant papers,
[2] their absence of strict inclusion rules, and [3] their non-quantitative assessments of contact
effects,” further noting that several studies used intergroup proximity, and not intergroup contact,
as their independent variable (274). More recent examinations of intergroup contact theory show
promising evidence that intergroup contact more regularly diminishes anxiety and prejudice
toward outgroup members than was previously believed, sometimes allowing positive beliefs
toward an outgroup member to be generalized to the entire outgroup (Pettigrew, et al. 2011).
Indirect intergroup contact—when you have an ingroup friend who has an outgroup
friend—can also serve to make this intergroup interaction more “normatively acceptable” (as
suggested by SCT), but does not show as strong effects as direct intergroup contact (Pettigrew et
al 2011). The authors suggest indirect intergroup contact may be an important step toward direct
intergroup contact. As such, indirect ntergroup contact mediated through dramatic narratives in
television and film could offer another such helpful stepping stone. Whereas direct intergroup
contact has been criticized in places of extreme intergroup contact as difficult and dangerous
(Pettigrew et al 2011), mediated intergroup contact is relatively safe and easy, especially given
the wide array of options and the entertainment industry’s growing desire to present more
inclusive material.
2.5.2

Facilitating Mediated Intergroup Contact

Two primary purposes of examining dramatic narrative as a means of influencing
sociopolitical attitudes are 1) understanding its ability to reduce resistance to embedded
messages and promote narrative persuasion and 2) understanding its ability to reduce anxiety and
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increase empathy toward an outgroup through mediated intergroup contact. In both cases,
identification plays a key role in fostering attitudinal change in the viewer. In the case of
narrative persuasion, parasocial interaction reduces reactance in the viewer, especially for
implicit messages, and cognitive-emotional identification reduces active counterarguing (MoyerGusé and Nabi 2010). In the case of mediated intergroup contact, identification with an outgroup
character—especially through empathy and perspective taking—increases empathy and
decreases anxiety toward the outgroup in the real-world.
Mediated intergroup contact refers to exposure to indirect intergroup contact through
media, often entertainment media and dramatic narratives. This mediated contact can occur
either as vicarious contact, in which the viewer identifies with an ingroup character who has an
onscreen interaction with an outgroup character, or as parasocial contact, in which the viewer
identifies with an onscreen member of the outgroup. Parasocial interaction can affect the viewer
both when based in reality—through a documentary or unscripted program—or as part of a
fictional narrative (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). Either way, identification seems to serve as the
primary mechanism in mediated intergroup contact for reducing anxiety and increasing empathy
toward the outgroup character—and toward the real-world outgroup (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019;
Ortiz and Harwood 2007).
Similar to Allport’s contact conditions, Ortiz and Harwood (2007) suggest that mediated
contact requires identification with a character in order to “vicariously participate” in the
interaction. However, the particular definition the authors provide for identification, “when
viewers perceive themselves as similar to a character and vicariously participate in the
character’s experiences,” may be more specifically termed perceived similarity and parasocial
interaction (Ortiz and Harwood 2007, 618). Although both are forms of identification, perceived
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similarity refers to the recognition of traits in a character that the viewer perceives as being
similar to themselves, and parasocial interaction (PSI) refers to the feeling of being a part of the
experience, as though the onscreen characters could be your friends (see Moyer-Gusé 2008).
This idea of “vicariously participat[ing] in the character’s experiences” could also be described
more simply as transportation, the feeling of being absorbed and mentally transported into the
scene. The authors further describe identification as occurring “when individuals view
themselves as the character within the program; adopt the character’s perspective; experience
and understand the character’s emotions; and understand how and why the character acts the way
he or she does” (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). Again, these can be labeled more specifically as
cognitive-emotional identification—viewing oneself as the character or experiencing and
understanding the character’s emotions—or empathy and perspective taking—adopting the
character’s perspective or understanding the character’s actions (see Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo
2005).
Ortiz and Harwood (2007) assert that mediated intergroup contact may serve as a step
toward real-world intergroup contact (see also Pettigrew et al 2011). Because it is not so severe
as to expect viewers to fully embrace the outgroup character’s views and emotions, as with
cognitive-emotional identification, or to see them as a friend, as with group identification or
parasocial interaction, empathy is likely easier to achieve with an outgroup character, especially
toward the beginning of viewing. As Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) point out, however,
empathy with an onscreen character may serve as a precursor to cognitive-emotional
identification. Relatedly, identification with the ingroup character who is experiencing intergroup
contact onscreen may be more important, especially at the beginning, for producing eventual
parasocial interaction (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz (2019) also find
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that identification through parasocial interaction and simply liking the outgroup character—in
their study, non-Muslim viewers liking an onscreen Muslim character—can evoke feelings of
guilt, which “can motivate an individual to develop more favorable attitudes and behaviors
toward the outgroup” (9).
2.5.2.1 Negative vs. Positive Mediated Intergroup Contact
In addition to identification, Ortiz and Harwood (2007) state the onscreen intergroup
interaction must be positive to serve as mediated contact, and the character must represent group
typicality, which they describe as meaning “the more the outgroup character is perceived as
representative of his or her group, the more likely exposure to positive intergroup contact will
translate into positive intergroup attitudes” (618). However, an extensive review of intergroup
contact studies suggests that both positive and negative intergroup contact may invoke positive
results (Pettigrew et al 2011). Furthermore, there are other factors that influence the impact of
negative intergroup contact. Voluntary intergroup contact that skews negative is not likely to
increase prejudice, and may even decrease prejudice; however, involuntary positive intergroup
contact, on the other hand, may not decrease prejudice (Pettigrew et al 2011).
As many other aspects of in-person intergroup contact seem highly relevant to mediated
intergroup contact, the nuances of contact type (positive or negative) and conditions (voluntary,
history, etc.) may impact mediated intergroup contact similarly. Given that entertainment media
consumption is largely voluntary, for example, even depictions of negative intergroup contact
may induce positive results such as decreasing anxiety of the outgroup (Ortiz and Harwood
2007). However, positive depictions of intergroup contact, and especially teamwork, serve most
strongly to reduce anxiety toward the outgroup (Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020). The results
discussed in Chapter 5 indicate that shows depicting the Muslim terrorist stereotype may not
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simply offer either a negative mediated intergroup experience or a positive one, but many shows
instead portray nuanced characters and intergroup relationships.
2.5.2.2 Decreasing Resistance to Narrative Persuasion
Several factors of narrative persuasion increase the likelihood of an embedded message in
entertainment media influencing audience members beyond the initial narrative exposure.
Although identification plays an essential role, absorption and reflection must still be
experienced by the viewer to produce real-world results (Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al.
2018). Absorption refers to an individual shifting their own deictic center—or point of
view/perspective—to that of the story, meaning they begin to experience the narrative from
within it. Reflection refers to the individual experiencing elaborative processing by relating
elements of the narrative to their own life once they have shifted their perspective—deictic
center—back into their own reality.
Identification occurs in tandem with absorption when an individual shifts their deictic
center into a story and also takes on the perspective of a specific character or understands a
character or characters in relation to themselves within the story. As described above, there are
multiple forms of identification, each of which increase the potential for narrative persuasion via
various mechanisms. Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) find evidence that cognitive-emotional
identification with or perceived similarity to an onscreen character can decrease feelings of
perceived vulnerability, which can diminish reflection in audience members. Cognitiveemotional identification, when the viewer takes on the emotions and perspective of the character,
showed an immediate decrease in viewers’ perceived vulnerability, while perceived similarity
showed a lagged effect (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). They also found evidence that parasocial
interaction, or feeling that one has a face-to-face relationship with a character, may decrease
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reactance to embedded messages, especially when the message is implicit rather than explicit
(Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010).
2.6

Benefits to Political Science Research
Perhaps one of the most significant factors that dramatic narratives in films and shows

lend to the study of political behavior is their potential to lessen or even bypass directional
motivated reasoning. Druckman and McGrath (2019) posit that information input versus prior
held beliefs is not a sufficient description of the preference formation process. The authors argue
credibility plays a key role in motivating individuals toward acceptance or rejection. It is not
simply that an individual weighs new and prior information objectively, but that the “strength of
an individual’s confidence in the new information relative to her strength of confidence in the
prior best guess determines both the extent to which belief moves in response to the new
information, and the strength of the confidence in that new belief” (Druckman and McGrath
2019, 112). Given three potential outcomes—no effect, persuasion, or backlash—confidence in
the validity of new information may be what makes new information more or less likely to shift
one’s prior beliefs.
Identification with a fictional character in a dramatic narrative—in the form of perceived
similarity to that character, of liking the character strongly, of wishful identification or wishing
to be like them, or of parasocial interaction (PSI), which allows audience members to relate to a
character similar to a real-life friend—has been shown to reduce reactance (Hamby, et al. 2018;
Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2011; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). Similarly, Andersen et al. (2017) find
that exposure to a news story with exemplars similar to the respondents “triggered an empathic
concern and increased political participation intentions,” while stories with dissimilar exemplars
“decreased empathic concern, which in turn decreased political participation intentions” (490).
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Communication scholars may label this type of identification as “perceived similarity,” and find
it to be a significant condition for decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion (Moyer-Gusé and
Nabi 2010; 2011).
Indeed, each of the directional motivated reasoning mechanisms discussed in political
science can be seen in patterns of resistance to explicit messages in dramatic narratives explained
by communication scholars in the entertainment-education literature. The confirmation bias,
defined by Druckman and McGrath (2019) as the “tendency to seek out information that
confirms one’s own beliefs” is also referred to by both political science and communication as
selective exposure (113). The prior attitude affect, which places the strength of new information
as being relative to one’s prior belief, may account for weak absorption and identification in a
dramatic narrative. When one’s prior attitudes are too far from those portrayed onscreen, it may
shatter the illusion created and diminish one’s ability to “connect” with the material. When
messages in a dramatic narrative are explicit, this can also elicit counterarguing (Moyer-Gusé
and Nabi 2011), or a disconfirmation bias, which Druckman and McGrath (2019) describe as
“greater scrutiny and counter-argumentation of information contrary to one’s prior beliefs”
(113).
Examinations of entertainment-oriented, soft news demonstrate the strong ability of nontraditional sources to influence political knowledge and voting patterns, especially in nonpolitically oriented viewers (Baum 2004; Baum and Jamison 2006; Baumgartner and Morris
2006). Soft news can be described as non-traditional, information-oriented media characterized
by specific characteristics, namely “the absence of a public policy component, sensationalized
presentation, human-interest themes, and emphasis on dramatic subject matter, such as crime and
disaster” (Baum 2004, 92). Unsurprisingly, these characteristics are what tie them closely with
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entertainment media, the dramatic presentations and endearing hosts being far more appealing
than traditional news broadcasts. Yet, these shows do provide compelling information that
reaches audiences. Viewers of The Daily Show, for example, are more likely to feel confident in
their political knowledge (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). When exposed to Tina Fey’s
impersonation of then-vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, individuals self-reporting as
Republican and Independent were afterward less approving of Palin as an appropriate running
mate for Republican presidential candidate John McCain (Baumgartner, et al. 2012).
Baumgartner and Morris (2008) even found evidence that Stephen Colbert’s spoof character of
himself as a staunch conservative ideologue on his popular late-night show The Colbert Report
increased affinity of Republicans in viewers.
Given the role that communication scholars see of identification in decreasing resistance
to narrative persuasion, it is likely no small wonder that these characters can influence attitude
shifts in their audience members. However, soft news media still does not have nearly the
viewership numbers of shows watched purely for entertainment. Further, shows like those
Baumgartner and Morris have examined for political influence—The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart (2012), The Colbert Report (2008), and Saturday Night Live (2012)—suffer from
selective exposure in that they are more likely to be watched by individuals who are younger and
more liberal (Baumgartner and Morris 2006).
However, entertainment-education studies note that dramatic narratives are more likely to
induce attitude shifts (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010) and reduce resistance (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi
2011) than their information-oriented counterparts. Watching crime shows like CSI or Law &
Order can prime audiences to believe crime is a much larger problem in America than it actually
is (Holbrook and Hill 2005; Pettey and Bracken 2008). Mulligan and Habel (2011) show that
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both the implicit frame (morality) and explicit frame (abortion is a choice) can affect attitude
shifts in viewers of dramatic feature film The Cider House Rules. Viewing scenes from The West
Wing, which depicts a strong, fair economist-turned-politician in the democrat President Josiah
Bartlet, can influence not only how individuals view the many roles of the president (Holbert, et
al. 2005), but also their approval of real-world presidents and their success (Holbert 2003).
Kearns and Young (2019) note greater expressed interest in political action after exposure to a
torture scene from popular TV show 24, and note that individuals watching the scene depicting
torture as unsuccessful in coercing the character to give up information were more likely to sign
a petition against using torture for interrogation than individuals watching the scene where
torture is shown as successful. This evidence altogether suggests that political and sociopolitical
messages in dramatic narratives are effective in decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion—in
different terms, overcoming directional motivated reasoning—especially within the low-political
knowledge population.
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3

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY ENTERTAINMENT
MEDIA CONSUMPTION PATTERS ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Entertainment media, through narrative persuasion, can have significant, lasting effects

on the social and political attitudes of viewers. While we understand the components of narrative
persuasion and its effects relatively well, its role in mediated intergroup contact has only recently
come to the fore. Mediated intergroup contact occurs as a form of vicarious contact between
members of two social groups, typically a majority ingroup and minority outgroup, without the
added anxiety of a real world interaction (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). As such, this mediated
contact could work to not only greatly diminish cultural intergroup conflict, but also interparty
conflict. Further, in conjunction with narrative persuasion, it could diminish the prejudice and
biases that impact certain policy attitudes in the American public. However, contemporary
consumption methods, such as binge watching, may hinder these potentially very positive
effects. In this chapter, I begin to explore how mediated intergroup contact theory might be
extended to influence interparty prejudice and policy attitudes. Then, I explore two theories: 1.
Accumulative effects of negative mediated intergroup contact may increase prejudice and
approval of public policies that negatively affect an outgroup, and 2. Binge effects may decrease
the impact of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. In each section of the
chapter, I link the concepts in question to the three empirical chapters of this manuscript and the
studies therein, culminating in an extended explanation of binge effects theory.
3.1

Mediated Interparty Contact
In the past, contact theory has largely been used to examine how certain conditions of

social contact between members of differing social groups can diminish prejudice. Typically, this
has referred to social groups differentiated by their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or
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religion. However, recent evidence from a study by Iyengar and Westwood (2015) notes that
political party, rather than race, may serve as the most divisive social identity in America. How,
then, may social contact—and my more particular interested, mediated intergroup contact—serve
to diminish interparty prejudice?
In Chapter 4, I explore the impact of narrative persuasion on policy attitudes as well as
social attitudes. Much of my findings reflect current understanding in the literature regarding the
importance of identification and absorption. However, I find that very little narrative persuasion
can be evidenced by participant discussions. Instead, I discover the potential for a new path of
examining mediated intergroup contact beyond the typical exploration of racial, ethnic,
gendered, or sexual orientation identities. The main finding of this chapter suggests that
behaviors and opinions of the political “other,” rather than policy attitudes, are more likely
affected by onscreen political disputes. As such, this chapter begins to ask whether mediated
intergroup contact can be extended to a very different type of social group: Political identity.
3.2

Accumulative Effects on Narrative Persuasion and Mediated Intergroup Contact
Does mediated intergroup contact increase in efficacy with accumulation of exposure?

Mediated intergroup contact may lessen anxiety and increase empathy toward outgroup members
in the real world. However, political science studies up to this point have focused on singleepisode exposure or observational correlations between shows watched and beliefs. One political
science study, conducted in Rwanda by Paluck and Green (2009), examines the effects of
consistent exposure to certain behaviors in a dramatic, fictional radio program using a
longitudinal, year-long experiment in sites across the country. They find that this consistent
exposure does impact audience perceptions of social norms, as well as intended behaviors. This
may indicate that narrative persuasion shifts behaviors with extended exposure, but do the effects
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of mediated intergroup contact increase or strengthen with extended exposure, as well? In other
words, are there accumulative effects with mediated exposure to indirect intergroup contact?
3.2.1

Cultivation Theory

Gerbner (1998) describes mass media cultivation of social reality a “gravitational
process” rather than a “unidirectional” one, explaining that mass media will alter the social
reality perceived by various groups in society based on their relationship to mainstream
television (180). “The angle and direction of the ‘pull’ depends on where groups of viewers and
their styles of life are with reference to the line of gravity, or the ‘mainstream’ of the world of
television” (Gerbner 1998, 180). Mainstream television creates this “line of gravity” by
establishing certain norms within their programming. The more individuals consume mainstream
television, the more they will assume these norms within their concept of social reality.
Gerbner’s cultivation theory, also referred to as “drip, drip effects,” has both served as
foundation for media research and been thoroughly critiqued (see Potter 2014). However,
scholars today are more likely to focus on viewership of specific media genres rather than total
television viewing, which Potter (2014) notes may not examine cultivation effects, but selective
exposure. I also find that very few political scientists endeavor to examine the accumulative
effects of dramatic media, though dramatic media effects on political attitudes have been studied
at length for their immediate influence. Priming in dramatic media, for example, can influence
views toward the real-world president (Holbert et al 2005) and perceptions of crime rates in
America (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Mulligan and Habel (2011) examine how frames in the
dramatic film The Cider House Rules affect attitudes toward abortion laws (79). Each of these
studies look at immediate effects of dramatic media, rather than lasting effects.
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Several impressive studies that do examine accumulated dramatic media effects,
however, do not discuss the underlying mechanisms of these effects using the vocabulary
outlined in this manuscript. Gierzynski and Eddy (2016) use extensive survey data to examine
the lasting influence of the Harry Potter franchise on Millennials’ political and social values.
Hether et al (2009), who opt for a quasi-natural experiment, collect survey data at multiple times
over a television season to find evidence that similar breast cancer storylines in two primetime
shows may affect policy beliefs. Paluck and Green’s (2009) study in post-genocide Rwanda
includes a year-long experiment to examine whether listening to a dramatic, fictional radio
program could alter perceptions of sociopolitical behaviors and listeners’ willingness to alter
their own behaviors.
However, streaming services and the surge of new material they bring in terms of
amount, story and character diversity, and availability may change the strength of that gravity.
Harmon et al (2019) find that streaming service users do not show the same “affluenza
symptoms” of materialism and life dissatisfaction associated with watching too much television.
The authors posit that audience program selectivity translates to audience message selectivity,
thereby eliminating the connection cultivation theory makes between increased television
viewing and greater expression of specific social norms. Similarly, binge watching may lessen
the gravitational effects Gerbner describes by lessening the persuasive impact of message
outliers.
3.2.2

Accumulative Impact

I posit that increased exposure to certain norms through entertainment media will
accumulate to impact perceptions of real-world social norms. When these depictions include
members of an outgroup, they will impact not only social perceptions of the outgroup and its
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members, but also viewers’ attitudes toward policies that impact the marginalized outgroup.
Portrayals of positive intergroup contact could decrease prejudice toward outgroup members and
decrease approval of policies that negatively affect the outgroup. However, the opposite is also
true: Portrayals of negative intergroup contact could increase prejudice toward outgroup
members and increase approval of policies that negatively affect them. As exposure to the new
social norm accumulates, so does its impact on sociopolitical attitudes.
However, streaming services and the surge of new material they bring in terms of
amount, story and character diversity, and availability may change the strength of that gravity.
Harmon et al (2019) find that streaming service users do not show the same “affluenza
symptoms” of materialism and life dissatisfaction associated with watching too much television.
The authors posit that audience program selectivity translates to audience message selectivity,
thereby eliminating the connection cultivation theory makes between increased television
viewing and greater expression of specific social norms. Similarly, binge watching may lessen
the gravitational effects Gerbner describes by lessening the persuasive impact of message
outliers.
In Chapter 5, I explore the potential for accumulative entertainment media effects. In
particular, I examine the impact of increased, accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist
stereotype present in many popular television shows. I observe whether increased exposure has a
greater impact as it accumulates across programs, and whether some character depictions are
more influential than others. I study these effects on social attitudes toward Muslims and on
policy attitudes toward counterterrorism policies and policies affecting people from Muslimmajority countries.
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3.3

Media Consumption Method Effects
The contemporary media environment includes many platforms, mediums, and screens.

The Nielsen Company (2018) reports that the average American spends nearly 11 hours per day
looking at screens—nearly half the entire day! Television viewing comprises nearly 4.5 (40
percent) of those hours, and 20 percent of overall American television viewing is done via a
streaming platform rather than a television set. In 2014, only 75 percent of Americans owned a
smartphone, up from 60 percent in 2013, and only 40 percent subscribed to some type of videoon-demand service, up from 21 percent in 2013 (Nielsen 2014). Just six years later, in the first
quarter of 2020, Nielsen (2020) reports that on average Americans spend nearly four hours per
day accessing the Internet or an app via their smartphone, and more than 2.5 hours on a tablet,
computer, or Internet-connected device. Another four hours is spent viewing live or time-shifted
television (Nielsen 2020), with nearly 19 percent of all television viewing occurring through a
streaming platform (Spangler 2020). Needless to say, the way Americans consume media has
drastically changed since 2000, when the hottest new trend was upgrading physical DVDs to HD
and Blu-Ray (Nielsen 2014).4
Nielsen (2020) does admit, however, that “some amount of simultaneous usage may
occur across devices,” indicating that some of their measurements may overlap (for example, the
Smart TV app would also be considered an Internet connected device), but also alluding to the
fact that many Americans interact with more than one screen at a time. While only 28 percent of
Americans say they “sometimes” use their phone or tablet while watching television, a whopping
45 percent say they “very often” or “always” use a second screen (Perez 2018). Daniel

4

DVD, or digital versatile disc, is form of digital optical disc storage developed in 1995 and widely used for
viewing films and show series. Video storage upgrades to this medium include HD, which stands for high definition,
and Blu-Ray, which can store larger quantities of HD video than a DVD.
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Kahneman (2011) describes four different conditions that make “thinking slow,” or using more
elaborative thinking processes, even harder. One of these conditions is switching between tasks,
not unlike diverting attention from watching a show to responding to a text message, or even
looking up something the show bring up. This increased cognitive load during viewing can
diminish absorption, reflection, and attitude effects (Hamby, et al. 2017). Additionally, the
elevated number of input signals increases the likelihood of audience members to process
incoming information according to their confirmation bias, focusing on the information that
aligns with strong prior beliefs and dismissing the rest (Leung 2020). This selective information
processing already poses an obstacle to diminishing partisan and directional motivated reasoning
prior to the introduction of multiple stimuli, predisposing individuals to agree more strongly with
partisan messaging with which they already agree while observing bias in messaging that aligns
with the opposing party’s viewpoint (Feldman 2010)
In Iyengar and Kinder’s (1987) seminal work on media effects, they address the issue of
experimental research being in contrast with mundane realism, asserting that while experiments
are important to the field of political science and especially to political communication,
observational research is still necessary. The real world problem of the inattentive audience is
one that does not often translate to laboratory experiment conditions, yet it remains a key factor
diminishing the connection “between the supply of information, on the one hand, and its
consumption, on the other” (Iyengar and Kinder 2010, 143). In the case of entertainment media
effects research, the attentive experimental audience may exhibit increased absorption, which
may overinflate results of narrative persuasion. Some efforts have been made in media effects
experimental research to increase the perception of mundane realism through experimental
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settings that resemble living rooms or through online studies that mimic natural online behavior
(see McDermott 2002).
3.3.1

The Drench Hypothesis

The question of whether high impact or frequent viewing more deeply impacts television
audiences has long been discussed but seldom studied in a political science context. There are,
indeed, two prevailing explanations in the communications literature that describe the most
impactful factors of dramatic narrative: Quantity or quality. Again, cultivation theory asserts that
continued exposure to similar messages and themes in media—entertainment or otherwise—will
shift audience perceptions of social norms toward those depicted in the media. The more
prevalent the depiction of society, the more likely it is to be seen as typical by the majority—an
effect of quantity (Gerbner 1998). Continued exposure to a stereotype, for example, will increase
viewers’ beliefs that the stereotype is typical of the group the character represents. Ortiz and
Harwood (2007) find that mediated intergroup contact, in which a majority member views a
program with an outgroup member and in some way empathizes with that character, can reduce
anxiety toward the outgroup as a whole. While this particular theory has not yet been observed
over time, Reep and Dambrot (1989) observed that the more frequently an individual watched a
show, the more likely they would be to list recurring characters as stereotypical.
The drench hypothesis, on the other hand, expects that a single instance of high-impact
exposure will have greater lasting effects on viewers—an effect of quality (Bahk 2009; Reep and
Dambrot 1987). Reep and Dambrot (1989) look to Greenberg’s “drench” hypothesis, which
states that “viewers may not be influenced by continual repetition of images, but rather some
particular characters or programs may have an intense and significant impact on viewers and,
thus, are far more influential than the accumulated images of numerous other characters and
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programs” (543). Frequency, they claim, is therefore less significant than a high-impact
characters and images. Bahk (2001a) takes a similar stance, arguing that high-impact films like
Outbreak about a brutal global pandemic greatly influence sociopolitical beliefs about health and
safety. Returning to the stereotype example, if an episodic show depicts a non-stereotype
character that viewers strongly identify with, viewers will instead begin to reject the original
stereotype in favor of the new character type (Reep and Dambrot 1987). This result is also
reflected in mediated intergroup contact research, in which researchers find that a single instance
of exposure to an outgroup character with which viewers empathize positively affects their views
of the outgroup as a whole (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). As Reep and Dambrot (1987) point out,
however, these theories are not mutually exclusive—especially, I would argue, outside the
laboratory where a single episode depicts many characters with varying degrees of what may be
deemed stereotypical traits and behavior.
3.3.2 Binge Watching
Does binge watching decrease the efficacy of narrative persuasion and mediated
intergroup contact in entertainment media? Where we once had to wait an entire week—or
more—in between episodes of our favorite primetime series, many people now opt to watch
them all at once. Binge watching, and even binge racing, has become a popular pastime for
adults across the globe. The popular streaming service Netflix defines binge-watching as
“watching between 2-6 episodes of the same TV show in one sitting” (Netflix 2013). This means
binge watching can entail as little as spending one to six hours viewing episodes of a show one
right after another in a single sitting. Or, in the case of binge racing, it can entail watching every
single episode in a season back-to-back with few to no breaks, even when the season is more
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than ten hours in length. How does the consumption shift from watching a show once weekly to
watching multiple episodes at once alter dramatic media effects?
I believe the heart of this question begins in the drip, drip vs. drench controversy and can
be answered within the context of deictic shift theory. Each of these theories originates outside
the field of political science, yet are vital to explaining the underlying mechanisms at work in
binge effects. Binge effects modulate dramatic media effects by decreasing the opportunity for
narrative persuasion in at least three key ways. Deictic shift theory states that the necessary
components for narrative persuasion are absorption and reflection, both of which may be
diminished by this new consumption pattern. First, more time spent watching the same show
may mean deeper absorption or, more likely, it may lead to dips in attention as the hours drag on.
Decreased absorption not only diminishes the opportunity for narrative persuasion, but also
diminishes viewer identification with characters and perceived realism, both of which decrease
resistance to messaging in dramatic media.
Second, waiting each week for a new episode may increase reflection time, as individuals
often turn after each viewing to peers, online forums, and blogs to keep talking and thinking
about the show while they wait for new content. This accumulation of input over time ties
closely with cultivation theory, which describes how mass media helps cultivate the social reality
of our society. In this sense, binge effects may lessen the impact of ground-breaking shows or
non-mainstream messaging in shows because the reflection time between exposures is shortened
or erased.
Third, binge effects may mimic drench effects, regardless of the level of impact provided
by imagery and storyline. In contrast to cultivation theory, the drench hypothesis asserts that
high-impact imagery and storylines can have stronger effects on individuals than more mundane
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audiovisual programs consumed over time—essentially, a high-impact movie will leave a more
lasting impression than a lower emotional impact show viewed over several weeks or months.
Viewing all episodes at once, when absorption levels remain high, may create similar effects in
viewers immediately after binge watching and show increased rates of narrative persuasion.
Based on the literature—drawing from studies examining deictic shift theory, reactance,
cultivation theory, and the drench hypothesis—I theorize that binge watching will decrease the
overall potential for narrative persuasion of dramatic media content as well as decrease the
potential for mediated intergroup contact to diminish prejudice, specifically for episodic shows. I
assert that while the immediate influence of binge watching a show may be similar to—or even
stronger than—watching the same number of episodes of the show weekly, these effects will
diminish faster due to decreased absorption and reflection time. Overall, I predict binge watching
dampens any lasting persuasive effects in dramatic media.
3.3.2.1 Binge Effects: Drip, Drip or Drench?
Binge-watching, at first glance, seems to join the considerations of cultivation theory and
the drench hypothesis. The sustained viewing of high-impact images—particularly those of
contemporary shows with large budgets—should, in theory, be most influential. However, the
sustained viewing in a single day (or even a couple days) cannot be considered equal to that of
regular viewing over multiple weeks. Simply pitting binge watching against weekly watching the
exact same show assumes comparative accumulative effects. More than television happens in
any given week. People are influenced by their personal circumstances, by the other news and
non-news media they encounter, and by world events (like the current pandemic increasing the
binge watching phenomenon). In addition to the previously mentioned ways binge watching may
shape dramatic media’s influence on its audience, the shortened time span removes potential life
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distractions that could occur in the longer time span of weekly viewing. for example, if a weekly
viewer breaks up with their significant other eight weeks into a ten-week romantic story arc, they
may feel not very absorbed and unable to identify when the two protagonists finally get together
in episode ten. However, if the viewer had binged the entire season before the breakup, they may
have felt very absorbed and connected to the show, leading to a stronger opportunity for overall
narrative persuasion.
Cultivation theory, on the one hand, dictates that the more time spent with a particular
media, the stronger the impact will be. According to deictic shift theory, narrative persuasion is
the result of two essential factors: Absorption and reflection. Together, they assert that the more
time spent absorbed in media with similar messaging and spent reflecting on that messaging
increases the likelihood of narrative persuasion. Increased time and absorption in dramatic media
can also allow for greater identification with characters, which further increases the potential for
narrative persuasion. Identification and perceived realism play key roles in increasing both
absorption and reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and counterarguing (Bahk
2001b; Moyer-Gusé 2008; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011). The traditional cable television
format of spacing show episodes out to one per week, for example, provides an hour of
engagement plus a full seven days in between each episode for reflection. On the other hand,
binge-watching the same number episodes only provides the increased time for absorption and
identification. Binge watching multiple episodes back-to-back results in much less reflection
time than that provided by weekly watching. Even if absorption remained at optimal levels
throughout all binged episodes of a show, which is unlikely given varied attention spans, the
reflection time between episodes is severely shortened from days to mere minutes. If reflection is
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the time period during which attitude change occurs, then shortening this time will inevitably
dampen the potential for narrative persuasion.
In this sense, binge effects cannot be considered the sum of cultivation theory and the
drench hypothesis. First, watching multiple episodes of a show at once does not equate to highimpact imagery and visualizations. Some shows, especially those with larger budgets, may
provide these components, but they are not by definition an essential part of binge watching.
Sustained high absorption levels in binge watchers may increase the likelihood that effects will
mimic drench effects; however, high levels of absorption may also indicate the show includes
high-impact imagery and/or visualization. This means the stronger effects immediately following
a binge session could indicate actual drench effects rather than binge effects. Second, individuals
do not engage with dramatic media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their
screens not only with specific motivations for engaging with media but also with personal
circumstances, current mindsets, and myriad potential distractions. They will leave their media
experience with certain impressions to reenter their own lives, often moving straight into
engagement with other narratives and other media formats.
Unfortunately, I cannot hold time still, nor can I split time into two dimensions where
individuals binge or watch weekly in their parallel timelines; therefore, I cannot fully separate
out all the additional interferences weekly watchers may experience. However, I can examine the
factors associated with narrative persuasion as they interact with these different consumption
patterns: Absorption, identification, and perceived realism.
3.3.3

Binge Effects Theory

In Chapter 6, I use a longitudinal laboratory experiment to examine the effects of
consumption method on narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. One episode of a
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show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers very little. Continued
messaging in one show or across multiple shows increases the likelihood that narrative
persuasion will occur, as evidenced by education-entertainment research and studies of
accumulative effects (e.g. Hether et al 2008). However, individuals are increasingly likely to
watch series on their own time rather than during the original broadcast, and binge watching is
on the rise (Nielsen 2019). These consumption shifts, particularly the trend toward binge
watching, will affect the potential for dramatic media to induce narrative persuasion. I expect,
based on deictic shift theory, that binge-watching will overall result in a diminished capacity for
narrative persuasion. While the drench-like experience may heighten dramatic media effects on
viewers’ attitudes immediately after bingeing, decreased reflection will diminish these effects
over time. My binge effects theory can be condensed to three main ideas:
1. Binge watchers are more likely than weekly watchers to experience lower levels of
absorption.
2. Binge watchers who do not experience lower levels of absorption than weekly watchers
will likely exhibit drench effects.
3. All binge watchers are less likely to experience lasting attitude change than weekly
watchers.
I postulate the immediate effects after binge-watching will mimic those of drench effects,
showing a sizeable shift in political attitudes and social perceptions. This effect may only be true,
however, for individuals who identify in some way with one of the show’s main characters and
those who maintain high absorption beyond the initial two hours of viewing. Further, because the
reflection time is greatly reduced for binge-watchers and is not sustained through a weekly return
to the program, lasting effects are less likely than what is suggested by cultivation theory. In
sum, binge-watchers who maintain a high level of absorption may exhibit greater attitudinal
effects immediately following their viewing session, but these effects are less likely to last than
those shown by weekly watchers.
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What does this mean for dramatic media effects on political and sociopolitical attitudes?
It means that binge-watching may decrease the impact of narrative persuasion overall. On one
hand, this could decrease the influence of non-mainstream media, making it more difficult to
encourage diversity of ideas via messaging and casting. On the other hand, it could increase the
effects of selective exposure and solidify as normal the messages of mainstream media by
dampening the impact of any new messages. To clarify, by “new messages” I mean any nonmainstream ideas or concepts included in the narrative. For example, Slater, Rouner, and Long
(2009) indicate minimal effects on viewers’ attitudes toward same-sex relationships after
watching a short film that depicts a healthy, loving same-sex relationship. At the time this study
was done, there were few examples of same-sex relationships in television, and many carried a
negative frame (Slater, Rouner, and Long 2006). Had the program been longer and viewed
weekly, stronger attachments to these characters may have grown and encouraged greater
attitudinal effects. Had the program been longer and binged, viewers with high absorption may
still have built stronger attachments to the characters, but there would be no lasting attitudinal
effects.
In particular, binge effects on narrative persuasion may diminish the potential for
dramatic media to bypass directional motivated reasoning, which can be particularly strong for
political attitudes (see Bolsen and Palm 2019; Druckman and McGrath 2019). Although this
manuscript focuses on dramatic media’s attitudinal effects, binge effects may also diminish the
capacity of any media to educate viewers. Furthermore, because young adults are more likely to
binge watch, binge effects could have lasting repercussions for Millennials, members of Gen Z,
and generations to come.
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3.4

Moving Forward
In sum, the next three chapters examine how narrative persuasion and mediated

intergroup contact affect social perceptions of outgroup members and political attitudes toward
the public policies that affect the outgroup. More specifically, they explore 1. The effects of
mediated intergroup contact on policy attitudes and interparty prejudice (Chapter 4); 2. The
effects of accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype on perceptions of Muslims
and approval of policy attitudes that negatively affect Muslims and individuals from Muslimmajority countries (Chapter 5); and 3. How binge effects alter the impact of narrative persuasion
and mediated intergroup contact on sociopolitical attitudes (Chapter 6). Overall, I assert that
mediated intergroup contact can affect perceptions of an outgroup and policy attitudes. More
specifically, I observe the conditions at work in narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup
contact through an onscreen debate on gun ownership. I move on to argue that nuanced
depictions of Muslims in TV and film will increase identification with the outgroup characters,
thereby decreasing viewers’ prejudice toward Muslims and decreasing viewers’ approval of
public policies that affect Muslims negatively. I finally posit, however, that current the
consumption habit of binge watching may limit entertainment media effects.
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4

UNDERSTANDING THE CONDITIONS OF NARRATIVE PERSUASION ON
POLICY ATTITUDES
“Personally, I have been a proponent of gun ownership for a long time,” remarks a

young, African American man and self-proclaimed news-lover in my “Pop Culture and
American Politics” seminar. He explains, “I do however believe that change is needed in our
policies regarding guns… Americans are losing their lives in senseless mass shootings every
year.” This sentiment resonates with the small group of students in my senior seminar class in
spring of 2019. It is still early in the semester, and the jovial seniors spend the minutes leading to
the start of class discussing current events and their work in other, shared classes. Without
knowing one midsemester topic for discussion will be gun rights, they chat openly about their
views while I listen, welcoming them to prolong their discussion into our class time as I note
their stances. He continues amidst a few nods, while other students quietly direct their focus
elsewhere: “people should be able to live their lives going to a place of worship, to school, or
simply publicly enjoying time out with friends without the thought of someone bringing in a gun
to kill people being in the back of their heads.”
Nearly two years after Governor Nathan Deal signed Georgia HB 280, commonly known
as a “campus carry” bill, into law, my students are still talking about the changes happening
around them. From one perspective, campus carry laws like Georgia’s HB 280 are intended to
address the potential dangers of school shootings and the more mundane robberies that occur on
or near college campuses. As Governor Deal stated in 2017, “At the present time, assailants can,
and do, target these students knowing full well that their victims are not permitted to carry
protection… we’ve witnessed college students fall victim to violent attacks in or while traveling
to libraries and academic buildings” (Downey 2017). From another perspective, these laws have
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been accused of creating a hostile learning environment that may “chill” free speech (Arnold
2019) in opposition to prior Supreme Court rulings like that of District of Columbia v. Heller,
which indicates the current interpretation of the second amendment allows for such limitations as
“laws forbidding the carrying of firearms into sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings” (Bennett 2020). There has also been some confusion as to when and where firearms
are allowed, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution noting 15 violations cited in the University System
of Georgia within the law’s first year on the books (Stirgus and Prabhu 2018). Further evidence
indicates that while laws allowing individuals to legally “carry firearms onto college campuses
are unlikely to lead to fewer mass shootings or fewer casualties in those mass shootings,”
increased “gun availability in campus environments could make far more common acts of
aggression, recklessness, or self-harm more deadly” (Webster, et al. 2016).
As political science majors and senior undergraduates, I first believe my students are
probably poised to speak more eloquently than others their age on this or other controversial
political topics. However, in a pre-class survey, my students scored an average of 5.13 out of
nine on a set of political knowledge questions. Their score is comparable to that of the 5.19
average score of 144 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory political science class who were
polled in a pre-treatment survey for the experiment discussed in Chapter 6 of this manuscript. It
is less than the 5.75 average score of 1088 participants in the national survey detailed in Chapter
5 of this manuscript. Many of these political science seniors share that they have rarely even
thought about the issue of gun rights, one young African American woman noting, “unless it was
being brought up on a national level with school shootings.” Shootings like the 2007 event at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) were the impetus for campus
carry laws that now exist in 11 states—including the Georgia law my students discuss, for 16
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state laws banning campus carry policies, and for multiple advocacy groups on both sides of the
issue (Hassett, et al. 2019). Even so, this young woman and other seniors in my class express
ambivalence or neutrality, such as the sentiment asserted by one student that, “I could understand
both sides.” What could push ambivalent Americans like these students toward aligning with one
side or the other, especially those Americans who are not news-lovers?
Can entertainment media, broadly enjoyed by adults across America, affect policy
attitudes? More specifically, can narrative persuasion decrease interparty prejudice and
motivated reasoning? During the fall 2018 and spring 2019 semesters, I conducted two focus
groups within my political science senior seminar classes on “Pop Culture and American
Politics.”5 The readings and activities in these classes exposed students to media effects research,
the concepts and conditions for narrative persuasion, and multiple forms of popular media with
sociopolitical messages. Understanding the concepts of narrative persuasion was necessary for
students both to engage in class discussions and also to discuss these concepts and their reactions
to media screenings as part of the focus group. Engaging with these concepts allowed
participants to use precise language when describing the impact of the media we screened in
classes. After each media screening, students were asked to respond to a writing prompt sharing
their thoughts and discussing connections to the literature. In conducting these focus groups, I
hope to better understand the key factors that influence whether an embedded message in a
dramatic narrative will impact audience attitudes. Simply, could watching a show that explicitly

These focus groups were approved by Georgia State University’s Institutional Review Board in March 2019. All
students in Ms. Pauley’s senior seminar classes during the 2018 to 2019 academic year were provided the option to
allow their discussion comments and written submissions be used as part of these focus groups. Only the
submissions of those students who signed the informed consent document expressly giving this permission have
been used by the researcher.
5
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debates gun rights and gun control laws move my ambivalent students toward taking a policy
stance?
4.1

Narrative Persuasion of Political Attitudes
Narrative persuasion refers to the internal process through which a dramatic narrative

may influence audience opinions and attitudes. This process may occur through explicit
messages in the narrative inducing central information processing in the audience, thereby
encouraging the audience to reconsider prior attitudes toward the message topic. It may also
occur through implicit themes and messages depicting social circumstances that are absorbed by
the audience through peripheral information processing, thereby affecting their overall
perceptions of social norms. One of the leading theories regarding narrative persuasion is deictic
shift theory, which asserts that absorption, or deictic transportation into the storyline, is
necessary for narrative persuasion and that reflection upon the narrative afterward increases the
likelihood of persuasion (Hamby, et al. 2017). Further research provides evidence that
identification with at least one character plays a key role in increasing absorption and
encouraging reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and counterarguing in the
audience (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). However, individuals do not engage with dramatic
media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their screens not only with specific
motivations for engaging with media but also with personal circumstances, cognitive load, and
myriad potential distractions (see Hamby, et al. 2018).
What is the key component to holding a viewer’s attention and inducing reflection
enough to evoke narrative persuasion? More importantly, which factor will encourage a lasting
attitude change? In reviewing the literature, I noticed that many studies use clips from a show or
film (e.g. Kearns, et al. 2019), though few include full-episode treatments (e.g. Slater, et al.
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2006). One episode of a show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers
very little, which is evidenced by the mixed results of survey data collected in these experiments
(e.g. Holbert 2003; Holbert, et al. 2005; Slater, et al. 2006). Continued messaging in one show or
across multiple shows increases the likelihood that narrative persuasion will occur, as evidenced
by education-entertainment research and studies of accumulative effects, or cultivation theory
(e.g. Hether, et al. 2008; Quick 2009). In each of these instances, however, results are drawn
from quantitative, not qualitative data. Few studies even discuss lasting change (see Hether et al
2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Quick, et al. 2013). Moreover, we tend to examine specific, explicit
attitudes rather than implicit perceptions of social norms, one exception being Paluck and
Green’s (2009) study of a dramatic radio program’s effects on acceptance of dissident behaviors
in post-genocide Rwanda.
To better understand the components of narrative persuasion qualitatively, I conducted
two focus groups. In these focus groups, I exposed 24 total participants to several forms of
popular media as part of my senior seminar class on “Pop Culture and American Politics,”
essentially assigning absorption. I then required participants to respond to a discussion prompt
regarding the media, thereby assigning reflection. Because absorption and reflection were largely
required of the participants, as part of their work as students for a class, this allowed me to hold
these essential components of narrative persuasion constant. Holding these conditions constant
further permitted me to better understand the remaining variables of the narrative persuasion
formula: Identification and the explicit or implicit nature of the message. Because these
participants were also my students in a course to examine media effects in popular culture, they
understood the basic components of narrative persuasion. This understanding bestowed
participants with the means to discuss the nuances of narrative impact in great detail using
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precise language. The discussion prompts provided to participants asked them not only about
their views on the related sociopolitical issue prior to and after the experience, but also about
three main components6 of narrative persuasion: Absorption, identification, and how the message
was presented (explicitly or implicitly).
4.1.1

Absorption

Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) describe the process of narrative persuasion first
through the lens of deictic shift theory: “the reader creates a mental model of the story world first
by shifting her deictic center into that model, and then continuing to relate the information given
in each successive sentence in the narrative to an understanding of the narrative as a whole”
(115). The deictic center can be described as one’s personal vantage point or point of perception
(Hamby, et al. 2018). When a deictic shift occurs, the individual will shift this vantage point
from perceiving the world from their own life to perceiving the world from inside the narrative.
This may also be described as the experience of absorption or transportation into a story. This
transportation allows individuals engaging with narrative media to experience “intense emotions
similar to the emotions we have in response to equivalent situations in our daily life” (Hamby, et
al. 2018, 115). For example, we may feel frustrated when a character refuses to cooperate, or our
heartrate may increase during a particularly harrowing scene.
The second piece of the deictic shift, returning to one’s original vantage point in the self,
cannot by itself induce persuasion. Retrospective reflection, during which the individual
considers their experience of the narrative within the context of their own life, is necessary
(Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018). Therefore, the two together—absorption and

6

I asked participants about absorption to best gauge their level of interest and absorption in the material. I do not ask
about reflection because they are clearly engaging in reflection to respond to the prompt.
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reflection—are required for narrative persuasion. However, they are not always sufficient to
induce lasting attitude change. Individual and contextual factors like cognitive load, which
affects attention and absorption, environment, and especially resistance to embedded messaging
can limit a narrative’s effectiveness (Hamby, et al. 2018). Absorption, as well as identification
with one or more characters and the way in which a message is delivered—implicitly or
explicitly—discussed below, can affect the level of resistance in audience members (Dale and
Moyer-Gusé 2020; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010).
4.1.2

Identification

In the context of social cognitive theory, Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) assert that
viewer identification with a character increases that character’s influence on the viewer.
However, multiple forms of character identification and association exist. Some characters may
serve as evaluative standards, not unlike priming effects (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005).
Others may push a viewer to feel that a character is like a close friend or relative, whose actions
can deeply affect the emotional state of the viewer (DeGroot and Leith 2018; Lather and MoyerGuse 2011; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012). Still others may simulate indirect intergroup contact, in
which a viewer observes intergroup contact but does not participate, thereby lessening prejudice
by providing examples of cross-group friendship and nonstereotypical behavior (Moyer-Gusé, et
al. 2019). Identification also plays a key role in facilitating mediated intergroup contact, in
which members of a majority group identify with characters in a narrative that includes positive
depictions of outgroup or minority group members—meaning the media serves as the form of
contact. Viewers who experiences this identification through mediated intergroup contact are
more likely to view outgroup members positively in the real world (Ortiz and Harwood 2007,
Park 2012, Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020).
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Moyer-Gusé (2008a) identifies five forms of involvement with a character: Identification,
perceived similarity, wishful identification, liking, and parasocial interaction (PSI). She
establishes identification with a character as “an emotional and cognitive process whereby a
viewer takes on the role of a character in a narrative.” In this case, absorption occurs as a shift
into the deictic center of a specific character as opposed to the narrative as a whole (Moyer-Gusé
2008a, 410). This form of identification is also referred to as cognitive-emotional identification,
when viewers choose to interpret the media through the lens of a specific character (Chory-Assad
and Cicchirillo 2005). I will use the term cognitive-emotional identification for the remainder of
the chapter to better differentiate the specific concept from its umbrella term. Perceived
similarity occurs when the viewer perceives that a character is similar in some way to
themselves, such as demographic similarities, physical attributes, personality, or values and is
often considered a precursor to cognitive-emotional identification (Moyer-Gusé 2008). Wishful
identification entails the viewer wanting to be like a character or wanting to emulate the
character in their own life. Moyer-Gusé (2008a) considers liking as simply holding positive
evaluations of a character, similar to parasocial interaction (PSI). She describes PSI as the
viewer feeling as though they have a “face-to-face relationship” with a specific character.
Other forms of identification include group identification, empathy, and affective
orientation. Similar to PSI and perceived similarity, group identification involves the viewer
seeing similarities between their friends and family and the onscreen characters, and then the
viewer identifying with those characters based on those similarities (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo
2005). Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) consider empathy toward an onscreen character as
another prerequisite for cognitive-emotional identification, stating that viewers must first be able
to understand the perspective of a character before taking on their viewpoint. The authors
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describe empathy, or perspective-taking, as both an appreciation for a character’s well-being
(empathic concern) and as experiencing emotions that correspond with the character’s emotions
(emotional contagion). Affective orientation, though not necessarily a form of identification,
gauges an individual’s sensitivity toward experiencing emotional contagion. Individuals with
high levels of affective orientation toward a character are more likely to experience cognitiveemotional identification (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005).
4.1.3

Implicit vs. Explicit Messaging

Another purpose of this study is to examine whether implicit or explicit messages are
more effective for narrative persuasion. Individuals come to their screens with specific
motivations, typically to escape or feel a thrill, or to feel or think deeply (Bartsch, et al. 2014;
Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Oliver and Bartsch 2010). This motivation is bi-directional,
meaning the artists and producers of entertainment media create with specific motivations in the
same way consumers select that media based on their own motivations, often corresponding with
one another (Oliver and Bartsch 2010). When Quentin Tarantino writes and directs a thrilling
screenplay, for example, he knows that people will watch his film with the motivation to feel
thrilled.
In addition to the primary themes of a film or show—like the genre and plot—dramatic
narratives impart nuanced messages to their audiences through story details and character
relationships. Explicit messages are often aimed at addressing specific issues, but implicit
messages address core beliefs about how the world works. Explicit messages may be expressed
through dialogue or even an epilogue at the end of an episode or film for specificity (Lane, et al.
2013; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012). Mulligan and Habel (2011), for example, provide evidence that
explicit, central frames in fictional media shape how we think about politics by influencing
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politically-relevant opinions such as whether abortion should be a legal procedure in the case of
incest. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012) note that individuals exposed to an explicit
persuasive appeal in addition to a dramatic narrative on driving under the influence of alcohol
led to the desired effect of negative attitudes toward drinking and driving. However, individuals
who did not receive the explicit persuasive appeal showed an increase in favorable attitudes
toward drinking and driving, which the authors believed was evidence of a boomerang effect in
which a dramatic narrative normalizes behaviors it intends to scorn (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012;
Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010).
Implicit messages, often imparted through characters’ actions and relationships, influence
viewers’ perceptions of social norms, potentially updating their socially constructed reality (see
Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018). Slater, Rouner, and Long (2006), for example, find that implicit
messaging decreases counterarguing in viewers, meaning viewers are less resistant to messages
counter to their prior beliefs when the message is implicit rather than explicit (see also MoyerGusé and Nabi 2010). However, the authors note that suppression of counterarguing is not
sufficient to induce attitude change, especially in deeply controversial, politicized issues like
marriage equality. While exposure to one implicit theme in a fictional drama (support for the
death penalty) shows evidence of persuasion in its audience, another implicit theme in a second
fictional drama (support for rights of gay partners) does not (Slater, et al. 2006). Mulligan and
Habel (2011) also note mixed effects on their implicit frame in the fictional film The Cider
House Rules about whether it is more important to follow one’s conscience even when
something is illegal or to remain morally absolute.
The literature shows mixed results as to whether an implicit or explicit message in
entertainment media is most effective. Lane et al (2013) find evidence that using an implicit
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message in a show episode followed by a public service announcement made by one of the main
characters shows the most promise for inducing the intended narrative persuasion. Moyer-Gusé,
Jain, and Chung (2012), on the other hand, show that similar results may have additional
gendered effects (see also Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011). The final purpose of this study is
to examine the responses of participants who have been educated on implicit and explicit appeals
when asked to describe the effects of those messages.
4.2

Mediated Intergroup Contact
In addition to reducing reactance, identification can facilitate mediated intergroup

contact. Mediated intergroup contact, as explained by Ortiz and Harwood (2007), argues that
when individuals are “exposed to TV images of positive intergroup contact, for example, viewers
may extract a rule that such interaction is open and friendly. They may then extrapolate this rule
and use it to guide their behaviors and judgments in future situations where this rule might be
applicable (i.e., other intergroup interactions)” (617). Similar to reducing reactance in viewers,
mediated intergroup contact may reduce anxiety in viewers toward intergroup interaction in the
real world and diminish prejudice toward the outgroup as a whole (Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020;
Ortiz and Harwood 2007; Park 2012). Mediated intergroup contact is a theory typically used in
studies regarding race, gender, sexual orientation, religion and other categories often associated
with social intergroup conflict or prejudice. While the primary focus of this study was originally
to examine the impact of narrative persuasion on attitudes toward the explicit debate of gun
control and gun rights, a secondary focus was to understand the impact of narrative persuasion
regarding the implicit message of healthy, nontraditional relationships. Because the depicted
nontraditional relationship occurs between two women of color, mediated intergroup contact
could also play a role in the narrative’s impact.
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4.3

Methods
During the 2018 to 2019 academic year, I conducted two focus groups within my senior

seminar classes on “Pop Culture and American Politics” to more deeply understand the
components of narrative persuasion and their importance to the attitude change process prior to
running a survey or experiment. Participants were exposed to the concepts of narrative
persuasion and its components in a classroom setting. They watched or listened to several
programs together and separately over the span of an academic semester, and they came together
each week in class to discuss concepts in the media effects and political science literatures
pertinent to the media with which they had recently engaged. In addition to discussions,
participants responded, in writing, to prompts provided after each program. Providing
participants with a deeper understanding of the concepts of narrative persuasion allowed them to
more effectively explain their experiences using precise, relevant language. Their discussions
and written responses offer qualitative insight into narrative persuasion and the role its
components play in media-influenced attitude change.
I find evidence of the important roles that identification and implicit messaging play in
narrative persuasion. While the literature explores various types of identification and their ability
to reduce counterarguing (see Moyer-Gusé 2015) the focus group participants’ responses
indicate that empathic identification with any character in a narrative may be sufficient to
encourage absorption and reflection—the key components of deictic shift theory. However, the
prompted reflection did not deliver the expected form of persuasion by altering opinions on an
explicit or implicit message. Instead, Paluck and Green’s (2009) assertion appears more likely:
People will accept and begin to mimic the relationships they are exposed to in a dramatic
narrative.
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4.3.1

Participants and Recruitment

In total, 24 students agreed to participate in the focus groups. The group of 24
participants, as well as the classes themselves, were predominately female (18 participants, the
other six identifying as male) and mostly minorities (22 participants). Of the 24 students who
agreed to participate, 16 were from one class and eight from the other. Because the focus groups
were exploratory and took place within real-world classes, the two groups were not set up
identically. One class (with 16 participants) was more structured and rooted in class discussions,
while the other (eight participants) relied more heavily on individual effort and written work.
The classrooms themselves were different, as well: The first being larger, more conducive to
moving the desks into a circle for discussions, and brighter with windows; and the second being
darker and without windows, smaller in size, and located in a building with frequent technical
difficulties. Regardless of these differences, however, participants’ responses and discussions in
each class often mirrored one another.
Table 1 Focus Group Race/Ethnicity Demographics
Participants
Female

Male

Total

White, non-Hispanic

2

0

2

White, Hispanic

2

0

2

African American or Black

10

4

14

Hispanic

3

2

5

Asian

1

0

1

Total

18

6

24

Responses to the writing prompt of a particular show episode screened in both classes
displayed sentiments strikingly similar to on another. The episode, “Betsy” from Freeform’s The
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Bold Type, portrays two friends arguing about gun ownership, giving equal time to each
woman’s perspective. Simultaneously, their other best friend contends with her feelings about
her new girlfriend’s request to try nonmonogamy. What struck me most about the responses was
that the individual explanations provided in these essay responses bucked against a key point in
the literature regarding attitude change and the role of identification while bolstering the
assertion that implicit messaging is often more effective than explicit messaging. Upon further
analysis, I also found it intriguing that the implicit message affected was not the one I had
originally intended to study, but instead involved the gun rights/gun control debate and how it
was carried out by the characters.
4.3.2

Writing Prompt

In the middle of each semester, students were asked to watch an episode from the second
season of the television show The Bold Type while in class. They knew they would be asked to
complete a related writing assignment after watching the episode, but were not informed about
what the writing prompt would specifically entail. In both classes, the students had previously
completed a similar assignment in response to either a collection of music or a film. I posted the
writing prompt for “Betsy” online immediately after class, providing students at least five days
to complete the assignment.
After the episode, I provided my students with the following writing prompt:
How did watching the episode "Betsy" from season two of The Bold Type affect your views
on either (pick ONE) a) gun rights/gun control or b) nontraditional romantic relationships?
In your response, be sure to include the following:
•
•

your views prior to watching the episode
how the show did or did not affect your views based on:
o various forms of identification
o level of absorption
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•
•

o level of implicitness or explicitness of the message(s)
o reflection
at least two different citations from the articles we've read for class
any other views you feel may have been affected by this episode

Both classes had previously been assigned to read journal articles about identification,
absorption, and reflection; however, one class was significantly more likely to have read the
material, while the other often had trouble during discussions with several students openly
admitting they had not read the material before class. Regardless, most students in both classes
clearly articulated their identification with a specific character (or none), their level of absorption
and interest in the show, and their views toward their chosen topic and the potential impact the
show had on these views.
The writing prompt responses were written by students prior to their knowledge of the
opportunity to participate in the focus group. Throughout each class, students were encouraged
to speak and write freely. Written assignments were graded on word count, answering all aspects
of a prompt, and providing citations to support their perspective. After students agreed to
participate in the focus group, their survey and written responses were downloaded, their names
were replaced with a study number, and all materials were set aside for at least one semester to
diminish researcher ability to link a specific student to a particular response.
4.3.3

Show Analysis

“Betsy” is the name of episode seven of season two of Freeform’s hit show The Bold
Type, which stars three young women who are best friends and work at the same women’s
magazine in New York City. “Betsy” is also the name of a shotgun owned by one of these
fictional characters, Sutton Brady. During this episode, Sutton and her best friend and roommate
Jane Sloan argue over Sutton’s right to keep her beloved shotgun in their apartment. Both
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women are Caucasian and in their early twenties, but with somewhat different backgrounds that
provide fodder for the frames they give this issue. Sutton grew up in rural Pennsylvania, where
she joined the high school shooting team to avoid her alcoholic mother’s benders. Jane grew up
in Colorado not far from where the Columbine High School shooting occurred when Jane was in
elementary school, which proved a traumatic event for her character.
In addition to the main plot of this episode, a secondary storyline involves a
nontraditional relationship between the third protagonist, Kat Edison, and her girlfriend, Adena
El-Amin. Kat is a biracial woman also in her early twenties who works with Sutton and Jane, and
the three are clearly very close friends. Adena is a Muslim lesbian woman and is Kat’s first
lesbian relationship. During this episode, Adena addresses an incident from a previous episode in
which Kat has kissed another woman. Adena explains that she is upset, but that she also
understands Kat’s need to explore her sexuality. The two decide to try an “open relationship”
where they are allowed to date other women on certain days of the week, allowing Kat to explore
this new same-sex aspect of her sexuality without putting her relationship with Adena in
jeopardy. While the writers dedicate some dialogue to Kat and Adena’s decision to try
nonmonogamy, 7 most of the frames surrounding the normalization of homosexual relationships
are implied, rather than stated explicitly. Kat speaks openly with Jane and Sutton about the
positive and negative aspects she perceives of nonmonogamy, and the three women frame their
opinions on open relationships regardless of sexuality. The frame surrounding the lesbian
relationship itself is one of complete acceptance and normalcy. When Kat flirts with their
rideshare driver in one scene, for example, they joke that the “lesbian version” of flirtatious

I use the term “nonmonogamy” rather than “polyamory” because the two women discuss an open relationship that
will be short-term and only physical outside their couple. Kat is allowed to explore her physical sexuality, but not to
become emotionally attached to another woman.
7
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physical contact equates to the same flirtatious physical contact in a heteronormative situation.
This explicit normalization of homosexuality represents an ongoing implicit normalization
throughout the episode. Kat may bring up her sexuality on occasion, but Jane and Sutton have
clearly fully accepted Kat as homosexual and do not mention it.
4.3.3.1 Framing “Betsy”
Frames are the context given to an issue either within our own thoughts or by someone
communicating information about an issue, like a journalist. Although framing effects are
primarily discussed in the political science literature in relation to news media (see Scheufele
2000), framing and other media effects are also present and effective in dramatic media (e.g.
Holbert, et al. 2005; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Mulligan and Habel 2011). In the first scene of
“Betsy,” we discover that Sutton keeps her shotgun in a locked case that Jane believes holds a
clarinet. Sutton goes along with this assumption at first, but then reveals the truth, and two
frames are immediately introduced surrounding how each woman views the issue of Sutton’s
shotgun. Jane first introduces a trust frame, expressing anger toward Sutton for lying to her about
keeping a firearm in their apartment. Later in the episode, this frame is flipped when Sutton
accuses Jane of not trusting Sutton to be safe with the weapon. Jane also introduces the safety
frame, stating that all guns are dangerous and that she does not feel safe with the gun in her
home. Again, Sutton provides the opposite aspect of this frame when she explains and then
displays her expertise with using and storing the firearm safely.
As there are no existing, publicly-available copies of the show’s scripts, content analysis
was completed by the researcher watching the episode on three separate occasions. The first
viewing allowed me to prepare the writing prompt for my classes and establish clear frames:
Trust versus safety. The second viewing allowed me to evaluate the distinctions of these frames:
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Mistrust due to omission, mistrust due to lack of faith, personal safety, and general safety. In the
third viewing, I assigned these frames to each mention by one of the characters (leads Jane,
Sutton, or Kat or recurring character Ryan). I additionally noted whether the frame was explicit
or implied. For example, Sutton assuring Jane that “we are very safe right now” is an explicit
safety frame, whereas Jane asking Sutton why she would hide the shotgun from Jane implies a
trust frame. In total, a trust frame was referred to explicitly and implicitly three times for each
type, while a safety frame was invoked 13 times total, only three of which were implicit.
Establishing frames for the nontraditional relationship between Kat and Adena is a
similar process. In the first viewing, I established two overall frames of nonmonogamy:
Acceptance and efficacy. The efficacy frame can be further broken down into a morality frame
and a trust frame.
4.3.3.2 Explicit Message
The main plot of the episode “Betsy” involves two white women in their early twenties
who are friends, coworkers, and roommates. The first scene of the episode reveals that one of
these women, Sutton, owns a shotgun and has kept it in a locked case in their apartment without
notifying her roommate, Jane. Because Jane is vehemently opposed to all guns, she immediately
demands that Sutton get rid of the shotgun. The shotgun, which Sutton named Betsy, holds deep
significance and sentimental value for Sutton in addition to playing a key role in her oncefavorite hobby of skeet shooting. Sutton refuses to get rid of the shotgun Betsy, and the two
women spend the rest of the episode at odds. Their discussions about the gun become even more
heightened when Jane decides to write an article for the magazine they work for entitled, “I Love
Everything About My Best Friend, But Not Her Gun.”
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Throughout the episode, we watch these women take firm stances on gun rights as well as
open up about the reasons behind their stances. Through discussions with each other and with
their fellow coworker and friend Kat, a biracial and newly lesbian woman in her early twenties,
the two women are finally able to see each other’s point of view by the end of the episode and
find a resolution.
4.3.3.3 Implicit Message
The third leading character, Kat, spends most of the episode exploring her sexuality
through meeting a new female partner with the permission of her girlfriend, Adena. Adena
expresses that she wants Kat to explore her new identity as a lesbian while maintaining an open
relationship together. While Sutton and Jane battle out the explicit messages of the right to gun
ownership and the need for gun control through pointed dialogue, Kat works through her feelings
about her own sexuality and her open relationship with Adena through some dialogue but mostly
actions. Kat is initially unsure about looking for physical intimacy outside her relationship with
Adena, but eventually tries online dating. She flirts with the rideshare driver taking Kat, Sutton,
and Jane to the skeet shooting range as part of Sutton’s entreaty to Jane, and Kat and the driver
do go out together. Kat shows her discomfort turn to excitement about learning more about
herself.
4.3.4

Results

The literature is clear that absorption, reflection, and identification are the key factors
encouraging narrative persuasion. The literature also debates whether an implicit or explicit
message is more persuasive. The responses I gathered from focus group participants offer
qualitative insight into the roles of these factors not present in previous quantitative and
experimental studies. The preliminary analyses provide evidence that absorption was present for

80
most participants and reflection was present for all included participants. However, absorption
and reflection were also essentially assigned conditions, as the participants needed to pay close
attention to the material to write a reflection response for a grade. Because of this, I am most
interested in participants’ discussions of identification and whether they were persuaded by the
implicit or explicit messages in the episode.
4.3.4.1 Analysis Protocol and Measures
I analyzed the student responses similarly to the way I approached the show analysis. The
first readthrough of all essays was done for the sake of grading, but it is also when I recognized
the similarity in responses to this particular prompt. Once informed consent was provided
following student grade submissions, participant essays were downloaded, student names were
removed, and responses were set aside for one semester. The first focus group was completed in
fall 2018, and so I knew already during the spring 2019 semester that I may obtain more of the
same responses. Although essays responses to other writing prompts differed from those of the
2018 class, the responses to “Betsy” in my 2019 class were very similar to those from students in
my 2018 class. Informed consent was collected again, and the second focus group essays were
set aside. In summer 2019, I began to analyze the first focus group’s responses. By spring 2020, I
had read all responses a second and third time, noting participants’ viewpoints, their use of
frames, their explanations of identification, and their acknowledgment of absorption and
reflection.
Of the 24 students who opted to participate in the focus groups, only 21 participants
responded to this writing prompt. Two additional participants did not follow instructions, nor did
their essays provide any information about the narrative persuasion factors, leaving 19 essays for
analysis. Two of the remaining participants chose to write about the show’s implicit message on
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nontraditional relationships, and the other 17 participants wrote about the show’s explicit
message on gun rights. Therefore, I will focus almost entirely on the analysis of responses
related the explicit message regarding gun rights. However, I believe the responses provided by
the two participants who wrote about nontraditional relationshilps are still worth noting with
regard to message implicitness. I include a brief analysis of these responses in the section on
explicit vs. implicit messaging.
Because the participants were senior undergraduates taking a course on the impact of
popular culture and media on political attitudes, they were familiar with narrative persuasion and
its components by name. I measure their absorption and identification first by explicitly asking
them in the prompt to discuss these factors in their essay responses. However, very few essays
expressed high levels of absorption or strong identification, two key conditions the literature lists
for narrative persuasion. One likely reason for this is the lack of perceived similarity between the
primarily non-white participants and the two white female characters at the center of the gun
rights debate that most participants chose to discuss. Another is that they may have chosen to use
other terminology to express this experience. After initial notation of participants’ explicit
statements of absorption and identification, I looked for language that expressed similar
experiences and concepts. Some participants did not mention the words “absorption” or
“identification” at all in their essays, for example, yet they did discuss feeling a connection in
some way to the material (absorption) or a character (identification).
4.3.4.2 Absorption
Of the 17 participants who wrote about the gun rights messages, only 11 expressed clear
absorption into the episode. One of the participants who wrote about nontraditional relationship
expressed high absorption, while the other expressed none. Levels ranged from two participants
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who explicitly said they experienced high absorption to those who did not mention absorption
explicitly but explained some level of investment in the outcomes of the show. One participant
wrote, “I was invested in the topic and the conflict,” while two others explained they only felt
absorbed after the gun rights topic was introduced. Five of the 18 participants did not mention
absorption, reflection, or a similar experience at all, and two expressed “no interest” and “no
deictic shift” while watching the episode.
Table 2 Participant Absorption
Experienced Absorption

Participants

High

4

Moderate

9

Low

3

None/No Mention

3

Of participants who did not explicitly express high absorption, a few expressed little
interest in the topic at all, but most described the process of transportation using other terms and
phrases. “I was invested in the topic and conflict,” wrote one student. Another explained that
they only felt absorbed after one character shared a story from her childhood about living close
to Columbine High School when the school shooting happened there. A third student simply
admitted they “wanted to know more about the relationship each of the three leading characters
had with one another.” These essays do not use the words “absorbed” or “transported,” but they
express thoughts that indicate the participants felt some deictic shift into the narrative.
4.3.4.3 Identification
The three participants who opted out of this assignment reported their demographics as a
white female and two Black males, leaving only one remaining white female in the focus group
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and three males, two Hispanic and one Black. These demographics decreased the likelihood of
participants identifying with the show’s characters based on perceived similarity, as the primary
characters are two young white women and one young biracial woman, and the secondary
characters are a white middle-aged woman, a young white man, and a young Black man.
In my initial analysis of participants’ identification, I looked for and tallied the keywords
for identification type. Eleven participants wrote that they felt some form of identification with
Jane, the “anti-gun” character, while seven identified in some way with Sutton and only two
participants identified in some way with Kat. Unsurprisingly, only one participant indicated a
feeling of perceived similarity to one of the white female characters. This participant was also
one of the only four participants to identify as white and female. More surprisingly, only one
participant expressed perceived similarity with Kat, who is biracial with a Black father and white
mother. This participant identifies as an African American or Black female and stated she “felt a
sense of similarity to [Kat] due to the fact that her beliefs felt similar to mine and some of her
physical attributes reminded me of myself as well.”
In my second analysis of identification in these essay responses, I noticed more
participants expressing a similar sense that their beliefs were similar to one character or
another—perceived similarity based on shared values. After compiling the responses who wrote
about shared beliefs or values with a character, I updated my count for perceived similarity from
only two participants explicitly stating they felt this type of identification to nine. Noticing this
sharp difference—even though the participants had some understanding of the terms and their
meanings—caused me to shift my analysis from a keyword search to a more detailed substantive
analysis. Between these analyses, I noticed a similar sharp difference between the many who
expressly wrote they experienced empathy and those whose language reflected the term’s
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technical definition. The participants who wrote about feeling empathy toward Sutton and Jane,
most described this as a connection with the characters’ arguments and emotional states rather
than with the characters themselves.
Table 3 Participant Identification with Characters
Identification Type
Experienced Sutton

Jane

Kat

Cognitive-Emotional ID

4

2

2

0

Perceived Similarity

9

2

5

2

Wishful Identification

0

0

0

0

Parasocial ID

2

0

0

2

Empathy*

9

3

5

1

Group identification

5

n/a

n/a

n/a

Low

High w/ Sutton

High w/ Jane

High w/Kat

7

6

4

2

Affective Orientation**

This table reflects the 19 participants’ responses that were analyzed.
*One participant expressed empathy for both Sutton and Jane, while another expressed empathy for individuals whose lives have
been affected by gun violence.
**One participant expressed high affective orientation for both Sutton and Jane, while another expressed none at all.

Similarly, while several participants explicitly wrote that they experienced cognitiveemotional identification, only four participants’ use of the term matched its technical definition.
Other participants instead described their identification in a manner more reminiscent of
perspective-taking, the cognitive dimension of empathy, rather than the emotionally-involved
experience of cognitive-emotional identification. Still other participants’ explanations of their
identification pointed to an agreement with a character’s stance on gun rights, which may be
better categorized as perceived similarity based on shared values, though some also express
empathy for the character in opposition to the character with which they most identified. In
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particular, two participants state they only feel empathy for Jane after she explains the trauma
she experienced as a child living down the street from Columbine High School when the school
shooting occurred there. This could explain why six of the 19 participants felt empathy for this
character, though one participant notes that while she agrees with Jane’s point of view on gun
control, “I would disagree with the way she handled the situation… thus negating the potential
for me to experience true empathic identification with her.”
My final understanding of the substantive analysis of these essay responses is presented
in Table 3. Five participants expressed perceived similarity—either through shared
demographics or shared values—with Jane. Two participants expressed similarity with Jane, and
two participants expressed similarity with Kat. Nine participants also expressed feeling empathy:
Five toward Jane, three toward Sutton, and one toward Kat. Two participants noted that they felt
as though they could be friends with Kat, voicing their parasocial identification (PSI). Five noted
feeling as though the main characters reminded them of their friends, family, or other social
group—group identification—with one participant admitting he identified with the “age group of
these characters” and the way they talked about gun rights. No participants reported they felt
wishful identification with one of the characters—either explicitly or implicitly. Four participants
articulated their cognitive-emotional identification with one of the characters, two identifying
with Sutton and two with Jane. Finally, 12 participants’ descriptions of their identification
pointed to high affective orientation with Sutton (6 participants), Jane (7), or Kat (2).
4.3.4.4 Explicit Messaging
Admittedly, most of the students who spoke up during the impromptu discussion of
Georgia’s campus carry law seemed to agree that while they approve of the constitutional right
to own firearms, the government also has a duty to its citizens to enact some measures of gun

86
control. In particular, students were keen on banning assault rifles and other weapons that may
be used to inflict a great deal of damage in a short amount of time. This trend did not shift in
their responses to the writing prompt on gun rights. One student even noted his views were
strengthened saying, "the media viewed in class has even further advanced my stance for more
legislation to be passed on gun control." Only two participants who responded to the gun rights
topic firmly stated they felt a shift in opinion regarding gun rights or gun control.
Instead, nine participants expressed what one participant termed a “softening” of opinion.
For several participants, this meant adopting a better understanding of why an individual may
own a gun and accepting new perspectives they had not previously considered. One participant’s
opinion shifted from "I held the view that those who were adamant on possessing a gun did so
with every intention of using it" to “This episode changed my stereotypical opinion on gun
owners.” Others recognized the need for better communication on divisive topics. One
participant wrote that her “views on communication for political topics such as gun control
opened a little in watching this episode,” and another stated the episode “affected how I view
others [sic] reasoning and opinions on situations that might differ from my own opinions.” This
participant went on to say she “also realized that you never really know why someone may feel
as strongly as they do about something, mainly when they're in opposition with you. You want
them to see your point of view so bad that you reject their feelings and ideas prematurely.”
These and other responses do not report a shift in policy views, but rather a shift in views
of the “other” side of the argument—the other side typically being Sutton’s viewpoint that guns
are not always violent and can be used safely. One explanation may be that while more
participants identified with Jane in some way—11 participants, as opposed to Sutton’s seven—
several expressed a preference for Sutton’s behavior during the friends’ argument and a dislike
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of Jane’s behavior. For much of the episode, Jane is dismissive of Sutton’s feelings and
somewhat rude to her friend, while Sutton appears more cool-headed and open to listening and
helping Jane. Several participants expressed dislike for Jane, with one explaining that Jane
reacted to Sutton’s beliefs in a “childish close-minded way.” Another noted that Sutton is framed
to make “her argument more acceptable and relatable,” and that this framing “made it harder for
me to completely dismiss or ignore [Sutton’s] opinion and reasoning.” This same participant
rightly acknowledges how this likability could lessen counterarguing in viewers.
4.3.4.5 Implicit Messaging
Conversely, the responses regarding the implicit message supporting nontraditional
relationships offered two very different experiences. One participant, who identifies as a
Hispanic woman and a Christian, admitted that her strong religious identity kept her from either
feeling absorbed in the story or identifying with one of the characters involved in the
nonmonogamous lesbian relationship between Kat and Adena. She explained that because she
believes “relationships and marriage should be between one man and one woman… this episode
did not affect my views on nontraditional relationships.” She also rightly points out that because
she does “not watch shows with same sex relationships… the chances of my views being
changed are minimal according to [the] chronic accessibility hypothesis.” This hypothesis states
that repeated exposure to the same themes in entertainment programs alters the information that
is chronically accessible to an individual (Holbrook and Hill 2005). According to the literature,
this participant’s failure to feel moved in any way toward this implicit message results from her
lack of absorption, identification, or exposure to similar themes.
The second participant who responded to the implicit message prompt, who identifies as
a white female, expressed quite the opposite experience as the first. This participant stated that
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she felt a high level of absorption and experienced some perceived similarity with Kat because
she “found myself to have a similar personality, as well as a[n] experience with needing to
branch out and explore my own sexuality.” However, she noted primary identification through
parasocial interaction with and empathy for Kat, explaining that “although I saw similarities, I
cannot fully relate to the pursuance of an open relationship.” The participant expressed that while
she began with more of a neutral stance on nonmonogamy, “this episode has shone a light on
why one might choose to pursue [an open relationship] and that the reasoning may not be as
selfish or sexually driven as I may have previously thought.” She goes on to acknowledge that
the implicit message of the episode exposed “a healthy aspect of open relationships,” noting that
by the end of the episode, “Kat and her partner were not only able to come to an agreement, but
they were able to grow closer which helped me to see how an open relationship can be healthy."
These two anecdotes do not provide new insight on the impact of implicit messages in
dramatic narratives. They do bolster previous studies regarding selection bias and mediated
intergroup contact. Given a wide array of media choice, individuals regularly select media and
information that aligns with their prior beliefs (Stroud 2007). The first participant I discussed
regarding implicit messaging clearly stated she avoids exposure to homosexual relationships in
entertainment media. However, the endogeneity presented in this choice does not altogether
remove persuasion effects in the media itself. Instead, Stroud (2007) suggests that individuals
choosing such media may strengthen their prior beliefs, leading to an overall attitudinal
polarization (426). The second participant indicates increased understanding of homosexual and
nonmonogamous relationships, in line with findings from studies on mediated intergroup
contact. Viewing a healthy relationship between two outgroup characters (homosexual women),
in addition to vicarious contact through ingroup characters (heterosexual women), can lead to
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increased empathy toward the outgroup in real life (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005; Kim and
Harwood 2019; Li 5019).
4.4

Discussion
When I first read the responses, I keyed in on several statements in which students

admitted they did not believe their overall opinion on gun laws had changed but that they
understood better the complexity of the issue. As one participant explained, “I've attempted to
view both sides of the story by watching various media outlets such as Fox News and CNN, but
[found] more and more issues with the comments and remarks,” noting that his frustration with
how news media covers this issue diminishes his willingness to hear out those with viewpoints
different from his own. However, entertainment media does not influence its audience members
in exactly the same way as news media, and narratives can decrease this kind of reactance.
Another participant shared that “after watching the show it gave me greater insight into the
different perspectives and more of an understanding of individual views.” The change is not
occurring after one episode, but the seeds are planted for further discussion.
4.4.1

Implicit Behavior Cues

Neither the intended explicit message nor the intended implicit message seemed to have
much effect in influencing participants’ policy attitudes. However, one unintended implicit
message did have an effect: Behaviors during an argument within friendly relationships. The
most interesting finding from the responses was not found in the students’ indications of attitude
change, but in their willingness to hear and consider both sides of the issue. One participant
recognized that "after watching the show it gave me greater insight into the different perspectives
and more of an understanding of individual views." Another noted that they “feel more
sympathetic as to why people with the opposite view have those views,” reflecting a newfound
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respect for individuals whose views stand in opposition to their own. Only two participants
stated they felt a potential shift in their views. One participant wrote that the episode “definitely
affected my view on gun-rights,” and another said “I experienced a shift in opinion when I saw
guns used in a different manner than violence.” The attitude that the episode “softened my
overall opinion and perspective on ownership” was much more frequent. The same participant
explained this softening as “[changing] my stereotypical opinion on gun owners,” though the
participant’s “attitude towards gun rights and gun control is very much the same.”
Across the essays, this sentiment rang out: “my view on gun rights was not changed;
however, I feel more sympathetic as to why people with the opposite view have those views.”
This same participant went on to write that "rather than the issue itself, the show showed me the
importance of understanding why one has a particular view on an issue.” Eight participants
expressed very similar sentiments that while their views of gun rights and laws had not changed,
their understanding of the other side had deepened. This sentiment supports the findings of
Paluck and Green (2009) that repeated exposure to new social norms will shift behaviors toward
those norms. While these participants did not experience attitude change, they did experience a
shift in how they perceive the situation.
4.4.2

Combined Factors

In addition to examining the factors of narrative persuasion by themselves, I also looked
for patterns in the responses. Which type of identification is most closely associated with high
absorption? Or, with increased empathy, considering more than half of participants expressed
this shift? Do identification and absorption combined have stronger effects? How about
identification combined with affective orientation, as suggested by the literature? Table 4
displays how each type of identification correlates with absorption and expression of increased
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empathy or understanding of the opposing viewpoint. For each participant who expressed one
type of empathy, I took note of whether they also expressed these conditions and found that
empathy or affective orientation, when combined with high absorption, showed the greatest
potential to increase real-world empathy for members of the opposition.
Table 4 Impact of Identification on Absorption and Empathy
Identification Type
Participants
Absorption

Increased Empathy

Cognitive-Emotional ID

4

4

2

Perceived Similarity

9

7

5

Parasocial ID

2

2

1

Group Identification

5

6

3

Empathy

9

7

7

Affective Orientation

11

10

7

Of the ten participants who expressed increased empathy toward the opposing viewpoint
or increased understanding of both sides, 9 expressed moderate to high levels of absorption. The
one participant who expressed low absorption also had little to say in their essay overall. Three
of these participants expressed pro-gun rights views, four expressed strong pro-gun control
views, and two expressed views somewhere in between. The remaining participant expressed
ambivalent views toward nontraditional relationships. Eight of the ten participants also expressed
some form of identification, though there seemed to be no defined pattern in type of
identification, while the other two participants simply did not discuss identification in their
essays. The most common form of identification, though, was empathy (seven participants),
which seems also to be associated with higher levels of affective orientation and moderate to
high levels of absorption.
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Of the nine participants who expressed empathic identification with one of the main
characters, seven indicated moderate to high levels of affective orientation; of these seven, six
also expressed moderate to high absorption. All six of these participants also expressed increased
empathy toward the opposing viewpoint or increased understanding of one or both sides. As
previously mentioned, two of the essays that expressed increased empathy or understanding did
not provide information on how they may have identified with the characters. One of the
remaining two essays that expressed increased empathy or understanding and moderate to high
absorption, but not empathy toward a specific character, indicated strong cognitive-emotional
identification with Sutton. Empathy can be considered a precursor to this form of identification
(Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005). The final essay indicated both group identification with the
three protagonist friends and perceived similarity to Jane based on similar viewpoints regarding
gun control.
Most interesting of these patterns, however, is that five of the six respondents who fit this
pattern of empathy, absorption, and increased understanding expressed empathy identification
with the character who expressed the viewpoint they came to better understand. For example, the
participant who professed ambivalent attitudes toward nontraditional relationships and
empathized with Kat, the character entering her first lesbian and open relationship, expressed
that she now feels more understanding about why individuals would choose a nontraditional
relationship. The participant who expressed cognitive-emotional identification with Sutton was
also originally very pro-gun control. Two other participants, who were initially strongly pro-gun
control and then expressed deeper understanding of the pro-gun rights side of the debate, chose
the pro-gun rights character, Sutton, as the character with which they most empathized. The two
participants who expressed increased understanding and identified as pro-gun rights actually
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empathized most strongly with Jane, the anti-gun character. Finally, the participant who
expressed increased understanding and identified as moderate on gun rights expressed empathy
with both Jane and Sutton.
This pattern does not strongly align with our current understanding of narrative
persuasion. Neither the implicit nor explicit messages appear to affect policy attitudes. Instead,
the combined factors of empathic identification, increased affective orientation, and moderate to
high absorption increased empathy toward people holding opposing policy beliefs in the real
world. This pattern seems to align more closely with mediated intergroup contact, traditionally
observed as increased empathy toward a societal outgroup. However, the conflicting characters
are both young, white, heterosexual American women—hardly the typical case study for
intergroup bias. In this episode, these characters differ solely in this one belief about gun rights
in America. The evidence provided by these focus groups suggests the impact of mediated
intergroup contact may extend to interparty contact, as well. 8
4.4.3

Limitations

In any political communication study where a treatment is provided, researchers must
account for selection effects, causal direction, and decreased environmental realism (see Iyengar
2011; Pettigrew, et al. 2011). The primary limitations of this study are that participants selfreported their experiences and they were aware of the type of questions that may be asked of
them following the treatment. One participant even noted they “knew immediately what kind of
question we would be asked” when the treatment episode began. Such conditions decrease
researcher ability to systematically measure attitudinal effects or accurately determine causality.

8

While both characters express liberal leanings in other episodes, neither character states affiliation with a political
party or ideology in this episode beyond taking a stance on the issue of gun control and openly accepting Kat as a
member of the LGBTQ+ community. Jane’s argument for gun control aligns closely with Democratic beliefs, while
Sutton’s statements for gun rights align with Republican beliefs.
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However, the open-ended prompt, paired with participants who were adequately able to discuss
their experiences, allowed for deeper understanding at an individual level of the identification
types present and their presentation in the participants.
The study also used too few subjects with too many ideal conditions, such as assigned
absorption and using participants familiar with the persuasive effects at work. Many media
effects studies with treatments often suffer from heightened absorption rates due to the nature of
subjects knowing they will be asked about the material later (Iyengar 2011), and using student
responses to a class assignment likely heightened this phenomenon. However, participants
expressly indicated their level absorption and interest. Because this level was explained in more
detail as part of a prompt, as opposed to a numerical measurement, I was better able to
understand whether they were absorbed for the sake of the assignment or genuinely interested in
the episode and its characters. This explanation also allowed me to compare absorption levels
with affective orientation and the various types of identification to gain a clearer picture of how
these conditions work together in narrative persuasion.
4.5

Implications for Future Research
This exploratory study into the components of narrative persuasion in fictional,

entertainment shows highlights much of what the extant literature already recognizes. Absorption
is imperative, and identification is key to reducing directional motivated reasoning (reactance).
Explicit messaging is clearer to identify, but less likely than implicit messaging to affect viewers.
Mediated intergroup contact can increase empathy in the real world. A single episode will not
persuade someone in a major way, but it can open an individual to entertaining ideas that differ
from their prior beliefs.
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Although the study was not groundbreaking, it did reveal that political scientists still have
much to uncover in how dramatic, fictional media can affect political attitudes. The explicit
message of the episode regarded gun rights, but a key implicit behavior made a statement about
how we discuss deeply divisive political issues with one another. The study suggests that
interparty and interbelief prejudice could also be reduced through dramatic, fictional narrative
exposure. Further research should dive deeper into this aspect of political attitudes and the ability
of dramatic, fictional narratives to encourage depolarization in the electorate. Additional focus
groups could be conducted to gain deeper qualitative insight on this. To better understand the
impact of mediated interparty contact, empirical evidence must be gathered and analyzed further.
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5

ASSESSING THE ACCUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF MEDIATED INTERGROUP
CONTACT ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS
Since 2014, the number of terrorist attacks has been decreasing both globally and in the

United States (Miller 2020). Yet, terrorism still accounts for a significant portion of news
coverage. Of the attacks reported in the U.S., those with Muslim perpetrators make up a
disproportionate amount of that coverage (Kearns, et al. 2019), although more recent years have
shown increases in terrorist acts by individuals with far-right and white supremacist ideologies
(Miller 2020). As mediators of information, the news media plays a significant role in helping
shape social norms as perceived by its audience (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018; Igartua, et al. 2014;
Bennett and Iyengar 2008). News media influences the public’s opinion not only on crimes like
terrorism, but also our perceptions of the marginalized peoples associated with these crimes
(Khan and Bruschke 2016; Mastro, et al. 2014; Shaheen 2009; Zúñiga, et al. 2012). However,
news media makes up a small portion of the television and internet-streamed content consumed
in America (Nielsen 2019). Does this media influence extend to entertainment media like
dramatic, fictional television shows?
Television viewing comprises the bulk (40 percent) of media consumption (Nielsen
2018). News audiences have long been declining (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2017), and evidence
indicates that dramatic shows are particularly adept at persuasion (see Hamby, et al. 2018). Much
like news media effects, entertainment media effects present in the dramatic narratives within
films and shows impact viewers by exposing them to specific topics in a specific context, thereby
making the information accessible and then providing a way to apply that information in a realworld context. Whereas the news media does this through compelling fact-based stories,
dramatic films and shows provide fictional narratives that viewers may relate to situations in
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their own lives. Over time, repeated themes and messages in entertainment media can shift
viewers’ perceptions of the world (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2008), and stereotypes can become
perceived as the norm (Reep and Dambrot 1987).
I employ data from an original survey using a national sample of (how many) people9 to
examine correlations between dramatic, fictional media exposure and perceptions of
marginalized peoples, in this instance, Muslims, Arabs, and Muslim Americans. In particular, I
explore individuals’ viewing habits of popular fictional shows, their beliefs about
counterterrorism policies and beliefs about who is likely to commit a terrorist act. The results
indicate that even with a vast array of media options, there is still a connection between the
fiction shows we watch and our beliefs about the crimes they depict and the people portrayed as
their perpetrators.
5.1

Dramatic Media’s Influence on the Social Construction of Reality
Although discussed using different terms by different fields, social scientists tend to

agree that individuals construct their reality through both personal experiences and what they
observe of the world around them. Political scientist John Zaller (1992) states that opinions are
“a marriage of information and predisposition” (6). Each attitude or opinion presented by an
individual is the result of combining the incoming information that the individual has been given
with their predisposition toward the topic at hand, often in favor of prior opinions (Krosnick
1988, McGuire 1966, Zaller 1992). Zaller’s work maintains that opinions are given based on
information available at the “top of the head” at the time of producing the opinion. Attitudes,
then, are not stable tenets that individuals carry with them from conversation to conversation but

This survey was approved by Georgia State University’s Institutional Review Board in 2019. The survey was
conducted through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform and is therefore a national sample, but is not nationally
representative.
9
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are instead nuances of stable values and are subject to change based on the current conversation.
Zaller (1992) explains that when individuals receive new information through experience or
observation they compare this information with their previously held beliefs before deciding
whether to accept or reject the new information.
The social construction process identified in communication works similarly, but with the
added understanding that during the competition between previous and new information about
reality, the media acts as a filter to position one version as more likely than another (Alitavoli
and Kaveh 2008). Individuals construct their reality, then, through personal experiences; through
information relayed via significant others, social groups, and organizations; and through
interaction with media (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2008). Alitavoli and Kaveh (2008) distinguish
between experienced reality, which is gained through “everyday interaction with the world
around us,” and symbolic reality, “which is gained from three other sources namely peers,
institutions and the media” (3). Media plays an especially large role in building symbolic reality
today as people increasingly spend their time looking at a screen. In 2018, the average American
adult spent more than eleven hours per day engaging with some form of media; nearly six of
those hours are spent accessing video content through TV, computer videos, and video focused
apps or web content on a smartphone or tablet (Nielsen 2018).
5.1.1

Accumulative Effects

Cultivation theory states that continued exposure to similar messaging and mediated
versions of reality can induce viewers to reshape their ideas of reality to be more in-line with
what they are absorbing from media (Reep and Dambrot 1987). For example, the more
frequently an individual watches a crime drama, the more likely they are to list crime as
America’s most important problem (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Similarly, health messages in
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dramatic shows may also influence whether individuals are more likely to become organ donors
(Quick 2013) or look into preventative options for breast cancer, even when the message comes
from more than one show (Hether et al 2008). Gierzynski and Eddy’s (2015) groundbreaking
work on the effects of sustained engagement with a dramatic narrative with a particular message,
Harry Potter and the Millennials, examines the accumulative influence of anti-authoritarian
messaging on political values. The more chronically accessible an issue is in entertainment
media, and the more consistent the message is, the more likely it is to shape an individual’s view
of society (Holbrook and Hill 2005).
Stereotypes in dramatic television shows—and the occasional character who breaks
them—offer prime examples of this sustained media influence on symbolic reality (Reep and
Dambrot 1987). News media is more likely to report terrorist attacks when the perpetrator is
Muslim (Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2019), and these stereotypes are mirrored in popular
dramatic media (see Shaheen 2009). Historically, Muslims and people of Arab descent have been
depicted in Western media as one of a handful of negative stereotypes: The terrorist, the oil
sheikh, the belly dancer, or the oppressed wife (Khan and Brushke 2016). As cultivation theory
suggests, this routine exposure to stereotypes keeps them salient and foundational to our social
constructive reality (Reep and Dambrot 1987). In essence, information saturation dictates
information acquisition (Elenbaas, et al. 2012).
Conversely, when a show presents a character from a marginalized group who does not
fit into the typical stereotypes, audience members are more likely to take notice in a positive way
(Gillig, et al. 2017). Gillig et al (2018) find evidence that increased visibility of transgender
individuals, especially through dramatic narrative, positively influences attitudes toward
transgender people and related policy issues. The authors credit this shift largely to identification
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with characters in the dramatic narrative and the elicitation of emotions, which Moyer-Gusé,
Dale, and Ortiz (2018) describe as form of mediated contact.
5.2

Entertainment Media Exposure as Mediated Intergroup Contact
Social contact theory asserts that intergroup, or intercultural, contact can diminish

prejudice, or ethnocentrism, between members of different social and ethnic groups. Americans
who exhibit high levels of ethnocentrism are more likely to experience increased perceptions of
threat after reading a news article about a Muslim terrorist, while those with previous intergroup
contact with a member from a cultural minority mediates the effects of perceived threat (Khan
and Bruschke 2016). Gillig et al (2018) and Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz (2018) suggest
entertainment media as a conductor for this intergroup contact, largely due to its ability to foster
identification between the viewer and one or more onscreen individuals. When identifying with
an onscreen individual who is also an outgroup member, or with an ingroup member who has
contact with an outgroup member, viewers can indirectly experience social contact through
parasocial interaction (Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz 2018).
However, what happens when depictions of out-group members are largely negative?
This study argues that increased exposure to Muslims/Arabs as terrorists/villain stereotypes in
dramatic media has significant, detrimental influence over viewers’ perceptions of Muslims and
Arabian people, as well as their attitudes toward related public policies. Although some shows
depict Muslims in protagonist roles, several scholars note it is more likely they will be cast in
antagonist roles, specifically as terrorist characters (e.g. Saleem 2017; Shaheen 2009). Based on
this literature, I expect the negative stereotype to negatively affect perceptions of Muslims,
increase the likelihood that individuals will associate terrorism with Islam, and influence
individuals’ attitudes toward related public policies. Furthermore, increased exposure through
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watching multiple shows with a Muslim terrorist antagonist and watching multiple episodes of
those shows will deepen this impact. To explore this theory, I hypothesize:
H1: Increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists will
increase viewers’ prejudice toward Muslims/Arab people.
H0: Increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists
will have no effect on viewers’ prejudice toward Muslim/Arab people.
H2: Individuals with increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as
terrorists will be more likely to support public policies that negatively affect
people from majority-Muslim countries.
H0: Individuals with increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab
characters as terrorists will be no more likely to support public policies that
negatively affect people from majority-Muslim countries than individuals with
less exposure to these shows.
H3: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as the primary antagonist
will heighten viewers’s support of these policies.
H0: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as the primary
antagonist will have no greater effect than exposure to shows where the
Muslim/Arab character is not the primary antagonist.
H4: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as a protagonist will
lessen viewers’ support on these policies.
H0: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as a protagonist
will have no effect on viewers’ support of these policies.

To appropriately examine these hypotheses, I conduct a two-part study that first examines
the available popular shows through substantive content analysis, and then second evaluates their
accumulative impact on viewers using an online survey.
5.3

Study Part 1: Show Selection and Analysis
When deciding which shows to include in my study, I began by selecting recent shows

that had aired in the last five years. I wanted to find shows that reached a large audience and met
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the following criteria, based on results from key studies examining narrative persuasion (namely
Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé 2008b; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Has a runtime of at least 40 minutes per episode,
Contains at least 8 episodes per season,
Falls within the drama genre,
Avoids a serialized format in favor of a season-length story arc (i.e. no crime or medical
dramas),
5. Involves crime, politics, and/or terrorism.
I leaned toward choosing shows that aired on one of the top networks (ABC, CBS, FOX,
and NBC) and platforms (Amazon, Hulu, and Netflix) and either ran more than one season
(denoting high viewership) or was considered a “most watched” or “top rated” show. I used
multiple popular, high-traffic entertainment sites to verify these criteria, including
TVGuide.com, TVLine.com, and Deadline.com. Once the initial shows were selected from these
lists, I used the synopses provided by Google as well as details listed on the International Movie
Database (IMDb) and Wikipedia for each show to determine whether they fit the required
criteria.
5.3.1

Show Synopses Analysis

This list was further shortened to include only shows whose Google and/or IMDb show
synopsis included at least one of the following keywords: Politics, political, government, trust,
crime, criminal, criminal justice, terror, and terrorism. I eliminated procedural crime dramas (e.g.
NCIS) and medical dramas (e.g. Grey’s Anatomy), as these appear in previous studies and have
already been shown to produce priming and framing effects (see Holbrook and Hill 2005; Quick
2009), as well as period shows, science fiction shows, and shows centered on the supernatural or
extra-human abilities because they may be less relatable, thereby diminishing perceived realism
(Bahk 2011). After all of these considerations I acquired a list of 35 shows that aired and/or
streamed from 2013 to 2018. I chose a five-year window to provide a large enough sample of
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shows for participants to choose from, and I ended the show selection in 2018 because I wanted
to ensure the entire current season of each show had aired prior to running the survey in fall of
2019, as the typical season of most network dramas runs from fall of one year to spring of the
next year.
Table 5 Dramatic Shows Chosen for Terrorism and/or Crime Content Analysis
24: Legacy (FOX)

Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)

Shots Fired (FOX)

Allegiance (NBC)

Jane the Virgin (CW)

State of Affairs (NBC)

American Crime (ABC)

Madame Secretary (CBS)

Taken (NBC)

Bodyguard (Netflix)

Mr. Robot (USA)

The Americans (FX)

Containment (CW)

Odyssey (NBC)

The Blacklist (NBC)

Crisis (NBC)

Orange is the New Black (Netflix)

The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)

Designated Survivor (ABC)

Ozark (Netflix)

The Crossing (ABC)

FBI (CBS)

Power (Starz)

The Informer (Amazon Prime)

Gang Related (FOX)

Quantico (ABC)

The Night Of (HBO)

Homeland (HBO)

Scandal (ABC)

The Passage (Fox)

House of Cards (Netflix)

Seven Seconds (Netflix)

Valor (CW)

Hostages (CBS)

Shades of Blue (NBC)

From this list of 35 shows related to crime, politics, and/or terrorism (Table 5), I studied
each show’s Wikipedia and IMDb pages for season and episode synopses. I read these to find
whether the show includes any mention of terrorism, terrorists, or terrorist-like attacks. For
example, some episodes of The Blacklist feature discussion about terrorism surrounding an event
but later label the attack otherwise. I also read the synopses with close attention paid to the
characters, their descriptions, and their relationships. I specifically looked at the antagonist
characters for signs of racial and religious profiling, as well as whether or not they were painted
as the primary antagonist in opposition to the show’s main protagonist.
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5.3.1 Character Analysis
To examine the prevalence of Arab, Arab-looking, and/or Muslim men as terrorist
antagonists in these 19 shows, I line read the same episode synopses to determine whether the
terrorist character served as an antagonist, sometimes called the villain, to the main characters.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, I discovered all terrorist characters served as antagonists. 10 To
continue my examination of terrorist characters, I learned whether each was described as being
Muslim or of Arab descent, at times needing to look up the actor’s biography to verify Middle
Eastern or South Asian descent when the character’s background is implied but not explicit.
Finally, I determined whether each show used their Muslim/Arab terrorist character(s) as a
primary antagonist, meaning the character was featured opposite the protagonist(s) in the show’
story arc for at least one season. Table 6 displays my findings, which are again not entirely
surprising.
Only five out of 19 shows featured terrorist activity not directly associated with a Muslim
and/or Arab character as the perpetrator, meaning two-thirds of the shows with some terrorism
storyline depict a Muslim/Arab perpetrator. While all Muslim/Arab terrorist characters are
portrayed as an antagonist, nine of the 12 shows use a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as their
primary antagonist. That is half of all shows portraying terrorism and three-fourths of those
shows with a Muslim/Arab perpetrator. Conversely, only five of the 19 shows depict a
Muslim/Arab protagonist. Of these shows, all depict some iteration of a Muslim/Arab terrorist
character, and only one, Quantico, does not have a Muslim terrorist as its primary antagonist.

I intentionally make the distinction here between “villain” and “antagonist.” Although often used interchangeably
in the vernacular, the term “villain” further connotes evilness, whereas “antagonist” simply refers to a character’s
position in relation to the main character, or protagonist. I prefer to maintain this neutral term as several
antagonists—even as terrorists—exhibit a complex backstory that does not always portray them as an evil villain.
10
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Table 6 Show Analysis of Muslim/Arab Characters
Shows with Terrorism Muslim/Arab as
Muslim/Arab
Story Arc

Muslim/Arab

Terrorist

Terrorist as

Character as

Antagonist

Primary Antagonist

Protagonist

24: Legacy

Yes

Yes

No

Bodyguard

Yes

Yes

Yes

Containment

Yes

Yes

No

Designated Survivor

Yes

Yes

Yes

FBI

Yes

No

No

Homeland

Yes

Yes

Yes

House of Cards

Yes

No

No

Jack Ryan

Yes

Yes

No

Madame Secretary

Yes

No

No

Mr. Robot

No

No

No

Odyssey

Yes

Yes

No

Quantico

Yes

No

Yes

Scandal

No

No

No

State of Affairs

Yes

Yes

No

Taken

No

No

No

The Americans

No

No

No

The Blacklist

Yes

No

No

Blacklist: Redemption

No

No

No

The Informer

Yes

Yes

Yes
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However, the plots and characters are often more complex than these dichotomous
variables suggest. As I explained that not all antagonists are evil villains, neither are all
Muslim/Arab terrorist characters all portrayed in the same way. In two instances, a season spent
framing the antagonist as likely to be Muslim and/or Arab would not be categorized as having a
Muslim/Arab terrorist antagonist, but could impact viewers differently depending on whether
individuals watched enough of the show to discover the true antagonist. For example,
Designated Survivor and Quantico both include story arcs where Muslim/Arab characters are
framed as terrorists at several points throughout the first season, although the actual terrorists are
revealed at the end of the season as being white characters. An individual who watched the full
first season of either show may be affected differently than an individual who watched only
several episodes, perhaps continuing to believe the Muslim/Arab character to be the primary
suspect.
Similarly, Homeland’s first season portrays a white man with mental health problems as
the primary antagonist, while its later seasons feature Muslim and Arab terrorist and non-terrorist
characters. News media effects studies note the discrepancies in coverage between terrorist acts
committed by Muslims and those committed by whites (Kearns, et al. 2019; Saleem 2017). Even
State of Affairs, which depicts both a Muslim Arab terrorist as its primary antagonist and South
American terrorists in a multi-episode story arc, discusses the Arab as a terrorist but refers often
to the South American antagonists as war lords or rebels.
5.4

Study Part 2: Survey
5.4.1

Survey Questions

Based on my analysis of show synopses and characters, I compiled and devised survey
questions to examine potentially key dependent and independent variables in my continued
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research on narrative persuasion of political attitudes. Responses to these questions hopefully
reveal information about how an individual perceives and interacts with a specific entertainment
media, how they interpret certain societal norms, and how they observe themselves. I looked to
the literature and studies examining similar attitudes for insight into question choice and
creation. When choosing and creating unique survey questions to use in the MTurk
questionnaire, I focused on three primary purposes: Identification, media use, and sociopolitical
attitudes related to terrorism and perceptions of Muslims. I did not need to create entirely new
questions for many aspects I wanted to examine; however, there were areas where I needed to
either tweak an existing question or create a new one. Below, I explain my choice of questions
for each purpose.
5.4.1.1 Demographics and Identification
In keeping with other political science studies, I employed demographics questions
regularly used on the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey to illuminate the
personal identities of my participants (see ANES 2016). These questions include political
identification, religion, education, marital status, employment, and income. For race, ethnicity,
and gender, however, I looked to newer versions of these questions to better capture the
contemporary, diverse identity landscape portrayed in today’s entertainment media. The gender
question includes male, female, and a third choice of “non-binary/other.” The race and ethnicity
question, taken from Hughes et al (2016), allows respondents to check multiple boxes and
provides more choices than previous questionnaires: American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian;
Black or African American; Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin; Middle Eastern or North
African; Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander; White; or Other. This form of the race and
ethnicity question was particularly important for its inclusion of the “Middle Eastern or North
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African” option, as distinguished from the “Asian” option, because it allows better differentiation
for participants’ potential identification with a character presented as being Middle Eastern
and/or Arab. I also included a question on travel, asking whether respondents had traveled
outside of the country in the past five years, which can indicate a greater openness to new
cultures (Saleem 2017).
These demographics questions are not only important for understanding why respondents
may hold certain sociopolitical attitudes, but also for exploring their similarities to the characters
portrayed in the popular dramas I’m studying. Perceived similarity, as a way of identifying with
a fictional character, remains the strongest influence on decreasing counterarguing, a form of
resistance to embedded messages in dramatic fictional media similar to directional motivated
reasoning (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). It also remains the only form of identification that can
be externally verified, to a degree, by comparing the demographics of the character to the viewer.
Therefore, certain demographics questions may serve as control variables or even covariates for
the dependent variables of this study.
5.4.1.2 Media Use
I asked participants about their media use to determine either an explanatory/independent
variable or a lurking or blocking variable. For example, the more politically aware someone is,
the less likely they are to be swayed by new information (Lupton, et al. 2015). Querying
respondents about how often they watch and how much attention they pay to the news each
week, as well as asking several political knowledge questions, provides insight into how
persuasive a narrative may be for that individual. These questions were also gleaned from the
regular ANES survey. Similarly, the literature provides evidence that watching crime serials like
Law & Order or CSI increase the likelihood that an individual will perceive crime as a major
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problem in America (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Thus, I created a question similar to those the
ANES asks about how many days each week an individual is exposed to news content, non-news
content, or social media.
As the consumption method and amount remain the key explanatory variables I am
observing, I created two new questions for my research. First, I directly ask respondents whether
they prefer to watch shows as they air on television, typically once per week, or if they prefer to
binge-watch shows after they have finished airing, watching many episodes in one sitting. Next,
I returned to the list of shows that fit my criteria for narrative persuasion of views toward
counterterrorism policies and perceptions of Muslims. For each show, I decided to ask
participants how much they had watched: Never watched, watched one to three episodes,
watched more than three episodes but not one season, or watched at least one full season. These
questions could help me to better understand the accumulative effects of these shows.
5.4.1.3 Key Attitude Variables
My key dependent variables include policy views and social attitudes. The policies I was
most interested in were those on sending troops to the levant to fight Islamic militants, allowing
Syrian refugees to immigrate to the U.S., and approving the use of drone strikes to target
terrorists abroad. For each of these policies, I chose questions with a range of answers to indicate
favorability on a seven-point likert scale. I selected the questions regarding sending U.S. troops
and accepting Syrian refugees from a survey that examines how news media affects these
attitudes (Saleem 2017), and I created a drone strike approval question to fit the same format.
Lastly, I included a dichotomous question about the relationship between sacrificing freedoms
and safety from terrorist attacks.
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For social attitudes, I wanted to examine perceptions about Islam and Muslims in
association to violence and terrorism. I chose questions about whether respondents are worried a
terrorist attack will happen in the near future in the U.S. and whether they are worried a terrorist
attack will happen in their area (Saleem 2017). Pulling again from Saleem et al (2017), I chose to
include a grid question on how likely members of certain social groups are to engage in an act of
terrorism. I created a similar grid question on how likely members of certain social groups are to
experience discrimination in the U.S. for comparison. Finally, I chose a dichotomous question
asking respondents whether they believe Islam is more or less likely than other religions to
promote violence.
To examine overall social prejudice against Muslims, I created a new bias variable from
the responses to two grid questions regarding Muslims. First, I created new measurements from
the spectrum of responses to the two grid questions asking for an evaluation of various social or
political groups. The first grid question asked respondents how likely they felt that a member
from each group would be to commit a terrorist attack on the United States in the near future
(Blacks, Whites, Muslims, Christians, Left-wing Radicals, Right-wing Radicals, Russians, and
Chinese). Because I am more interested in prejudice against Muslims than whether the individual
is overly concerned about terrorism in general, I compared each individual’s response to whether
a Muslim would commit an attack to the individual’s average response across all eight groups. I
subtracted the averaged response from the response specific to Muslims, and then I converted
these measurements to a spectrum from zero to one. I repeated this process for a second grid
question regarding discrimination. The question asked respondents to evaluate how much
discrimination members of each group (Black, Whites, Women, Men, LBTQ Persons,
Transgender Persons, Muslims, and Christians) face in the U.S. from none to a great deal.
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Because prejudiced individuals are less likely to perceive discrimination against the group about
which they are prejudiced, I took the final measurements and subtracted them from one to
achieve a percentage that reflects a higher number for individuals less likely to perceive
prejudice against Muslims than against members of other groups. To create the bias dependent
variable, I added together the final percentage measurements created from the two grid
questions, and then I divided by two to obtain a single set of measurements reflecting overall
bias against Muslims.
For political policy attitudes, I chose to examine two different, salient policies that affect
Muslim-majority countries. First, I asked respondents whether they favor or oppose “sending
ground troops to fight Islamic militants, like ISIS, in Iraq and Syria,” providing a seven-point
response scale. My assumption is that individuals with greater bias against Muslims will be more
likely to favor sending troops. Second, I asked respondents whether they favor or oppose
accepting refugees from Syria, again providing a seven-point response scale. My assumption is
that individuals with greater bias toward Muslims will be less likely to favor accepting Syrian
refugees.
5.4.1.4 Key Independent Variables
Using the list of 35 shows that include the themes or keywords crime, politics, and/or
terrorism (Table 5), I presented each show one-by-one in a survey question that asked whether
respondents had seen the show: never (0), 1-3 episodes (1), more than 3 episodes and up to one
season (2), or at least one season (3). From these questions, paying particular attention to the
shows listed in Table 6, I created three new variables that measure exposure to terrorism
storylines with Muslim perpetrators and storylines with a Muslim terrorist as the primary
antagonist. These variables—Muslim terrorist (MT) exposure, Muslim terrorist antagonist
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(MTA) exposure, and Muslim protagonist (MP) exposure—are an aggregation of participants’
responses to how much they watched of a specific set of shows. The MT exposure variable
aggregates participants’ responses to the exposure question for the 14 shows that depict a
Muslim/Arab terrorist, and the MTA exposure variable aggregates responses for the nine shows
with a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as the primary antagonist. The MP exposure variable
aggregates responses for the five shows with a Muslim protagonist.
The variation in exposure of these three conditions (MT, MTA, and MP exposure) is
provided as an aggregation of the responses to the initial show exposure questions, which place
responses on a scale from 0 to 3. The gross exposure variables express a percentage (0 to 1) of
the initial aggregation of these responses to the shows of each category. For example, if a
participant watched two episodes of Jack Ryan (measured as 1 in the original show exposure
variable), ten episodes of Madame Secretary (measured as 2), more than one season of both
Quantico and Taken (measured as 3), and no episodes of any of the other shows that depict a
Muslim terrorist stereotype, their initial MT exposure measurement would be 9. However,
because only Jack Ryan depicts a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as a primary antagonist, their
MTA exposure would measure as 1. These aggregations are then converted into a percentage of
possible responses. Because there are 14 shows depicting a Muslim terrorist stereotype,
continuing with this example, the individual’s MT exposure percentage measurement would be
0.214 or 21.4 percent of the total exposure measurement possible.
By aggregating the responses to these show exposure questions, I am better able to
understand the potential impact of watching shows that use terrorists, and especially Muslim
terrorist stereotypes, as an antagonist. For example, a show that uses a white, left-wing radical
terrorist in one episode and a Muslim jihadist in another episode, like FBI, will probably have
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less impact on a viewer’s belief that Muslims are more likely than other groups to commit a
terrorist act than a show where an entire season is based on a storyline that uses a Muslim
terrorist character as its primary antagonist, such as State of Affairs. By converting the
aggregated responses to percentages, I am better able to compare these responses across varying
measurements.
5.4.2

Methods

In October 2019, I conducted a survey experiment using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
platform. The survey included 118 questions covering demographics, views on public policy,
political knowledge, beliefs about various social groups, trust in governmental institutions, and
news and dramatic media consumption patterns (Appendix B). A total of 1088 participants
responded and were provided $2.00 as compensation for their time, which was approximately 30
to 45 minutes. Data was collected in less than 24 hours using this method, and participants were
compensated within two business days.
5.4.2.1 Participants
Of the 1088 participants, 652 (60.04%) identified as male, 431 (39.69%) identified as
female, and 3 (0.28%) identified as non-binary or other. Approximately 70% of participants selfidentified as age 35 or younger, with the youngest participant at 18, the mean age at 34, and the
oldest participant at 74 years of age. More than half of participants (54%, 587 participants)
identified as White, while 23% (250) identified as Asian, and 11.32% (123) identified as Black
or African American. Only 4.23% (46 participants) identified as Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish
origin as their sole identification, though 72 participants in total listed this as one of their
identities. A total of 61 participants (5.61%) listed more than one identity, with 16 participants
listing American Indian or Alaskan Native, 21 listing Asian, 18 listing Black or African
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American, 26 listing Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin, seven listing Middle Eastern or North
African, 10 listing Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and 46 listing White as one of
multiple identities. There were also 15 participants who identified solely as American Indian or
Alaskan Native, and five participants (0.46%) identified as Middle Eastern or North African.
Considering the marginalized identity being observed concerns a globally popular
religion, I included nine choices for the religion question and also a question about the level of
importance of participants’ religion (Appendix B). The majority of respondents identified as
Catholic (343, 31.53%), Hindu (162, 14.89%), and Protestant (160, 14.71%) with 292
participants (26.84%) claiming no preference. The remaining 5.98% of participants associated as
Pagan (3 participants), Jewish (11), Muslim (32), and another religion (66) with 19 participants
preferring not to say. Participants’ responses as to how important their religion is to them was
somewhat bipolar with 30.91% (336 participants) claiming their religion is not at all important
while 23.46% (255) claim it to be very important and 22.17% (241) claim it to be extremely
important. This places nearly 46% of participants as feeling their religion (likely Catholicism,
Hinduism, or Protestantism) is very or extremely important to them. Only 8% (87) reported their
religion was slightly important and 13.52% (147) claimed it to be moderately important. The
remaining 21 participants (1.93%) reported they were undecided. Unsurprisingly, those who
reported their religion was of little importance were more likely to claim no religious preference
(250 participants). Those who claimed their religion to be very important were predominately
Catholic (110, or 32% of those who reported to be Catholic), Protestant (50), and Hindu (70).
Those who claimed their religion was extremely important to them were also predominately
Catholic (129), Protestant (42), and Hindu (39). Those who identified as Muslim were more
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likely to report their religion as very important (34.38% of Muslim respondents) or extremely
important (31.25%).
Interestingly, 40.63% of respondents reported to align with the Democratic Party, while
31.25 aligned with Republicans. Yet, 44.12% reported they disapprove of how President Donald
Trump is doing his job, while 47.95% said they approve. Many respondents also agreed with the
statement that they generally trust the federal government to run the United States, with 57.72%
saying they agree in some capacity and only 32.72% saying they disagree.
5.4.2.2 Shows
A surprising 141 participants (12.96%) reported having never seen an episode of any of
the 19 shows depicting a terrorism storyline, and 198 (18.2%) had never seen an episode of one
of the 14 shows depicting one of the terrorist characters as Muslim. Nearly one-third of
participants (30.15%) had never seen an episode of one of the nine shows depicting a
Muslim/Arab terrorist character as the primary antagonist. A similar 33.09% had never seen one
of the shows with a terrorism storyline depicting a Muslim protagonist—not surprising
considering four out of the five shows with a Muslim protagonist also include a Muslim
antagonist.
5.4.3

Results

My first hypothesis states that increased exposure to the Muslim terrorist (MT) stereotype
will negatively influence viewer perceptions of Muslims. To examine this hypothesis, I ran a
linear regression comparing the correlation between aggregated exposure to shows depicting a
Muslim/Arab terrorist character and the bias dependent variable (Table 7). Unsurprisingly,
individuals with higher education and those who have traveled outside the US in the past five
years appear less likely to express bias against Muslims. Surprisingly, higher political knowledge
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significantly correlates with greater bias. Against my expectations, greater aggregated exposure
to the MT stereotype negatively correlates with bias against Muslims, indicating that increased
exposure lessens bias.11 This may indicate that any increased mediated exposure—positive or
negative—to an outgroup member (mediated intergroup contact) can facilitate empathy and/or
decrease anxiety toward the outgroup, as suggested by the focus group responses in Chapter 4 of
this manuscript.
Table 7 OLS Regression on Bias Against Muslims
Bias Against Muslims
Coefficient

Standard Error

z-score

p-value

MT Stereotype

-0.101***

0.018

-5.61

0.000

White

0.025***

0.008

3.25

0.001

Female

0.006

0.007

0.83

0.410

Education

-0.007**

0.002

-2.79

0.005

Pol ID/Republican

-0.001

0.004

-0.30

0.761

Pol Knowledge

0.007***

0.001

5.28

0.000

Travel Outside US

-0.020**

0.007

-2.91

0.004

Constant

0.582

0.019

31.08

0.000

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

My second hypothesis claims that increased exposure to the MT stereotype influences
views toward favoring public policies that may negatively affect Muslims and people from
Muslim-majority countries. To test this hypothesis, I looked at responses to two salient public

11

See Appendix C for additional models that measure the relationship between aggregated exposure and the raw
responses from the questions I used to create this bias variable. While these models provide greater evidence for my
hypothesis, I believe this is a more adequate measurement of bias against Muslims through association with
terrorism, whereas the raw answers only provide evidence for bias against Muslims or fear of terrorism in general.
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policy questions in the survey. The first question asked respondents whether they favor or
oppose sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria. The
second asks whether they favor or oppose accepting Syrian refugees to the United States. Both
questions offer a 7-point response scale from “favor a great deal” to “oppose a great deal.” Table
8 shows the results of these linear regression analyses, providing the coefficient for each
correlation with the standard error in parenthesis.
Table 8 OLS Regressions on U.S. Public Policy Beliefs Related to Muslim-Majority Countries
Public Policy Beliefs
Send Troops to MidEast

Accept Syrian Refugees

MT Stereotype

2.434 (0.265)***

1.545 (0.263)***

White

-0.115 (0.113)

-0.441 (0.113)***

Female

0.129 (0.103)

0.214 (0.103)*

Education

-0.032 (0.036)

0.135 (0.036)***

Pol ID/Republican

0.152 (0.062)*

-0.503 (0.062)***

Pol Knowledge

-0.028 (0.021)

0.011 (0.021)

Travel Outside US

0.268 (0.104)**

0.209 (0.103)*

Constant

-0.257 (0.278)

0.577 (0.275)*

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001
Standard errors in parenthesis.

There is a strong correlation between accumulated exposure to the MT stereotype and
approval of both policies, which supports the assumption that increased exposure would increase
support of sending troops but refutes the assumption it would decrease favor of accepting Syrian
refugees. However, the latter result of a positive correlation between accumulated exposure to
the MT stereotype and favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. may indicate increased
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empathy toward Syrian refugees and increased bias against Muslim terrorists in particular, as
opposed to Muslims in general. The question regarding sending ground troops to fight Islamic
militants specifies “in Iraq and Syria,” which could lead many respondents to instead interpret
the question regarding accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. to mean accepting individuals to the
U.S. who are escaping from Islamic militants.
Both models also show correlations between political identification and the policy
attitudes; however, the data reports that Republicans are more likely support sending troops but
less likely to accept Syrian refugees. Having traveled outside the U.S. within the previous five
years also appears to favor toward both policies. Approval of accepting Syrian refugees to the
U.S. also correlates with being female and more highly educated, while individuals who identify
as white are less likely to approve this policy. The mixed results signify there is likely a deeper
explanation for these specific beliefs rather than a blanket correlation between stereotype
exposure and policy attitudes. An additional factor that may affect these policy attitudes in
particular, but also all the models depicted, is that a significant percentage of respondents
identify as Hindu and Asian. This shows there may be a large portion of the sample that is
Indian, rather than American. As these policy attitudes are specific to the United States, nonAmericans are likely to answer very differently than Americans.
My third and fourth hypotheses consider the impact of having a Muslim as the primary
antagonist or as a protagonist in a show with a terrorism storyline. I predict that having a Muslim
terrorist character as the primary antagonist will further increase the negative influence of this
stereotype on viewers’ political attitudes and social perceptions, while having a Muslim
protagonist will diminish these effects. To evaluate these hypotheses, I examine again the bias
and policy dependent variables using my aggregated exposure variables for shows that include a
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Muslim terrorist character as the primary antagonist and shows that include a Muslim
protagonist. Table 9 displays OLS regressions on the bias and policy attitudes including the
aggregated variable for exposure to MT antagonists.
Table 9 OLS Regressions on Bias and Policy Attitudes Regarding Muslims
Bias Against Muslims
Policy Attitudes
Send Troops

Accept Refugees

MT Antagonist

-0.106 (0.017)***

2.298 (0.257)***

1.472 (0.255)***

White

0.023 (0.008)**

-0.099 (0.114)

-0.429 (0.113)***

Female

0.005 (0.007)

0.131 (0.103)

0.216 (0.103)**

Education

-0.007 (0.002)**

-0.032 (0.036)

0.135 (0.036)***

Pol ID/Republican

-0.001 (0.004)

0.150 (0.062)**

-0.504 (0.062)***

Pol Knowledge

0.007 (0.001)***

-0.023 (0.021)

0.014 (0.021)

Travel Outside US

-0.019 (0.007)**

0.268 (0.104)**

0.208 (0.103)**

Constant

0.582 (0.019)***

-0.214 (0.277)

0.601 (0.275)**

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001
Standard errors in parenthesis.

In all three models, the correlation between the substantive independent variable and the
dependent variable is statistically significant (Table 9). The results indicate that increased
exposure to shows with a Muslim terrorist character as the primary antagonist will decrease an
individual’s bias against Muslims. The full model regarding bias against Muslims is the same for
aggregated exposure to Muslim terrorist antagonists as to the Muslim terrorist stereotype. Also
similar, aggregated exposure to Muslim terrorist antagonist characters is positively and
significantly correlated with both policy stances. Travel and political party identification are
again statistically significant, with Republicans being more likely to favor sending troops but less
likely to favor accepting Syrian refugees, and those having traveled being less likely to express
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bias but more likely to favor both policies. In the regression on favor toward accepting Syrian
refugees, again the only non-significant factor is political knowledge.
Table 10 OLS Regressions on Beliefs that a Muslim will Corry out a Terrorist Attack in the U.S.
in the Near Future
Bias of Muslims
Bias of Muslims
Muslim Protagonist -0.069 (0.016)***

No Muslim Protagonist -0.104 (0.018)***

White

0.027 (0.008)***

White

0.025 (0.008)***

Female

0.008 (0.007)

Female

0.005 (0.007)

Education

-0.008 (0.002)**

Education

-0.007 (0.002)**

Pol ID/Republican

-0.002 (0.004)

Pol ID/Republican

-0.001 (0.004)

Pol Knowledge

0.008 (0.001)***

Pol Knowledge

0.007 (0.001)***

Travel Outside US

-0.023 (0.007)***

Travel Outside US

-0.020 (0.007)**

Constant

0.577 (0.019)***

Constant

0.583 (0.019)***

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001
Standard errors in parenthesis.

I ran the same three models using exposure to shows with a Muslim protagonist as the
substantive independent variable. Interestingly, the results of these regressions were extremely
similar, likely because four of the five shows with a Muslim protagonist also include a Muslim
antagonist. To better understand the difference between having a Muslim antagonist and
protagonist and having only a Muslim protagonist, I created a fifth aggregated exposure variable
using responses for the shows that depict a Muslim terrorist character but with no Muslim
protagonist. I compare the two results in Table 10 on the bias dependent variable. Even
separating the shows, I still find the same correlations. Increased exposure to shows with a
Muslim protagonist negatively correlates bias against Muslims, as does exposure to shows with a
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Muslim terrorist character but no Muslim protagonist. In both models, education level and
political identification also show correlations with statistical significance.
5.5

Discussion
All four exposure variables exhibit similar results regarding beliefs about Muslims and

public policies regarding Muslims and Muslim-majority countries. Increased exposure to the MT
stereotype in any capacity may influence viewers’ ideas about Muslims—both in America and
abroad. However, evidence does not support my initial projection that negative stereotypes
would correlate with bias. Instead, aggregated exposure to onscreen Muslims correlates with
decreased bias against Muslims. In one interpretation, the correlations are arbitrary. In another,
there is perhaps an endogenous, underlying factor that indicates individuals less likely to express
prejudice toward Muslims are also more likely to watch shows that include Muslim characters.
In a third view, the correlation supports previous studies, like that of Ortiz and Harwood (2007;
see also Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019), who find that any voluntary, mediated intergroup contact
increases empathy toward the outgroup.
With regard to policy attitudes, increased exposure significantly correlates with favor
toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria, but also correlates with
favor toward accepting refugees from Syria, a Muslim-majority country. While this refutes my
initial assumptions that increased exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype will increase favor
of policies that negatively affect Muslims and Muslim-majority countries, it may instead indicate
the exact opposite. Increased empathy toward Muslims, as is evidenced in the social bias models,
would understandably correlate with favor of accepting refugees from a Muslim-majority
country. In another interpretation of the question regarding sending ground troops to Iraq and
Syria, respondents empathic to the plight of victims in these countries may see U.S. intervention
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against Islamic militants as positive for the majority-Muslim countries impacted by militant
violence. These relationships may actually provide deeper evidence that mediated intergroup
contact—even those of negative portrayals—increase empathy toward the outgroup (see Dale
and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; Ortiz and Harwood 2007).
5.5.1

Limitations

It is important to note several key limitations of this study. Namely, using the Mechanical
Turk platform allows for a large sample, but not one that is nationally representative.
Considering the large ratio of individuals identifying as Asian and Hindu, this sample likely
includes a significant number of Indians. This may partially account for the overall favor toward
policies that would send American troops to fight Islamic militants and would accept Syrian
refugees to American, as non-Americans may be more willing to risk American lives and
resources. However, it may provide greater evidence for mediated intergroup contact decreasing
prejudice, considering the long history of religious animosity in India which pits Hindus against
Muslims. The deep divide between these groups led to the 1948 partition of India and the
creation of a new, Muslim state, Pakistan. Should the sample include a large number of Hindu
Indians, the negative correlation between accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist
stereotype and prejudice against Muslims is even more striking.
Further, the proxies provided to account for stereotype exposure accumulation cannot
account for varied frames within a show. It is one thing to understand that many shows will delve
deeper into character histories later in a season and, therefore, to expect audience stereotype
acceptance to increase in the introductory episodes and decrease thereafter. However, it is quite
another to comb through every single show available for this tipping point. That level of detail is
neither a good use of time nor a necessarily desirable collection of data. Regardless of where the
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show makes this tipping point, there are many other factors in play, such as primacy and recency
effects (McGuire 1992), personal attention and circumstance (Bennett and Iyengar 2008),
perceived realism and identification (Hamby, et al. 2017), etc.
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6

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF BINGE EFFECTS ON NARRATIVE
PERSUASION AND MEDIATED INTERGROUP CONTACT

Do contemporary media consumption habits like binge watching alter the impact of
entertainment media effects on social and political attitudes? When Gerbner and colleagues
developed cultivation theory, which asserts that extended exposure to similar messaging across
mass media influence social norms, they had no way of knowing the vast changes the Internet
and the information revolution would bring. Harmon et al (2019) present evidence that the
contemporary media environment diminishes the accumulative effects described by cultivation
theory, positing that selection bias pushes individuals to seek out media—both news and
entertainment—that matches their current perceptions of social norms. While this certainly
comprises part of the explanation for the results they find that messaging in media has null
effects in the contemporary media environment, it is not the full story.
In addition to selection bias, the very methods of media consumption have changed quite
drastically since the 1960s conditions in which Gerbner made his first assertions. Where
television shows and films were once strictly monitored and even scarce, today the media market
is saturated at all times with easily-accessible audio-visual material that Americans consume in
rather large quantities. In the 1960s, television, film, and advertising were not new, but they did
command a far lesser percentage of Americans’ daily attention. Today, Americans have access to
video content across a wide array of devices and platforms at any time of the day in nearly any
location. American adults spend, on average, 11 hours per day looking at a screen, using more
than four of those hours to watch live or streamed television (Nielsen 2019). In addition to cable
and network television, subscription-based platforms offer full of hundreds of thousands of hours
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of entertainment content. Unlike the 20st century in which cultivation theory was developed,
today we have Netflix.
Video streaming platforms like Netflix have transformed the entertainment media market,
not only raising the sheer amount of easily-accessible content, but also transforming the methods
through which we consume it. In the 1960s television news and a few shows were available at
certain times of the day, limiting the possibilities of consumption. Now, American adults report
not only watching more television, but bingeing on it. Binge watching refers to the practice of
consuming at least two to six episodes of the same show in one sitting (Netflix 2013). Netflix
(2016), which makes up 31 percent of television streaming, reports approximately 73 percent of
its users engage in binge watching on a weekly basis. With the ever-growing supply and everchanging demands of the entertainment media market, does cultivation theory still have merit?
6.1

Evaluating Media Consumption Method Effects
In this chapter, I evaluate the effects of binge watching on narrative persuasion and

mediated intergroup contact through a longitudinal laboratory experiment. To do this, I build
upon the survey results in Chapter 5, which suggest a relationship between watching shows that
include Muslim characters—even as antagonists—and shifting attitudes toward Muslims and
policies related to Muslim-majority countries. In addition to examining the accumulative effects
of exposure to nuanced mediated intergroup contact and persuasive messages embedded in the
narrative, I use this experiment to study how binge watching further alters these effects on
viewers’ social perceptions and political attitudes. The laboratory experiment also allows me to
control for selection effects and evaluate causal direction.
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Over seven weeks, 14412 undergraduate students from a large, diverse, university
screened the first three episodes from one of two popular, fictional dramas. Within each of these
groups, approximately half of the participants binged all three episodes in one sitting, screening
them back-to-back with only short breaks in between each episode. The other half of each group
came in once per week for three weeks to watch each episode, mimicking the conventional
weekly television broadcasting format. Thus, the two by two treatment design produced four
groups: Show 1 binge watchers, show 1 weekly watchers, show 2 binge watchers, and show 2
weekly watchers. All participants completed pre- and post-treatment surveys to determine
attitude shifts, and 112 participants (77.8 percent) completed an additional follow-up survey two
weeks after the final episode was screened for weekly watchers to track any lasting effects. I
used two treatment shows to compare effects between material as well as between consumption
methods. The first three episodes of Amazon Prime’s Jack Ryan served as the counterterrorism
treatment show, intended to influence audience attitudes toward American counterterrorism
policies and perceptions of Muslims and crime. I used ABC’s This Is Us as a comparison show
with a tolerance treatment, as it neither discusses terrorism nor depicts a Muslim character but
does portray explicit and implicit messages of acceptance regarding marginalized groups.
This chapter describes the experiment in full. First, I revisit my theory of binge effects in
the context of mediated intergroup contact and my expectations for its effects on social
perceptions and political attitudes. Next, I expound upon the details of designing and carrying
out the study. Finally, I share the results of the experiment and discuss the evidence these results
provide. This innovative design builds upon exceptional previous studies, and I hope it will
prove the first of many in this vein.

12

In total, 159 participants began the first treatment, but only 145 completed all three treatment sessions and filled
out the pre- and post-treatment surveys.
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6.2

Binge Effects Theory
The entertainment media effects literature does not currently consider the impact of what

is popularly referred to as “binge watching.” The term “bingeing” is vernacularly related to the
act of gorging oneself on food and/or drink. This is where we get the term “binge drinking,”
which alludes to the act of drinking alcoholic beverages to excess in a short period of time. In
contemporary parlance, one may binge on books, movies, video games, and television shows in
the same manner. Binge watching typically describes the act of watching multiple episodes of
the same show in one sitting (Conlin, Billings, and Averset 2016; Netflix 2013). An entire season
of a show may even be binged in a day or two, depending on the number and length of episodes.
I coin the term binge effects to describe changes to the impact of narrative persuasion on
individual attitudes that may occur as a result of the consecutive consumption of lengthy media
over a relatively short period of time. This can refer to a film and its sequels or to many episodes
or a full season of an episodic show. As Conlin, Billings, and Averset (2016) point out, “the
content of the narrative does not shift, yet the amount of narrative one watches can be rapidly
accelerated when compared to past media release models” (152, emphasis removed). However,
the act of bingeing on a specific media—in which each consumed item of media is part of a
series or is highly related in some thematic way, such as by genre or topic—is different from the
acts of consuming a single media item such as a film or show episode or of consuming multiple
media items over a longer time period such as a week, month, or season. As such, it deserves
different terminology from cultivation theory.
Because the media is consumed all at once, I expect it to have greater initial persuasive
effects, not unlike the drench hypothesis suggests. In other words, after watching multiple
episodes in one sitting, persuasive effects will be greater than the same effects measured at the
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end of watching the same episodes week-by-week. I formed this expectation based on my
understanding of narrative persuasion, and the probability that binge watching may keep viewers
in a state of absorption longer.13 Sitting for multiple episodes of a show implies there will be
fewer interruptions to viewers’ narrative engagement, indicating that any deictic shift of
absorption (transportation and/or identification) will last longer. I aver that the longer a viewer is
absorbed in the narrative, the more likely they are to experience full transportation and
identification, which increases the likelihood of reduced reactance and of message acceptance.
However, I also expect binge-watching to have fewer lasting persuasive effects than
those associated with cultivation theory because there is less likelihood that viewers will have a
continued engagement with the exact theme, or message, of the binged show. Without regular
engagement, the effects are likely to wear off faster than if the media was continuously watched
over a longer time period, as with cultivation theory. Furthermore, without the regular and
continued sessions of reflection—bypassed by beginning the next episode immediately and
staying absorbed—an individual who has binge-watched a show rather than watching it at
regular intervals is less likely to receive the full effects of reflection. The reflection process of
considering the narrative concepts as they relate to one’s own life in the real world is imperative
to inducing attitude change; fewer opportunities to reflect mean fewer opportunities for the
individual to consider how the narrative relates to his own beliefs.
Therefore, I posit that binge-watching a show with politically-relevant themes and/or
characters will have a strong initial effect on viewers’ attitudes. However, watching the same
show regularly over a longer period of time will have more lasting effects on viewers’ attitudes.

13

An opposing assumption may be that continuous watching could lead to decreased absorption through distractions
or multitasking. I try to limit this potentiality in my design, described later thin this chapter, by limiting the binge
session to three hour-long episodes.
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In this study, I look specifically at the impact of exposure to three episodes of two different
shows. The counterterrorism show includes a terrorism storyline as its main plot with a Muslim
terrorist character as the show’s primary antagonist. In line with mediated intergroup contact
theory, I expect the negative portrayal of an outgroup member—the Muslim terrorist character—
to negatively affect perceptions of Muslims. In accordance with cultivation theory, I expect the
narrative to influence attitudes toward favoring counterterrorism policies that target terrorists,
Muslims, and Muslim-majority countries. The tolerance show details the struggles of several
marginalized social groups and includes a storyline of familial bond and acceptance of outgroup
members. In line with mediated intergroup contact theory, I expect the positive intergroup
contact consistently portrayed in these episodes will increase tolerance of outgroup members in
viewers. As per my binge effects theory, I expect that viewers who binge the episodes will
exhibit these effects strongly immediately following the screening, and I also expect that these
effects will diminish more quickly for binge watchers than for weekly watchers.
6.3

A Longitudinal Experiment of Binge Effects
Several entertainment media effects studies provide evidence that contemporary fictional

television shows influence our political attitudes (e.g. Holbert 2003; Holbrook and Hill 2005;
Kearns and Young 2017; Gillig, et al. 2017; Pettey and Bracken 2008) and social perceptions
(e.g. Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Gillig, et al. 2017; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; Ortiz and
Harwood 2007; Wojcieszak and Kim 2016). However, very few examine these effects over time
(see Hether, et al. 2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Paluck and Green 2009; Slater, et al. 2006). So far,
none examine how binge watching these shows affects their ability to influence us.

130
6.3.1

Experiment Design

To study how binge watching alters entertainment media effects, I created a six-part
longitudinal experiment with a pre/posttest and two-factor design. The experiment begins with a
pre-treatment survey, to be completed online by all participants. Participants who complete the
questionnaire must then complete three sessions of exposure to one of two treatment media. Half
of participants complete the sessions in the same day to simulate bingeing, whereas the other half
complete one session each week for three weeks to simulate traditional weekly watching.
Immediately following their third session, participants fill out a post-treatment survey. For binge
watchers, this occurs on the same day they watch episodes one, two, and three. For weekly
watchers, this occurs on the day they watch only episode three. The final, sixth part of the
experiment consists of a follow-up survey sent to all participants at a later date. Figure 1 depicts
the six components of this process.
Pre-treatment
Questionnaire

Media Treatment
Session 1

Media Treatment
Session 2

Media Treatment
Session 3

Post-treatment
Questionnaire

Follow-up
Questionnaire

Figure 1 Experiment Components and Process

The two-factor design examines a specific media, episodes from a television show, as one
treatment and mode of consumption, binge versus weekly watching, as the second treatment.
This results in four participant groups: Binge counterterrorism, weekly counterterrorism, binge
tolerance, and weekly tolerance (Table 11). I choose to use television shows for the media
treatment to best account for current binge practices, which typically involve episodic shows as
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the preferred media. To ensure internal validity, all subjects are randomly assigned to one of the
four participant groups upon signing up for the experiment.
Potential participants are informed they will be randomly assigned to either come in for
approximately four hours on a single day or for approximately three and a half hours on three
separate days. To minimize attrition, the days are specified in the call for participants, and
participants are notified of their particular expectations prior to the first media session. The
signup period lasts two weeks, during which participants sign an informed consent document and
take the pre-treatment questionnaire online, and then day and time assignments are sent to
participants at least 24 hours prior to the first media session for scheduling purposes. Participants
are not told which show they will be watching until they arrive at the first media session.
Table 11 Experiment Groups
Counterterrorism Show
Binge Sessions

Counterterrorism Binge

Weekly Sessions Counterterrorism Weekly

Tolerance Show
Tolerance Binge
Tolerance Weekly

The three media sessions account for three episodes of either the counterterrorism show
or the tolerance show, each of which are approximately 50 to 60 minutes long. Therefore, one
session is equal to one episode, and three sessions allow participants to watch all three episodes
of their assigned show. Participants assigned to the Binge Groups complete all three sessions in
the same day, allowing for breaks in between each session. Following the third session, which is
the third episode, binge participants take a post-treatment questionnaire online using their smart
device or on a hard copy. This means the binge participants complete Sessions 1 through 3 all
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during Week 2 of the experiment. They also take the post-treatment questionnaire during Week 2
of the experiment.
Participants assigned to the Weekly Groups complete only one session per week. This
means that in Week 2 of the experiment, they complete Session 1, during Week 3 they complete
Session 2, and in Week 4 they complete Session 3. Like the binge participants, weekly
participants are asked to take the post-treatment questionnaire on their smart device or on a hard
copy immedialy following their third session. However, unlike the binge participants, this means
weekly participants take the post-treatment questionnaire during Week 4 of the experiment.
To examine lasting attitudinal effects, the follow-up questionnaire is sent out two weeks
following the final media session for all participants. All participants may take the follow-up
questionnaire during Weeks 6 and 7 of the media sessions, which is approximately four weeks
following exposure for the binge participants and two weeks following final exposure for the
weekly participants.

Binge
Treatment
Show

Week 2
Posttest
Week 4
Posttest

Weekly

Week 1
Random
Assignment

Binge
Control
Show
Weekly

Week 7
Follow-up

Week 2
Posttest
Week 4
Posttest

Figure 2 Model of Binge Effects Longitudinal Experiment Process

I expect the statistical means of questionnaire responses to specific dependent variable
questions will change in relation to the treatments. Prior to any treatment, means between groups
should be relatively equal. Immediately following treatment exposure, during Week 2 of the

133
experiment for binge participants and in Week 4 for weekly participants, I expect these means
will differ between participants assigned to the counterterrorism show and those assigned to the
tolerance show, as well as between the binge and weekly groups within those groups. At the
follow-up point, I expect only the weekly groups’ means to differ from those of the binge groups,
indicating the diminished effects of bingeing.
Two key issues with any observational study of entertainment media effects are selection
effects and causal direction (Pettigrew et al 2011). Considering mediated intergroup contact, for
example, individuals less likely to express prejudice are also more likely to interact with
intergroup members and watch shows portraying intergroup relationships (Ortiz and Harwood
2007). Conversely, individuals more likely to experience prejudice are less likely to engage in
intergroup contact or view shows with mediated intergroup contact. Random assignment controls
for selection effects, allowing me to better examine causal direction.
Another issue with experimental studies, however, lies in the decreased realism of a
laboratory setting. To increase the mundane realism of this study, I incorporated both a familiar
setting and online tools. All surveys were taken by participants online using a computer, tablet,
or smartphone—participants chose their preferred device. As part of the treatment procedures,
participants were told to try and view the show as they would normally view a show. Participants
were allowed to bring in food, breaks were taken in between sessions for the Binge Groups to
allow for movement and using the restroom, and the only discouraged activity was talking loudly
so as not to disturb other participants.
6.3.2

Show Selection and Hypotheses

The linchpin of the experiment lies in selecting appropriate treatment shows for
evaluating the effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact on participants in
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each group. In Chapter 5 of this manuscript I establish 18 popular television and streamed shows
that aired between 2013 and 2018 that depict terrorism, 12 of which depict a Muslim terrorist
character and nine that contain a Muslim terrorist character as the show’s primary antagonist. To
select the counterterrorism treatment show for my binge effects experiment, I more deeply
examined these nine shows (Appendix A). To select the tolerance show, I reviewed the most
popular shows that did not make my original list and, therefore, did not cover topics relating to
terrorism, crime, and politics.
6.3.2.1 Counterterrorism Treatment: Jack Ryan
I chose Jack Ryan as the counterterrorism treatment show primarily because it depicts a
Muslim terrorist character as the show’s only antagonist in the first three episodes and depicts no
non-Muslim antagonists.14 It is also ideal because this antagonist arrives in the first episode and
because there is a Muslim protagonist. The humanization of the antagonist offers an additional
layer to the study pertaining to mediated intergroup contact theory. The inclusion of a Muslim
protagonist and the humanization of the Muslim antagonist may offer insight into the role
identification plays in facilitating narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. For
instance, participants who identify in some way with one or more Muslim characters, like Hanin
Ali, may present very different attitudes than those who identify in some way with
counterterrorism agents, like Sandrine Araud or Victor Polizzi (see Appendix A for analysis).
First, I expect the counterterrorism treatment show, Jack Ryan, will influence audience
members’ social perceptions of Muslims as a result of mediated intergroup contact. More
specifically, I hypothesize:

In episode one, the terrorist group who arrives at Suleiman’s compound does include a white man who seems to
be European. However, he receives very little screen time and acts solely in a subordinate role. His brief interaction
with Hanin explicitly brings attention to him being different from the others. Neither myself nor my colleague listed
this character as an antagonist vital to the storyline in our content analysis of the first three episodes.
14
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1. Bias against Muslims will shift following exposure to the counterterrorism treatment
show.
a. Bias will increase for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as fighting
Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan, Sandrine Arnaud, or Victor Polizzi.
b. Bias will decrease for viewers who identify with Muslim protagonists, like Hanin
Ali or Jim Greer.
Further, I expect exposure to the treatment show will affect audience members’ policy
attitudes through narrative persuasion. I hypothesize:
2. Favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria will
increase.
a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with military characters portrayed as
fighting Muslim antagonists, like UAV operator Victor Polizzi.
3. Favor toward accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S. will decrease.
a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with Syrian Muslim protagonist
Hanin Ali.
b. Favor will decrease for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as fighting
Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan or French intelligence agent Sandrine Arnaud.
4. Favor toward using drone strikes to target Islamic militants will increase.
a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with UAV operator Victor Polizzi.
b. Favor will increase for viewers who dislike Muslim terrorist characters, like
Mousa bin Suleiman or Yazid.
6.3.2.2 Tolerance Show: This is Us
I chose This is Us as the tolerance treatment show and as a comparison to the
counterterrorism treatment show. It does not contain any characters or storylines likely to
influence counterterrorism policy attitudes. It contains no overtly Muslim characters, nor does it
discuss terrorism or foreign policies. After selecting this show, I also found that it depicts a great
deal of intergroup contact. The main characters comprise three siblings—a white man, a white
overweight woman, and a Black man, who was adopted. The Black man, Randall, meets his
biological father, who spent many years abusing drugs, and they begin to build a relationship in
the first three episodes. These episodes also follow the obese woman, Kate, as she navigates her
emotions and struggles with her health. Their mother, Rebecca, has remarried a Latino man,
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Miguel. This show provided a clear mediated intergroup contact treatment, but one very different
from the counterterrorism treatment.
As such, I expect that exposure to the tolerance treatment show, This Is Us, will influence
audience members’ overall outgroup tolerance as a result of mediated intergroup contact. I
hypothesize:
5. Bias toward outgroup members will decrease following exposure to the tolerance show.
6.3.2.3 Binge Effects Hypothesis
However, for those exposed to a treatment show in a binge watching group, I expect
these attitude shifts to appear immediately following exposure and then to diminish or disappear
over time. Specifically, I hypothesize:
6. Attitude shifts that appear after exposure to any treatment will fade more quickly in
audience members of the binge groups than those of the weekly groups.
Overall, I assert that exposure to the counterterrorism show or the tolerance show will
provide mediated intergroup contact, and that exposure to mediated intergroup contact in the
counterterrorism show in particular may increase bias against Muslims. Further, participants
exposed to the counterterrorism show will be more likely to favor counterterrorism policies that
target Muslims or Muslim-majority countries than participants exposed to the tolerance show.
However, these attitude shifts will diminish or disappear for participants in the binge group after
several weeks. One condition that may alter these effects is identification, which may cause some
participants in the treatment group to exhibit less bias toward Muslims than participants in the
control groups. This is because identification may increase the effects of mediated intergroup
contact, regardless of the harmful stereotypes of Islamic militants included in the
counterterrorism treatment.
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6.4

Data and Methods
In February and March of 2020,15 144 undergraduate students16 at a diverse university

with over 54,000 students took part in a seven-week laboratory experiment consisting of six
components—three surveys and three treatment sessions. I chose undergraduate students for this
case study because young adults report the highest levels of binge watching (Sabin 2018) and,
therefore, may be most likely to exhibit binge effects as the new “normal” for entertainment
consumption patterns. As detailed earlier in this chapter, participants completed an online pretreatment survey during the week prior to the first treatment session. All participants proceeded
to attend three treatment sessions, during which they watched one episode of their assigned show
per sessions. Participants assigned to either binge group (71 participants) completed all three
treatment sessions in one day during Week 2 of the study. Participants assigned to one of the
weekly groups (73) completed their first treatment session during Week 2, their second session
during Week 3, and their third during Week 4. As such, binge group participants took the posttreatment survey after their third session in Week 2, whereas weekly group participants took the
post-treatment survey after their third session in Week 4. Participants received a follow-up email
in Week 7 to complete the follow-up survey. For their time, participants were provided three
points of extra credit to an introductory political science class grade, a $5 Amazon gift card for
completing the post-treatment survey, and an additional $5 Amazon gift card for completing the
follow-up survey.17

15

All treatment sessions were completed prior to the university lockdown and the shelter-in-place orders carried out
due to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Participants completed the follow-up survey online.
16
Originally 226 students agreed to participate and took the pre-treatment survey, but only 159 participants showed
up for the first session. Session two received 155 participants, and during session three attendance dropped to 147
participants. Of these 147 participants, two did not complete the post-treatment survey, and one had not completed
the pre-treatment survey, leaving 144 participants who completed all but the follow-up survey.
17
The gift cards were funded by an internal research grant awarded by the Georgia State University Political Science
Department.
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6.4.1

Recruitment and Participants

Recruitment was conducted using a political science research pool, which provides
undergraduates students enrolled in introductory political science classes to participate in
political science research studies for extra credit in those classes. The call for participants was
posted online on the Sona System platform during week one of the study. After attrition, 144
students participated in the full study up to the follow-up survey, and 112 participants also
completed the follow-up survey (Table 12). The sample was predominately female (102
participants, approximately 71%), with 41 participants identifying as male and one participant
identifying as non-binary or other. However, this was evenly distributed across the four groups
with males as 9, 10, or 11 participants in each group (Appendix C). Approximately 92% of
participants (132) are aged 18 to 21, with 10 participants aged 22 to 27, one participant aged 39,
and one participant aged 45. Unsurprisingly, 124 participants indicated that they often prefer to
binge watch shows rather than watch them weekly, with only 20 participants saying they prefer
to watch weekly. The weekly watchers were slightly more likely to be assigned to a binge group,
with seven of these participants randomly assigned to each binge group and three randomly
assigned to each weekly group.
Table 12 Experiment Participants by Group
Counterterrorism Tolerance
(Jack Ryan)
(This Is Us)
Binge Group
35
36
Weekly Group

41

32

Of the eight religion options, approximately 60% responded they either had no preference
(43 participants) or selected “other” (45). Four preferred not to say, another four identified as
Hindu, and 14 identified as Muslim. Of these 14 Muslims, the weekly group watching the control
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show contained 2 participants, while the three other groups contained 4 Muslim participants
each. No participants identified as Jewish or pagan. Christians made up approximately 24% (34)
of participants, with 18 identifying as Catholic and 16 as Protestant. The sample was largely nonwhite, with the largest group identifying as Black or African American (54 participants, 38%).
Only 24 participants identified as white (17%), with 31 identifying as Asian (22%), 15
identifying as Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (10%), three identifying as Middle Eastern or
North African, and two identifying as Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Fifteen
participants (10%) indicated some combination of these identities or selected “other.” These
factors—age, religion, and race/ethnicity—demonstrate that the sample is not nationally
representative. However, this study is not looking to represent American beliefs, but is instead
intended to examine the effects of entertainment media exposure and the contemporary
consumption method of binge watching on narrative persuasion. As such, the results provided by
this sample are still useful for understanding these effects.
Overwhelming, 78% of participants indicated they are likely to vote in the 2020
elections, with 73 participants saying they are extremely likely to vote. Only seven participants
said they are extremely or moderately unlikely to vote, with five participants indicating
neutrality. The majority of the sample identifies as democrat (82 participants, 57%), with 38
undecided participants (26%), 6 republicans, 12 independents, 4 libertarians, and 2 claiming
“other.” Participants also listed their parents as largely democrat (69 participants, 48%), with 43
claiming they “don’t know” their parents’ political affiliation (30%), 19 listing their parents as
republican (13%), three as independent, two as libertarian, three as “other,” and five claiming
their parents identify with different parties. I include parental indicators as an additional
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understanding of my young sample. While university students may lean liberal, more specific
policy attitudes can sometimes align more closely with familial beliefs.
Most participants claimed they engage with social media every day (110 participants,
76%), but their responses were less patterned for news media. The majority of participants (83
participants, 58%) indicated they engage with news media one to three days per week, with only
14 participants indicating they never engage with news media and 15 indicating they engage with
news media every day. More participants, however, reported that they only pay attention to the
news a little (67 participants) or a moderate amount (45). As with social media, participants were
more likely to say they engage with non-news media every day (67 participants). They also
indicated they much prefer to binge watch an episodic show than to watch one episode per week,
with 124 participants (86%) preferring to binge. However, these participants are spread across
the four groups, with seven participants in each of the binge groups and three participants in each
of the weekly groups who prefer to watch weekly.
6.4.2

Surveys

In addition to demographics questions in the pre-treatment survey, I include social and
political attitudes questions on all three surveys, and I include show-specific questions on the
post-treatment survey. The social and political attitude questions are intended to measure the
effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact by examining views toward
Muslims and approval of counterterrorism strategies that target Muslim-majority countries. I
used the same questions from the survey study discussed in Chapter 5, which ask about whether
Islam is more likely to promote violence than other religions, whether they are concerned about a
terrorism attack on the U.S. in the near future, whether they believe a member from several
groups is likely to carry out a terrorist attack on the U.S. in the near future—one of the eight
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groups being Muslims. I asked the same two policy questions from the survey in Chapter 5, how
much participants favor allowing Syrian refugees to come to American and how much they favor
sending U.S. troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria. Because the Jack Ryan episodes
include the side story of a UAV operator, I also included a question that asks participants how
much they favor using drone strikes to target terrorists in other countries.
For the show-specific questions, I aim to measure two key aspects of narrative
persuasion: Absorption and identification. I directly ask participants to report how absorbed or
“sucked in” they felt to the storyline. However, most Americans have little to no knowledge
about the differences between the types of identification—namely cognitive-emotional
identification, perceived similarity, wishful identification, and parasocial interaction. To gain
better responses to an identification question about the main characters of a show, I decided to
first briefly explain identification and then to use general language to describe the meaning
behind each type rather than provide their technical terms. For example, rather than asking
whether participants experienced wishful identification toward a character, I asked whether they
might “want to be more like this character” (Appendix B).
6.4.3

Results

The key relationships I examine are the differences between the four groups over time
regarding social bias toward Muslims and regarding counterterrorism policy attitudes.
Differences in the pre-treatment and post-treatment survey responses between the groups that
viewed the tolerance show, This is Us, and those that viewed the counterterrorism show, Jack
Ryan, should evidence the effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact
embedded in the treatments. Differences in the post-treatment and follow-up survey responses
between the binge groups and the weekly groups should indicate whether binge watching altered
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these effects in some way. In particular, I look at four dependent variables: Association of
Muslims with terrorism (social bias) and favor toward sending U.S. ground troops to fight
Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria, accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S., and using drone strikes
to target and kill terrorists abroad (policy views). Each of the four variables were calculated on a
7-point scale.
I begin my evaluation of the experiment’s results by examining whether there were
indeed differences between participants exposed to the counterterrorism show (Jack Ryan) and
those exposed to the tolerance show (This Is Us). I used t-test analyses to compare the means
between the counterterrorism and tolerance treatment groups prior to the treatment, immediately
following the treatment, and at the follow-up point in Week 7 of the experiment. Table 13
displays the results of these analyses, and I observe several notable shifts in the differences
between them.

Table 13 Comparison of Differences of Means Between Tolerance and Counterterrorism Groups
Survey Results Over Time
Social Variable
Bias

Pre-treatment

Post-treatment

Follow-up

Tolerance

CT Show

t-value

p-value

Mean

4.104*

3.579*

1.786

0.076

(SD)

(1.793)

(1.723)

3.881

3.618

0.832

0.407

(2.033)

(1.736)

3.455

3.526

-0.232

0.817

(1.698)

(1.582)
Continued next page
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Policy Variables
Troops

Pre-treatment

Tolerance

CT Show

t-value

p-value

Mean

-0.338

-0.039

-1.085

0.280

(SD)

(1.617)

(1.677)

-0.059

0.066

-0.489

0.625

(1.185)

(1.561)

-0.182

-0.175

-0.022

0.983

(1.657)

(1.453)

Mean

1.015**

1.697**

-2.971

0.004

(SD)

(1.511)

(1.244)

1.015**

1.474**

-1.994

0.048

(1.321)

(1.428)

1.018*

1.509*

-1.958

0.053

(1.269)

(1.377)

Mean

-0.338

-0.342

0.014

0.989

(SD)

(1.681)

(1.621)

-0.397*

0.158*

-1.956

0.052

(1.631)

(1.759)

-0.4

-0.193

-0.621

0.536

(1.791)

(1.737)

Post-treatment

Follow-up

Refugees

Pre-treatment

Post-treatment

Follow-up

Drones

Pre-treatment

Post-treatment

Follow-up

T-Test Difference of Means Analysis
N=76 for pre- and post-treatment and n=57 for follow-up counterterrorism groups.
N=68 for pre- and post-treatment and n=55 for follow-up tolerance groups for policy variables.
N=67 for pre- and post-treatment tolerance groups for bias variable.
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Namely, I observe only five points of statistically significant treatment effects between
participants exposed to the counterterrorism show and those exposed to the tolerance show. The
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first statistically significant difference of means occurs between participants in the tolerance
versus the counterterrorism groups at the pre-treatment point for bias against Muslims. While
this should have been addressed through random assignment, which occurred at the pretreatment point when participants signed up for the study, the small sample could decrease the
effects of this randomization. I continue to take this into account when moving forward with my
analysis. The specific survey question used as a proxy for the social bias dependent variables
measures participants’ association of Muslims with terrorist activity. Here, I find the probability
value reflects that after exposure to the treatment shows, it becomes less likely that the social
bias means of the counterterrorism and tolerance groups are statistically different. While the pretreatment correlation between these groups could be termed statistically significant within a 90%
confidence interval, this probability entirely diminishes at the post-treatment and follow-up
points. Given that participants in the tolerance groups begin with a higher level of bias, meaning
they were more likely to associate Muslims with terrorist activity than participants in the
counterterrorism groups, this shift could indicate a several causes. First, it is possible that the
samples are biased and no treatment effects are actually present. However, it could also indicate
either that participants in the tolerance groups’ bias lessened during the experiment or that
participants counterterrorism groups’ bias increased, or both, as was the expectation.
Regarding the policy variables, the statistically significant differences in means between
participants exposed to the counterterrorism treatment show and those exposed to the comparison
show, the tolerance treatment show, occur at all time points for the refugees dependent variable
and at the post-treatment point for the drone strikes dependent variable. They do not occur at all
for the troops variable. In my hypotheses, I state that exposure to the counterterrorism show will
likely increase favor toward the troops and drone strike variables and decrease favor toward the
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refugee variable. I further hypothesize that character identification may influence these effects.
In the t-test results, the troops variable shows no statistically significant difference between the
counterterrorism and tolerance groups at any point in the experiment, while the Syrian refugees
variable shows statistically significant correlations at all three survey points in the experiment.
The drone variable shows no significance at the pre-treatment point, statistical significance at the
post-treatment point, and no significance at the follow-up point. This indicates that the
counterterrorism show likely had an impact for attitudes toward using drone strikes, but that
effects on the other policy dependent variables are either null or nuanced.
6.4.3.1 Social Bias
My first and fifth hypotheses suggest that exposure to either one treatment show or the
other will affect social bias. More specifically, I hypothesize:
𝐻1 : Bias against Muslims will shift following exposure to the counterterrorism show.
𝐻1𝑎 : Bias will increase for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as
fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan, Sandrine Arnaud, or Victor Polizzi.
𝐻1𝑏 : Bias will decrease for viewers who identify with Muslim protagonists, like
Hanin Ali.
𝐻5 : Bias toward outgroups will decrease following exposure to the tolerance show.
As a proxy for measuring social bias, I created the bias dependent variable from a survey
question asking participants how likely they think it is that a member from one of eight social
groups will commit a terrorist attack on the U.S. in the near future. The social groups were
Blacks, whites, Muslims, Christians, right-wing activists, left-wing activists, Russians, and
Chinese, and responses were provided on a 7-point scale from “extremely unlikely” to
“extremely likely.” Because I expect the counterterrorism treatment to influence bias toward
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Muslims, I keyed in on responses solely addressing how likely participants were to associate
Muslims with an imminent terrorist attack in the U.S.
To better evaluate my hypotheses regarding bias against Muslims, I ran several OLS
regression models using post-treatment bias, change in bias between the pre- and post-treatment
points, and change in bias between the pre-treatment and follow-up points as my dependent
variable. In each model, I controlled for treatment show, consumption type, party identification,
race, religion, and having recently traveled outside the U.S. Using post-treatment bias as my
dependent variable, I found that being white negatively correlated with bias with 90 percent
confidence. However, including pre-treatment bias in this model erased this correlation. Running
the same two models separately for participants exposed to each show, I found that identifying as
Christian correlated with 95 percent confidence for participants exposed to the counterterrorism
treatment.
When using change between the pre- and post-treatment points as my dependent variable,
I found a positive correlation with identifying as Christian with 95 percent confidence for
participants exposed to the counterterrorism show. When examining change between the pretreatment and follow-up points, I found a negative correlation with identifying as Democrat with
90 percent confidence for participants exposed to the tolerance show and a positive correlation
with identifying as Christian with 90 percent confidence for participants exposed to the
counterterrorism show. I also found a positive correlation between exposure to the
counterterrorism show and increased bias between the pre-treatment and follow-up points. These
results indicate treatment effects are at work in one or both of the treatment shows, with
individuals exposed to the counterterrorism show displaying greater bias than those exposed to
the tolerance show over time.
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Table 14 Pairwise Comparisons for Two-way Repeated Measures ANOVA for Social Bias
Mean
Standard
p-value
Difference

Error

Pre- to Post-Treatment

0.066

0.168

1.000

Post-Treatment to Follow-up

0.279

0.151

0.201

Pre-Treatment to Follow-up

0.345

0.170

0.135

Pre- to Post-Treatment

0.207

0.237

1.000

Post-Treatment to Follow-up

0.418

0.240

0.265

Pre-Treatment to Follow-up

0.625*

0.232

0.029

Pre- to Post-Treatment

-0.072

0.232

1.000

Post-Treatment to Follow-up

0.139

0.186

1.000

Pre-Treatment to Follow-up

0.067

0.244

1.000

All Participants

Tolerance Treatment

Counterterrorism Treatment

*p<0.05

To better understand these results, I ran three two-way repeated measures ANOVA
models using binge effects and identifying as Christian as the control variables. The three models
included 1. all participants, 2. participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, or 3.
participants exposed to the tolerance show. All three two-way repeated measures ANOVA
models passed Mauchly’s test of sphericity at p=0.321 (all participants), p=0.075
(counterterrorism), and p=0.964 (tolerance).
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Figure 3 Estimated Marginal Means of Bias for Tolerance Groups Derived from Repeated
Measures Two—Way ANOVA

Figure 4 Estimated Means of Bias for Counterterrorism Groups Derived from Repeated
Measures Two—Way ANOVA
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In reviewing the three sets of pairwise comparisons for each time period, I found only
one statistically significant shift with 95 percent confidence, which occurs for participants
exposed to the tolerance show between the post-treatment and follow-up points (Table 14).
However, none showed statistically significant differences between weekly and binge watchers.
Figures 3 and 4 provide visual depictions of the estimated marginal means from these two-way
repeated measures ANOVA models. I include these figures because they provide additional
information about directionality. Although the statistically significant shift occurs only between
the pre-treatment and post-treatment points for participants exposed to the tolerance show, there
is additional information to be gleaned from the direction of this shift and the non-statistically
significant shifts in other groups. For both weekly and binge watchers exposed to the tolerance
show, there is a steady decline in bias across all three points (Figure 3). What makes the shift
particularly interesting is where it occurs: From above 4 to around 3.5. Given the response
options in the survey question used to measure bias against Muslims, the number 4 denotes the
point of neutrality between “slightly likely” at 5 and “slightly unlikely” at 3.
This shift from above the point of neutrality to below the point of neutrality over the
length of the experiment, in conjunction with statistical significance, could support the assertion
of Hypothesis 5 that exposure over time to the positive intergroup relationships depicted in the
tolerance show will lead to decreased bias toward outgroups in real life. The results could also
indicate stronger mediated intergroup contact effects than previously discussed in the literature.
No Muslim, Middle Eastern or Arab, or terrorist characters exist in the tolerance show episodes,
nor is there any discussion of Islam or terrorism. Yet, the overt intergroup relationships depicted
between whites, African Americans, and persons from other marginalized groups seem to evoke
a mediated effect on overall tolerance toward members from any outgroup.
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Participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, however, exhibit little to no shift in
their responses between the pre-treatment and post-treatment points—statistically significant or
otherwise. Both the binge and weekly watchers exposed to the counterterrorism show provided
averages responses below the point of neutrality at all three time points, indicating they were
already less likely to associate Muslims with terrorism than their counterparts in the tolerance
groups. The slight increase exhibited by weekly watchers visible at the post-treatment point
could instead indicate some form of demand bias, in which respondents became aware of the
research agenda to some extent and were more likely to respond to this question with neutral
attitudes rather than an indication of true attitudes.
As a final test of mediated intergroup contact effects on counterterrorism group
participants, I used linear regression analyses to examine whether identifying with different
characters affected the social bias dependent variable (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Hypothesis 1a
suggests that viewers who identify in some way with characters portrayed with fighting terrorism
would be more likely to associate Muslims with terrorism; whereas, Hypothesis 1b asserts that
viewers who identify in some way with Muslim protagonist characters would by less likely to
exhibit this bias. The original question regarding identification provides laymen descriptions for
four different types of character identification: Cognitive-emotional identification, wishful
identification, parasocial interaction, and an inverse identification type of whether participants
disliked the character. I dichotomized individual characters into whether participants expressed
one of the positive forms of identification versus whether they expressed dislike or no
identification, and I ran an OLS regression on post-treatment bias including all dichotomous
identification variables and the control variables of pre-treatment bias and identifying with the
Christian religion (Table 15).
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Table 15 OLS Regression on Association of Muslims with Terrorism for Counterterrorism Show
Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism
Coefficient

Standard Error

z-score

p-value

Pretest Bias

0.534**

0.101

5.27

0.000

Christian

1.202*

0.428

2.80

0.007

Jack Ryan

0.790

0.962

0.82

0.415

Victor Polizzi

0.712*

0.354

2.04

0.049

Sandrine Arnaud

0.496

0.396

1.25

0.215

Jim Greer

0.113

0.421

0.27

0.789

Hanin Ali

0.058

0.747

0.08

0.939

Fathi al-Abbas

-0.477

0.486

-0.98

0.330

Ali bin Suleiman

-0.554

0.432

-1.28

0.204

Mousa bin

1.105

0.683

1.62

0.111

Yazid

-2.673*

1.127

-2.37

0.021

Constant

0.357

0.937

0.38

0.705

Suleiman

N=74, Prob>F=0.0000, R-squared=0.4681
*p<0.05, **p<0.001

In addition to the two control variables, I found identification with two characters, Victor
and Yazid, to be statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. Yazid is one of the few
speaking Muslim characters who does not receive a detailed background story and who is
featured in a solely villain-like role. He is also killed via drone strike by the character Victor, a
UAV operator portrayed in episodes two and three in a subplot only related to the main story
through this killing. While the show does not expose Victor’s background in the same way it
does lead characters, like Jack Ryan, the subplot does explore his clear aversion to the work at
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hand through self-destructive behaviors. In the third episode, Victor goes against his
commanding officer to shoot down Yazid as Yazid attempts to rape the Muslim female
protagonist, Hanin. Interestingly, Victor and Yazid are two characters who are given only one
valence: Yazid is presented in a negative valence as a typical “bad guy” villain and as the more
typical Muslim terrorist stereotype character, as described in Chapter 5. Victor is portrayed in a
positive valence as a “good guy” military type, a hero who protects women, and as a winner—
having won $35,000 in a single night at a casino. Though we are shown his contempt for this
money and the work he does, the final scenes of episode three show him clearly placed in the
hero trope taking down Yazid, who has been framed in solely negative terms.
Identification with the Muslim terrorist character, Yazid, negatively correlated with
association of Muslims with terrorism, indicating that a lack of identification with Yazid
increased association of Muslims with terrorism. Identification with Victor, as expected,
positively correlated with associating Muslims with terrorism. These results could point to the
mixed frames of the lead characters having a mixed impact on bias toward Muslims in the
counterterrorism treatment groups. The results confirm my Hypothesis 1a, which asserts that
identification with a character portrayed as fighting Muslim terrorists, e.g. Victor, will increase
participants’ association of Muslims with terrorism. While the results do not directly confirm
Hypothesis 1b, which suggests that identification with a Muslim protagonist character will
decrease bias, they do support an inverse of this assertion: Failing to identify with a character
who fits the Muslim terrorist stereotype, e.g. Yazid, correlates with increased association of
Muslims with terrorism.
Overall, the results provide evidence to support Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 5, but fail to
support Hypotheses 1 and 6. In sum, mediated intergroup contact appears evident in participants
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exposed to the tolerance show (Hypothesis 5), but may be more nuanced in participants exposed
to the counterterrorism show (Hypothesis 1). Identification appears to play a key role in
determining the effects of mediated intergroup contact (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). However, binge
effects do not appear to greatly affect the influence of mediated intergroup contact within these
contexts (Hypothesis 6).
6.4.3.2 Policy Attitudes
The policy attitudes I use to examine narrative persuasion are favor toward sending U.S.
ground troops to fight Islamic militants such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, favor toward accepting
Syrian refugees into the U.S., and favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in
other countries. In Chapter 5, I observed a statistically significant positive correlation between
accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype and favor toward sending ground
troops. I chose to also include a question regarding drone strikes because of the drone operator
subplot included in episodes two and three of Jack Ryan. Responses to all three questions were
measured on a 7-point Likert scale from “oppose a great deal” to “favor a great deal.”
6.4.3.2.1 Sending U.S. Ground Troops
My second hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect
favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria.
More specifically, I hypothesize:
𝐻2 : Favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria will
increase following exposure to the counterterrorism show.
𝐻2𝑎 : Favor will increase for viewers who identify with military characters
portrayed as fighting Muslim antagonists, like UAV operator Victor Polizzi.

154
Although no statistically significant differences were apparent for this variable in my
initial t-test results, I examined the pre- and post-treatment points further to assess possible binge
effects. I conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA for the binge and weekly
counterterrorism groups on favor toward sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants in
Iraq and Syria at three points in time (pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up). Again, no
correlations were statistically significant, but the graph produced provided additional evidence of
potential demand bias in participants at the post-treatment point (Figure 5).

Figure 5 Favor Toward Sending U.S. Ground Troops to Fight Islamic Militants

While the pre-treatment and follow-up attitude means are distinctly different regarding
the troops policy, the post-treatment attitude means are nearly the same, converging at the point
of neutrality not unlike the results of the bias variable. Participants in the binge counterterrorism
group were more likely to express opposition to this policy at the pre-treatment and follow-up
points, while those in the weekly counterterrorism group were more likely to express opposition
at these points. The means of both groups, however, converge at the point of neutrality at the
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post-treatment point, indicating mixed treatment effects or, more likely, some form of demand
bias. Because participants responded to the post-treatment survey immediately after screening
episode three, respondents likely gleaned some understanding of the research agenda. As such,
the lack in opinion shift between the pre-treatment and follow-up points indicates little influence
of the treatment on attitudes toward sending group troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and
Syria, thereby rejecting Hypothesis 2. Additional regression models reviewing potential
identification influence showed no statistically significant correlations, thereby also rejecting the
sub-hypotheses for this dependent variable regarding identification. Furthermore , as there were
no statistically significant differences between the binge and weekly groups, this dependent
variable offers no evidence to support Hypothesis 6 regarding binge effects.
6.4.3.2.2 Accepting Syrian Refugees into the U.S.
My third hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect favor
toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. More specifically, I hypothesize:
𝐻3 : Favor toward accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S. will decrease following
exposure to the counterterrorism show.
𝐻3𝑎 : Favor will increase for viewers who identify with the Syrian Muslim
protagonist Hanin Ali.
𝐻3𝑏 : Favor will decrease for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as
fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan or Sandrine Arnaud.
Because the initial t-tests showed statistically significant differences between the
counterterrorism and tolerance groups at all three time points (Table 13), I ran a series of linear
regressions to determine which factors were likely influencing this policy attitude. For all
participants within the experiment, race and party identification showed statistically significant
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correlations with change in the refugees variables between the time periods, indicating these
identities may have been influenced by either the counterterrorism or the tolerance show. In
these models, individuals who identified as white or as Democrat were more likely to exhibit
decreased favor toward the refugee policy over time (Appendix C). When examining these
factors in the counterterrorism and tolerance groups separately, I find distinct differences within
each group and across time points.
For participants exposed to the tolerance show, being a Democrat negatively correlated
with increased favor toward the refugee policy between the pre- and post-treatment points with
statistical significance at 90 percent confidence. Identifying as Democrat, white, or Christian
showed the same negative statistically significant correlation between the pre-treatment and
follow-up points with 90 percent confidence. Though my initial hypothesis considered only the
impact of the counterterrorism treatment on attitudes toward the refugee policy, the tolerance
show may have influenced attitudes toward this variable through triggering these identities.
Regarding participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, however, only being Christian
showed a positive statistically significant correlation with 95 percent confidence on attitude
change between the pre- and post-treatment points, but not between the pre-treatment and
follow-up points. In other words, Christians exposed to the counterterrorism show were more
likely to exhibit increased favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. between the preand post-treatment points. Christians, Democrats, and whites exposed to the tolerance show,
however, were more likely to exhibit decreased favor toward this policy across the experiment.
This could indicate that while the means between the two treatments are statistically different
across the span of the experiment, treatment effects may still be at work in either or both shows.
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As this hypothesis was initially created to explain treatment and binge effects in
participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, I continued testing on these participants only.
I ran another linear regression to examine the impact of identification with key characters, and I
found evidence supporting my sub-hypothesis 3b, which asserts that identification with
characters depicted as fighting Muslim antagonists would decrease favor toward the refugee
policy. In this case, identifying with the French intelligence agent Sandrine Arnaud negatively
correlated with a positive change in favor between the pre-treatment and follow-up points toward
accepting Syrian refugees. This means individuals who identified with Sandrine were more
likely to exhibit decreasing favor toward the refugee policy across the span of the experiment. In
episode three, Sandrine discusses with Jack Ryan her opinion regarding Paris’s issues with
Muslim immigrants. She describes her perception that French people generally do not accept
social identifications other than French nationality. Many Muslim immigrants, she explains,
cling to their identity as Muslims over their new identities as being French. This discussion could
factor into why identification with Sandrine seems to influence participants’ opposition to
accepting Syrian, likely Muslim, immigrants into the U.S.
To best understand the relationship of these factors with the dependent variable, I ran a
two-way repeated measures ANOVA model including identification with the Christian religion
or with the character Sandrine as covariates (Table 16). The model passes Mauchly’s test of
sphericity with a significance level of p=0.099. While attitudes toward the refugee policy in the
binge and weekly counterterrorism groups do not show statistically significant differences in
means over time, F(2,104)=0.42, p=0.658, I do find that the main effects of the model show
approach significance for the interaction of the dependent variable over time for both covariates
with 90 percent confidence. Identifying as a Christian significantly correlates with attitudes
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toward the refugee policy over time, F(2,104)=2.867, p=0.061, and identifying with the character
Sandrine also correlates significantly with attitudes toward the refugee policy over time,
F(2,104)=2.785, p=0.066.
Table 16 Simple Effects for Two-Way Repeated Measures ANOVA for Counterterrorism Show
Favor Toward Accepting Syrian Refugees to the U.S.
CT Participants

p-value

F-value

df

Time Period

0.658

0.420

2

Time*Christian

0.061

2.867

2

Time*Sandrine

0.066

2.785

2

Time*Binge

0.709

0.345

2

Error
CT Weekly Group

104
p-value

F-value

df

Time Period

0.659

0.421

2

Time*Christian

0.225

0.528

2

Time*Sandrine

0.586

0.538

2

Error

cont. next pg.

64

CT Binge Group
Time Period

0.916

0.088

2

Time*Christian

0.198

1.692

2

Time*Sandrine

0.095

2.510

2

Error

36

In reviewing the simple effects of this model across consumption type, I find that the
weekly counterterrorism group (n=35) and the binge counterterrorism group (n=21) pass

159
Mauchly’s test of sphericity at p=0.216 (weekly) and p=0.086 (binge). The simple effects show
only a statistically significant correlation for identification with the character Sandrine in the
binge group with 90 percent confidence (Table 16). This indicates that binge watching the
episodes could have allowed this character to have a stronger effect on audience members.
Results of the between-subjects tests suggest the same conclusion. While no difference
exists in policy attitudes between the binge and weekly groups, F(1,52)=0.388, p=0.536, there
does appear to be significant difference between the groups in terms of identifying with the
character Sandrine, F(1,52)=3.444, p=0.069. This suggests that while binge effects may not
directly alter narrative persuasion, they could interfere with identification, a key factor both in
diminishing reactance to narrative persuasion and in fostering mediated intergroup contact
effects.
In sum, the results provide neither evidence to support Hypothesis 3, which asserts that
exposure to the counterterrorism show would decrease favor toward the refugee policy, nor
Hypothesis 3a, which suggests the counterterrorism show may increase favor in participants who
identified with a Muslim protagonist. Further, it does not provide evidence of binge effects
(Hypothesis 6). However, it does provide evidence to support Hypothesis 1b, which asserts that
exposure to the counterterrorism show would decrease favor toward the refugee policy in
participants who identified with one of the characters portrayed as fighting Muslim terrorists, e.g.
Sandrine.
6.4.3.2.3 Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists Outside the U.S.
My fourth hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect
favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists outside the U.S. More specifically, I
hypothesize:
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𝐻4 : Favor toward using drone strikes to target Islamic militants will increase following
exposure to the counterterrorism show.
𝐻4𝑎 : Favor will increase for viewers who identify with UAV operator Victor
Polizzi.
𝐻4𝑏 : Favor will increase for viewers who dislike Muslim terrorist characters, like
Mousa bin Suleiman or Yazid.
Initial t-tests of treatment effects on the drone strikes policy variable show statistically
significant differences between the counterterrorism and tolerance groups only at the posttreatment point, potentially indicating diminished effects at the follow-up point. To better
understand these differences, I ran a series of linear regression analyses to determine potential
demographic influences on change in attitudes toward the drone policy variable. I confirmed the
statistically significant difference with 95 percent confidence in attitudes at the post-treatment
point between participants exposed to the counterterrorism show and those exposed to the
tolerance show, which those exposed to the tolerance show being more likely to favor using
drone strike to target terrorists. Using change in attitude as the dependent variable, I also found
that consumption type displayed a statistically significant correlation with 95 percent confidence
between the pre- and post-treatment points, which binge watchers being less likely to exhibit and
increase in favor toward the drone policy.
Given that identification with the two characters most deeply affected by the drone strike
subplot in episode three, Victor and Yazid, also significantly correlated with the social bias
dependent variable, I ran a second set of regressions to determine whether the same was true for
the drone policy variable. In my initial regression, I find that identification with neither of these
characters correlates with the drone policy variable. When I include consumption type as a
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control variable in this model, however, I find that identification with Ali Suleiman, brother to
the primary antagonist Mousa bin Suleiman, negatively correlates with favor toward using drone
strikes with 90 percent confidence. This result could indicate that increased empathy or
sympathy toward this character, who is injured in episode two by a raid and whom we learn more
about in episode three, decreases favor toward the drone policy. Episode three reveals more
information about Ali’s backstory, his desire to be an artist and his kindness and empathy toward
an old friend who takes Ali in when he is injured. This humanization could play a role in
decreasing favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists. In either case, treatment
effects and binge effects appear to be present.
I conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the influence of consumption
method of the counterterrorism treatment on favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill
terrorists abroad at the pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up time points. I ran a two-way
repeated measures ANOVA model, including covariates for being Christian and for identifying
with the characters Victor, Yazid, or Ali. This model passed Mauchly’s tests of sphericity with a
p=0.290 significance level. In reviewing the main effects, there was again statistical significance
for binge effects over time, F(2, 98)=4.408 and p=0.015. Identification with Yazid also showed
significance with 90 percent confidence, F(2, 98)=2.557 and p=0.083, though neither the religion
nor the other identification covariates correlated with the drone policy variable with statistical
significance.
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Table 17 Pairwise Comparisons of Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes for Counterterrorism
Treatment Groups
Mean Diff.
Standard Error p-value
Counterterrorism Participants
Pre- to Post-Treatment

-0.314

0.234

0.559

Post-Treatment to Follow-up

0.191

0.203

1.000

Pre-Treatment to Follow-up

-0.122

0.196

1.000

Pre- to Post-Treatment

-0.886*

0.265

0.006

Post-Treatment to Follow-up

0.543*

0.240

0.091

Pre-Treatment to Follow-up

-0.343

0.221

0.388

Pre- to Post-Treatment

0.136

0.391

1.000

Post-Treatment to Follow-up

-0.045

0.305

1.000

Pre-Treatment to Follow-up

0.091

0.335

1.000

CT Weekly Group

CT Binge Group

I then split the consumption groups to separately analyze the simple effects for binge and
weekly watchers, both of which pass Mauchly’s text of sphericity at p=0.467 (weekly, n=35) and
p=0.401 (binge, n=22). However, only the weekly group shows statistically significant effects
for the drone strike policy variable over time, F(2,68)=6.778, p=0.002. The pairwise
comparisons across time for each consumption type bear out this finding, indicating that only the
weekly counterterrorism group experienced the expected counterterrorism show treatment effects
(Table 17).
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Figure 6 Drone Policy Attitudes by Consumption Type for Counterterrorism Treatment

Participants in the binge group at all three time points provided a mean response lower
than the point of neutrality, indicating opposition to the drone strike policy. Interestingly,
participants in the weekly group exhibit a mean at the pre-treatment and follow-up points below
the point of neutrality, but exhibit a mean above the point of neutrality at the post-treatment
point, indicating a shift toward favor of the drone strike policy. This may reveal drench effects
related to episode three of the counterterrorism show, which portrays a successful drone strike
made by a likable American, Victor, against a decided foreign villain, Yazid, in its final scenes.
These drench effects could have been diminished for binge watchers experiencing fatigue after
having watched two episodes immediately prior to viewing the same episode three that affected
weekly watchers so significantly. It could also indicate some type of demand bias in either the
weekly or binge group. Either way, there remains a significant difference in attitudes toward the
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drone policy across the experiment between the weekly and binge groups, indicating some form
of consumption method effects.
Overall, the results provide evidence that supports Hypothesis 4, which asserts that
exposure to the counterterrorism treatment will affect attitudes toward the drone strike policy.
Hypothesis 4a suggests that identification with a Muslim protagonist would decrease favor
toward the drone policy, whereas Hypothesis 4b asserts that identification with a dislike or lack
of identification with a Muslim antagonist would increase favor toward the drone policy.
However, the related sub-hypotheses have no direct evidentiary support. While no statistically
significant shifts occurred in policy views for participants in the binge counterterrorism group,
participants in the weekly counterterrorism group exhibited the effects expected of the binge
group in Hypothesis 6, which suggests that treatment effects will increases significantly at the
post-treatment point, but diminish back toward original levels at the follow-up point (Figure 6).
As such, Hypothesis 6 regarding binge effects is likewise not fully supported, though the results
do indicate consumption method effects, as much lesser effects appeared in the binge group as
opposed to the weekly group.
6.5

Discussion
The data and models presented in the results section of this chapter seek to test six main

hypotheses regarding the impact of the two treatment shows on social bias, of regarding the
impact of the counterterrorism treatment show on three policy attitudes, and regarding the effects
of binge watching as a means of media consumption. The tests also consider the influence of
character identification in enhancing these effects. However, as this experiment did not take
place within a vacuum—and was designed to increase external validity by using full-length
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episodes and increased mundane realism—there are several limitations of the experiment and the
data to consider.
6.5.1

Limitations

First, there is little evidence of strong treatment effects between the counterterrorism and
tolerance groups, with only the social bias and drone policy variables exhibiting statistically
significant evidence of treatment effects aligned with my first four hypotheses (see Table 13).
Although great care was taken to select the treatment shows based on their ability to directly
affect the key dependent variables, this does not mean these shows were without caveat. The
counterterrorism show, Jack Ryan, depicts multiple Muslim and terrorist characters with myriad
frames and contexts. This nuanced portrayal could weaken treatment effects of mediated
intergroup contact on the dependent variables. Alternately, the tolerance show, This Is Us, may
not depict or discuss terrorism or Muslims, but it does portray positive interracial, interethnic,
and other relationships that could increase mediated intergroup contact effects to include the
Muslim outgroup. Together, the two effects likely led to diminished differences between the two
groups regarding the social bias dependent variable.
Second, the sample itself may have been biased. The participants were largely individuals
from minority groups and did not associate themselves strongly with any conservative political
views. All participants were undergraduate students enrolled in either an Introduction to
American Government or Global Issues course during the span of the experiment. Although the
experiment took place during the first half of the semester, regular discussion of political
topics—especially international political topics, which may have included immigration, global
security, or the Israel-Palestine conflict—could have influenced participants’ responses to survey
questions about terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Further, taking the post-treatment survey
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immediately following screening the third episode, and with no distractor task, likely led some
participants to exhibit demand bias. This might especially be true for the binge groups, who
would have been heavily immersed in the subject matter and have only taken the pre-treatment
survey in the week prior to their lengthy media session.
Any one of these factors may have influenced participants’ views in a more impactful
way than three episodes of a show. However, this experiment was set up with the intention of
inducing mundane realism for participants with the expectation that any potential results would
have a significant degree of external validity. Considering participants approximately spent only
three hours in a theater-like classroom watching a fictional, entertainment show, and considering
other influences that potentially affected participants during the seven-week long study, any
results are impressive.
6.5.2

Social Bias and Policy Attitudes

Overall, bias across all four groups decreased both at the post-treatment and follow-up
points, with the only statistically significant difference in the means of the counterterrorism and
tolerance groups occurring at the pre-treatment point. The only statistically significant difference
in the means of these groups across time occurs within the tolerance groups between the pretreatment and follow-up points. Together, this could indicate that the significant shift does not
occur as an increase in bias in the counterterrorism groups, but as a decrease in bias in the
tolerance groups. The counterterrorism show offers a nuanced depiction of Muslims and
terrorists, and it also only depicts terrorist activity as occurring outside the U.S. These factors
may have diminished any potential treatment effects in the counterterrorism groups regarding
participants’ association of Muslims with terrorist activity in the U.S. Furthermore, the
overarching message of intergroup acceptance in the tolerance show for multiple social
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outgroups (e.g. African Americans, drug abusers, and obese persons) likely increased tolerance
of the Muslim outgroup through mediated intergroup contact effects. The results also suggest
that identification plays a key role in treatment impact.
In reviewing results related to the three policy variables, there is evidence of treatment
effects from the counterterrorism show. Although no effects were present for the troops variable,
identification appears to interact with treatment effects on the refugees variable, particularly for
participants in the binge counterterrorism group. Favor toward the drone strike policy shows the
most promise not only in terms of exhibiting treatment effects on the drone variable but also
regarding binge effects. Based on the literature, I had expected the an attitude shift for both
weekly and binge watchers at the post-treatment point followed by a sharp decrease at the
follow-up point for binge watchers. However, this attitude shift appears to only have occurred
within the weekly counterterrorism group, with no statistically significant effects on the binge
group. This provides evidence of narrative persuasion only for the weekly group.
Even still, this is enough evidence to support my claim that binge watching may lead to
decreased entertainment media effects. Most participants, across all four groups, ranked their
absorption and interest in the material as being moderate to high at the post-treatment point.
However, the stark difference in treatment effects on the drone policy attitude between the binge
and weekly counterterrorism watchers indicates there may be more nuanced effects at work. It
could be that binge watchers were less absorbed in the material by episode three. Watching three
episodes containing intense action scenes back-to-back may have saturated or inured the binge
watchers’ sensitivity so that the final storyline, which depicted Victor’s drone attack on Yazid,
made a far lesser impact. Demand bias may also have played in role in one of these groups.

168
6.5.3

Developing a Binge Effects Theory

While my initial hypothesis regarding binge effects does not appear to hold up under
scrutiny, the results of this experiment do provide evidence that consumption method, and
especially binge watching, does play a role in entertainment media effects. Binge watching may
have diminished narrative persuasion of attitudes toward the drone strike policy, for example.
Binge watching may also have intensified the impact of some forms of identification—binge
counterterrorism watchers who identified with Sandrine were more likely to oppose the refugee
policy—while diminishing the effects of other forms of identification—dislike of Yazid in
weekly counterterrorism watchers increased favor toward the drone strike policy. These results
may not have been expected, but they provide the first step toward better understanding the
impact of entertainment media, and how we engage with it, on social and political attitudes.
Future research can build on this study to better understand the effects of binge watching and
how it affects the conditions of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact.

169
7

CONCLUSION

The Information Revolution of the 21st century has brought many changes to the lives of
Americans and, with those changes, reshaped the very fabric of society through influencing
social norms and introducing new conversations about the role of government and media within
those norms. Not only has the media landscape vastly expanded, so too has Americans’ response.
Hundreds of thousands of hours of entertainment media content exist at our fingertips, leading to
blogs, forums, fan sites, social media, podcasts, and other forms of entertainment reflection and
parasocial interaction that would amount to millions of hours of related content. Comparatively,
very little research has been done to understand how these changes affect the complex
relationship humans have with entertainment media.
Markus Prior (2013) was right when he posited that increased entertainment options
would decrease news consumption. Though social media has begun to fill some of those gaps in
recent years, most Americans prefer to spend a quarter of their waking hours engaging with
entertainment, not news media. However, Matthew Baum (2004) was also correct in asserting
that even passive viewing of politically relevant soft news can influence political attitudes and
behaviors. So, too, can exposure to entertainment media influence our political attitudes and
behaviors (e.g. Holbert, et al. 2005; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Kearns and Young 2017; Mulligan
and Habel 2011; Paluck and Green 2009). Yet, most of the research that has been done to
understand the influence of entertainment media—or that of hard and soft news media—does not
account for the vast and drastic changes to Americans’ daily media consumption patterns that
epitomize the contemporary media environment.
Contemporary media consumption patterns can be characterized by selection bias,
inattentive viewing, multitasking and bingeing. Given these habits, do entertainment media
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effects understood through narrative persuasion, cultivation theory, and mediated intergroup
contact still exist? With this manuscript, I sought to examine the conditions and effects of
contemporary entertainment media consumption patterns in the American context. I found that
identification with characters, especially empathic identification, plays a much larger role in
entertainment media effects than previously believed. Viewers who experience high affective
orientation and empathic identification with a character involved in an onscreen intergroup
relationship may express empathy toward an outgroup in real life. In Chapter 4, focus group
participants discussed this effect of mediated intergroup contact not regarding social outgroups
previously studied, but in relation to public policy views. They expressed increased
understanding of views regarding firearm policies they had previously deemed categorically
repugnant or unconscionable. Participants in the longitudinal experiment in Chapter 6 evidenced
the impact of character identification on social and policy attitude shifts following exposure to
the counterterrorism treatment. Identification with different characters during exposure to the
counterterrorism treatment showed evidence of influencing participants’ association of Muslims
with terrorism, favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S., and favor toward using drone
strikes to target and kill terrorists outside the U.S.
The studies all provide evidence that mediated intergroup contact evokes strong, nuanced
effects, and these effects appear to accrue over time and across narratives. The focus group
responses indicate that mediated intergroup contact can influence political intergroup bias in
addition to other social intergroup conflicts. The longitudinal experiment results suggest that
mediated intergroup contact with any outgroup may influence tolerance in viewers toward all
outgroups. Responses to the survey evidence that the shift in entertainment media toward
nuanced depictions of Muslim terrorist characters may decrease bias toward Muslims in real life,
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regardless of whether the mediated intergroup contact portrayed is overall negative or positive.
The survey and experiment results also support the assertion that mediated intergroup contact
effects may accrue, demonstrating that cultivation theory still holds a place in the entertainment
media effects literature regardless of increased selection effects.
While this manuscript did not develop a complete theory of binge effects, it does provide
a much-needed stepping stone toward understanding the impact of this consumption method. The
experiment data present evidence that binge watching can diminish narrative impact on political
attitudes. Furthermore, binge watching can change the way viewers identify with characters and
storylines. This manuscript provides evidence that attention, absorption, identification, and
reflection must all be included in developing a complete theory of binge effects to determine the
full impact of this increasingly popular method of consuming entertainment media.
The studies reveal no small amount about identification, accumulated media exposure,
and binge watching. Narrative persuasion may be diminished through inattentive binge watching,
low absorption created by selection bias, or low levels of affective orientation. Though mediated
intergroup contact shows the highest lingering efficacy in the contemporary entertainment media
environment, identification and absorption are still required to produce an impact on viewers.
Cultivation theory, through accumulative effects, still matters in the media effect literature;
however, its effects remain tempered by selection bias and consumption method effects. The
evidence supports my assertions that contemporary consumption patterns are altering the impact
of entertainment media on political attitudes and social perceptions, but there is a long way to go
before we can uncover the full story.
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7.1

Future Research
This manuscript begins a broader discussion of how contemporary consumption patterns

affect the efficacy of entertainment media’s influence on political attitudes and perceptions of
social norms. Inattentive binge watching, as this dissertation evidences, appears to decrease the
impact of narrative, while having little effect on the efficacy of mediated intergroup contact. The
studies presented in this manuscript highlight the importance of understanding the impact of
consumption method in addition to the influence of what media we consume. Furthermore, it
begins a new line of research that will help political scientists better understand the political
attitude and behavior changes of American adults who spend a quarter of their waking hours
passively watching entertainment media.
Future research should build upon this line of inquiry by examining the conditions and
mechanisms present in contemporary entertainment media consumption patterns with greater
specificity. Qualitative, experimental, and mixed method approaches will be most helpful in
targeting personal variance in media selection, exposure effects, and consumption method effects
in the contemporary media environment. Understanding this individual variance through detailoriented studies designed to increase internal validity will allow for better specificity in
designing large-n, quantitative studies of the specific conditions and mechanisms at work.
Future research should include better understanding consumption methods such as binge
watching, multitasking or using multiple screens, the role of attention, and selection bias. It
should focus more distinctly on understanding the impact of absorption and attention, but also
differing amounts and methods of engaging in retrospective reflection. Contemporary forms of
reflection continue to take place in the mind and in person through conversations, but has
expanded to continue through blogs, forums, podcasts, social media, conventions, and more.
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Future research regarding entertainment media effects and media consumption method effects
must take these components of the contemporary media environment into account to fully
understand the impact of media on individual political attitudes, social norms, and the broader
public opinion.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Content Analyses
Appendix A.1: Focus Group Essay Analysis
After establishing which topic each participant selected, I first reviewed the essay
responses looking for the following keywords:
•

Absorbed/absorption

•

Cognitive-emotional identification

•

Perceived similarity

•

Wishful identification

•

Parasocial identification (PSI)

•

Group identification

•

Liking

•

Empathy

•

Affective orientation

•

Trust

•

Safety

Also reviewed whether they noted a shift in opinion, as well as what their prior attitudes
were toward their chosen topic, the gun debate or nontraditional relationships. When they
mentioned a specific type of identification, I marked down with which character they associated
some type of identification. I also noted their pre-treatment attitude toward the issue at hand. For
gun ownership, I ranked them as pro-gun ownership, anti-gun ownership, or somewhere in
between. For nontraditional relationships, I also ranked them in favor, opposed, or in between.
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Participant gun topic
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

absorbed
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1

anti (1) to pro (3)

increased empathy

1
2
1
0
2
2
2
1
2
1
0
2
3
2
0
2
1
2
1
1
2

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

Parti- Jane Sutton Kat c-e ID similarity wish ID PSI
group empathy
AO
cipant
ID
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
5
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
7
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
8
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
10
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
11
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
12
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
13
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
16
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
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18
19
20
21

0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1

0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
1

1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

However, because the identification explanations several participants provided did not
match up with the identification labels they used, I reviewed the essays again—not looking for
keywords, but matching their descriptions of how they identified with the storyline and
characters. From this analysis I created a second, more detailed, table of responses. When
participants did not mention absorption, for example, I looked for similar terminology that would
express their level of absorption—transportation, level of interest, sucked in, etc. For
identification, I paid closer attention to their descriptions of how they connected to each
character rather than the terminology. For example, a description of feeling similar in values to
one of the characters would be “perceived similarity,” or saying one of the characters reminded
them of their friends would be “group identification.” I also paired the character with the type of
identification more clearly. In particular, I marked for whom each participant expressed empathy
by writing that in the empathy section.

participant gun topic
9
37
5
10
11
12
13
14
17
18
19
22

absorbed
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

high
none
moderate
moderate-high
moderate
low
moderate
moderate
high
moderate
high
high

anti (1) to pro (3)
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
3

safety

1

1
1

trust
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23
26
28
30
34
36
38

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

n/a
moderate
n/a
low
low
moderate
moderate

Jane Sutton Kat Cogn.- Similarity Wish
Em. ID
ID
1
Kat

1
1
1

Jane
Sutton

1
1

2
1
3
2
2
3
3

1
1
1
1
1
1

PSI

Group Empathy Increased Change?
ID
empathy
1
Kat
1

Jane
Jane

1
1

Sutton

1

Jane

Jane
1

Kat

1
Sutton

1
1

Cont.

Jane

1

1
Sutton

1

1
Jane
1

Jane
1

Sutton

Jand &
Sutton
Jane
Jane
Sutton

1
1
1

Yes

1
n/a
1

1

Yes
Jane
People
affected
by gun
violence

1
1
1

Appendix A.2: Show Synopsis Analysis
For each of the 35 shows whose synopses mentioned one or more of the keywords
terrorism, terrorist, politics, or crime, I content analyzed the Wikipedia and International Movie
Database (IMDb) season and episode synopses to determine the potential impact for the terrorist

185
character(s) and storyline. In particular, I took notes on the intended ethnicity of the antagonists
and protagonists, and I reviewed how much time the terrorism story arc took up.

Show Name

Terrorism?

Muslim/Arab

Notes

Villain?
24: Legacy

1

1

Allegiance

0

0

American Crime

0

0

Bodyguard

1

1

Russian villain

Most villains white,
many Asian good guys

Containment

1

1

Crisis

0

0

Designated Survivor

1

1

Asian terrorist was a
patsy, all others white

FBI

1

1

Arab protagonist

Gang Related

0

0

Homeland

1

1

S1 white terrorist

House of Cards

1

1

S4 & 5

Hostages

0

0

Jack Ryan

1

1

Jane the Virgin

0

0

Madame Secretary

1

1

Mr. Robot

1

0
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Odyssey

1

1

Orange is the New Black

0

0

Ozark

0

0

Power

0

0

Quantico

1

0

Many Asian good guys

Scandal

1

0

Small plot in S3

7 Seconds

0

0

Shades of Blue

0

0

Shots Fired

0

0

State of Affairs

1

1

Taken

1

0

The Americans

1

0

The Blacklist

1

1

Blacklist: Redemption

1

0

The Crossing

0

0

The Informer

1

1

Protagonist also Asian desc.

The Night Of

0

0

Framed Asian male

The Passage

0

0

Valor

0

0

Mostly white villains

Appendix A.3: Experiment Show Analysis
Two coders evaluated the primary treatment show for its potential to induce certain
attitude changes in viewers. The researcher and a second graduate student in the Georgia State
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University Political Science Department, Adrien Halliez, evaluated the substantive content of the
first three episodes of season one of Jack Ryan. Below are the materials provided to the coders to
direct their analysis. The researcher created these materials more than a month prior to carrying
out the analysis to diminish bias.
Content Analysis
Character Content Analysis Template
Show

Title

Episode

1.1 (i.e. Season One, Episode One)

Absorption

1-5

Character

Name

Gender

Male/Female/Trans

Race

Asian/Black/White

Ethnicity

Hispanic/Non-Hispanic

Nationality

American/French/Lebanese/etc.

Religion

Christian/Jewish/Muslim/NA

Age

Young/Adult/Old

Overall Likeability

1-5

Is this character described/depicted in this episode as a(n) __________?
Gov Official

Y/N

CIA Agent

Y/N

Military

Y/N

UAV Operator

Y/N

Terrorist

Y/N
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Active—Y/N Are they acting in an active role like leadership?
Passive—Y/N Are they acting in a passive role, where they are just helping?
UAV Target Y/N

UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle (drone)

Sane

Just whether or not they are clearly in control of their faculties

Y/N

Is the character given the following frame in this episode?
Victim Frame

Y/N

Are they portrayed as a victim?

Perpetrator Frame

Y/N

Are they portrayed as having committed a crime?

Adept Frame

Y/N

Are they good at their job?

Corrupt Frame

Y/N

Are they bad at their job or acting in a corrupt manner?

Humanizing Frame

Y/N Are they portrayed in a sensitive way as a human with flaws?

Criminalizing Frame Y/N

Are they portrayed as a hardened criminal?

Episode Content Analysis Template
Show

Title

Episode

1.1

Absorption

1-5

For each episode, answer the following questions:
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?

189
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you
felt.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
Jack Ryan Content Analysis: Alexandra Pauley
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 1
18. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
a. Jack Ryan
b. James Greer
c. Mousa bin Suleiman
19. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
a. Jack and James are CIA officials. Jack is very smart, described often as a boy
scout. He does go around his boss, James, when he thinks James is not listening
and is overlooking the next 9-11.
b. James is gruff and has been described as potentially incompetent. He has been
severely demoted, which one rumor attributes to a war crime.
20. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. Not yet.
21. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
a. Mousa bin Suleiman
22. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
a. He is heavily humanized in this first episode. The flashback to his home being
bombed, presumably by Westerners, establishes motive for his terrorism. He is
also shown as being caring and emotionally connected to his brother.
23. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. Yes. He nearly lost his brother in the bombing, and we don’t know what all he did
lose.
24. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
a. They don’t explicitly address Islam in the episode, though the crime James is
rumored to have committed was clearly against Muslim terrorists in Karachi,
Pakistan (another analyst says James ordered pig’s blood poured on all terrorist
bodies so they could not get into heaven).
b. In another instance, Hanin speaks up against the visiting terrorist leader. He is
framed as being shady and up to no good, and she is shown as being a loving
mother of three children.
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c. Several of Suleiman’s escape team are shown as killers and fighters, but without a
uniform like the American soldiers.
25. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Christianity is not discussed
26. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Judaism is not discussed
27. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Latin culture is not discussed
28. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Race is not discussed
29. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Race is not discussed, though the one Black man in the episode is shown as being
disagreeable and with a chip on his shoulder, easily angered and quick to lash out
(as with the first scene where he almost hits Jack with his car, but takes the time
to fully stop, roll down his window, and call Jack a shithead).
30. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
a. The female characters take a clear backseat in the episode. Jack even manipulates
a woman who likes him at the office to go against his orders from James.
31. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
a. Yes. Words like shithead, asshole (spoken by a young Mousa), etc.
32. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
a. Listen to your superiors
b. Westerners are partially to blame for Middle Eastern terrorism
c. Terrorists will do anything for their leaders, even kill and then maim dead bodies
33. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you
felt.
a. The final scene where it flashes back to after the bombing when Mousa saves his
litter brother and scars his hands in the process. We see his brother rescue him in
the present, and they share a moment together in both times where they are
touching foreheads in clear gratitude for each other.
34. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
a. Joe Mueller is an ass for trying to get state secrets from Jack
b. Nathan Singer doesn’t seem like he’s going to be a nice guy based on his tone
when talking with James
c. I’m really curious about Hanin and how she got where she is – she doesn’t fully
fit into the docile wifely role media typically depicts of Muslim wives, especially
wives of terrorists
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 2
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
a. Jack Ryan
b. James Greer
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?

191

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

a. Jack is getting cockier.
b. James is shown with a softer side, going through a divorce and questioning his
faith.
Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. I feel sympathy for James because he is having a hard time both with his divorce
and with having been severely demoted. It’s clear something big happened.
b. There are moments that point to Jack having PTSD from something major when
he was a marine in Afghanistan, but we don’t know what. The moments he shares
with Cathy are cute because he’s just a man who likes a woman, and she makes
him nervous.
Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
a. Mousa
b. Ali bin Suleiman
How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
a. It’s hard to call them antagonists at times because they are shown to be so kind
and loving to one another, and then also Mousa with his wife and children. Yet,
they’re still clearly criminals who are okay with people dying for their cause –
whatever it is.
Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. Sympathy is a strong word. I am more sad that they have ended up here, because
they seem to be good people at their cores, but again they are still involved with
terrorism, money smuggling, and deaths – albeit up to this point they have only
killed officers.
b. We find out Mousa was in jail, but without any deep explanation.
How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
a. We begin to see how Muslims are treated poorly in France through Sandrine’s
commentary and the massive SWAT team they bring into the district.
b. We see two men who do not appear to be Arab talking about Islam in a positive,
peaceful way. One of these men is James.
c. There seems to be a demarcation between the Suleiman family and “other
Muslims,” as expressed by Hanin. She is upset at these men being in her home.
d. We also see one man coming onto her daughter in a really creepy way. This scene
and the scene where Mousa takes Hanin to bed show a clear male dominance.
Hanin is asking her husband why these men are in her home, and she says to him
that she has never asked anything of him before, as though this would be a
violation.
How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
a. The opening scene shows two Arab men kill a Catholic priest in an alley for his
wallet. This frames Arabs as criminals and Christians as victims of their crimes.
How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Judaism is not addressed in this episode
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10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Latin culture is not addressed in this episode
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Being white is not addressed in this episode
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Being Black is not addressed in this episode
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
a. n/a
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
a. Yoga helps build core muscles
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
a. Women are inferior in Muslim culture
b. Muslims are more likely to commit crimes
c. Non-Arab Muslims are more peaceful
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you
felt.
a. The scene with James and his Muslim friend in the diner is very sweet. James is
vulnerable, and we learn more about his history. His friend implores him to come
back to prayers and gives him a prayer bead necklace as a reminder that Allah has
not given up on James even if James has “taken a break” from his faith. It makes
me feel loving toward the Islamic faith and those who practice it in a peaceful
way.
b. The raid scene is disturbing for several reasons. The kid playing dice as the
group’s lookout was sad and a bit revolting – clever to use a kid, but also awful to
bring a kid into that mess. The group in the apartment is playing cards and
smoking (maybe weed?), generally being shown as degenerates. Then, there are
guns and explosives everywhere. Ali forces one of them to wear a suicide vest,
and the only woman of the group, who looks very small and terrified, volunteers
to wear it. They start shooting even before the SWAT team burst through the front
door. The scene is very disturbing. Neither side looks innocent, though they do
make the Muslims look dirtier and criminal.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
a. I definitely like James more now that I understand his background more.
b. I do not like Nathan, who keeps trying to drag James down, even though he said
he went to bat for him. I don’t trust him.
c. Yazid is a total creep! He makes young, greasy, Muslim men look like evil
villains.
d. I worry for Hanin. She seems so unsure of her place in the world, or her
children’s.
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 3
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
a. Jack and James
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

b. Hanin
How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
a. Hanin comes to light as a minor protagonist. She is meek, but strong. She loves
her children and defies her husband first by getting passports to take them away
from Syria. Then, after Mousa finds and burns the passports, she takes her girls
and runs anyway.
b. Victor becomes a protagonist, but in an antihero kind of way.
Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. So much sympathy for Hanin! She cares for her husband, but is deeply devoted to
her children and giving her daughters a better life than she had. She did not
choose her life path up to this point, but in this episode, she decides to change her
life path drastically.
b. I have some sympathy for Victor, but he chose the path he is on. He seems stuck
and sad, but unwilling to make any real changes.
Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
a. Mousa
b. Ali
c. Yazid
How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
a. Mousa grows darker with each episode. He is becoming a scary character.
b. Ali is still running, more in a passive role and not so much an antagonist anymore
as someone being chased by the protagonists.
c. Yazid is the antagonist to Hanin as she and Sara run away. He is just despicable.
Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. We know Mousa is angry about the bombings when he was a kid. We know he
was in a French jail for several years. We do not know his exact vendetta. My
sympathy for him wanes with each episode.
b. I do have some sympathy for Ali, especially when he ignores his brother’s orders
to kill Omer and his sons. Ali doesn’t seem like he wants to be a terrorist, but just
wants to do right by his older brother.
c. Zero sympathy for Yazid.
How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Largely, Muslim men are vilified in this episode, while Muslim women are shown
as lesser in their community and in need of protection.
b. Captain Arnaud points out the difficulties faced by Muslims in France. She
acknowledges that they are forced into poorer neighborhoods, often refused
employment, and seen as lesser because they do not fully accept being French and
only French.
How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Christianity is not discussed in this episode
How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?
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a. Judaism is not discussed in this episode
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Ava “Riot Grrl” Garcia is the first presumable Hispanic character we see in the
series. Her ethnicity is not directly pointed out, nor is it discussed.
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Being white is not explicitly discussed
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Being Black is not explicitly discussed
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Garcia makes a transgender slur when she asks Victor if he “accidentally picked
up another tranny” when he comes in with a black eye
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
a. Muslims are not treated fairly in France
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
a. Muslim men are misogynist, and Islam is likely misogynist
b. White men are godlike heroes
c. Women need to be protected by men
d. America must protect the world
e. Drone strikes are good
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you
felt.
a. The scene when the Suleimans play Monopoly and Mousa tells his children how
he married their mother is chilling. I am touched he chose to marry Hanin rather
than bed her as a gift from her poor father, but that is a very inappropriate story to
tell small children. When he mentions Hanin was only a little older than Sara, it
felt like a threat that he might sell/marry off Sara the way Hanin’s father sold her.
Then, when he burns the passports, I was scared for Hanin and furious with
Mousa for being so cruel.
b. When Hanin is leaving with her children and her son Samir refuses to leave, she
tells her youngest daughter Rama that Samir will be okay because their father
loves him. It was a sad reminder that Hanin feels unsafe and that her husband
does not love their daughters the way he loves their son.
c. I was so scared for Hanin when Yazid was attacking her. I cried when Victor
killed him.
d. When Victor kills Yazid, I was so grateful, but the frame is a dangerous one.
There is an implicit message that white American men will always be the heroes
and the rest of the world, especially beautiful Muslim women, need their help.
e. The scene where Victor tries to gamble away the money he “earned” shooting
targets is depressing. He is clearly miserable. When he wins and keeps winning is
like a slap in the face, but also an implicit message that being a white American
male soldier means killing makes him a hero who deserves big rewards.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
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a. I was relieved when Yazid was killed. They completely villainized this character
to the point where I had no negative feelings about his death.
b. Victor unsettles me. He seems like a nice enough guy, and I was glad when he
stood up to his superior officer and killed Yazid anyway, but there is still
something off about that storyline. He is troubled by the deaths he inflicts, but
also glorified for them.

Character Analysis: Alexandra Pauley, Part 1
Show

Ep

Character

Gend.

Race

1.1

Absor
b
4

Nationality

Religion

Age

White

Hisp
.
No

Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan

Jack Ryan

Male

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.1

4

Cathy
Femal
Mueller
e
James Greer Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.1

4

Black

No

American

n/a

adult, 40s

1.1

4

Male

Arab

No

Lebanese

Muslim

adult, 40s

Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 50s

Femal
e
Male

Arab

No

adult, 30s

White

No

Middle
Eastern
American

Muslim

4

Mousa bin
Suleiman
Nathan
Singer
Hanin
Suleiman
Joe Mueller

1.1

4

1.1

4

1.1

n/a

adult, 60s

1.1

4

Teresa

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.1

4

Patrick

Femal
e
Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.1

4

Tarek

Male

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.1

4

Uncle Fathi

Male

South
Asian
Arab

No

Muslim

adult, 60s

1.1

4

Matice

Male

White

No

Middle
Eastern
American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.1

4

Male

Arab

No

Middle
Eastern

Muslim

adult, 50s

1.1

4

Leader of
visiting
forces to
Suleiman
compound
Ansore

Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan

Male

White

No

n/a

adult, 40s

1.2

5

Jack Ryan

Male

White

No

Scandanavian
?
American

n/a

adult, 30s
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Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan

1.2

5

Cathy
Femal
Mueller
e
James Greer Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.2

5

Black

No

American

Muslim

adult, 40s

1.2

5

Male

Arab

No

Lebanese

Muslim

adult, 40s

Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 50s

No

Muslim

adult, 30s

No

n/a

adult, 30s

5

Patrick

East
Asian
White

Middle
Eastern
American

1.2

Femal
e
Femal
e
Male

Arab

5

Mousa bin
Suleiman
Nathan
Singer
Hanin
Suleiman
Noreen

1.2

5

1.2

5

1.2

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.2

5

Tarek

Male

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.2

5

Sara

Femal
e

No

Middle
Eastern

n/a

adolescen
t

Jack
Ryan

1.2

5

Yazid

Male

No

Middle
Eastern

Muslim

adult, 20s

Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan

1.2

5

Matice

Male

South
Asian
Middle
Easter
n
Middle
Easter
n
White

no

White

n/a

adult, 30s

1.3

5

Jack Ryan

Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

1.3

5

James Greer Male

Black

No

American

Muslim

adult, 40s

1.3

5

Male

Arab

No

Lebanese

Muslim

adult, 40s

1.3

5

No

adult, 30s

n/a

adolescen
t

Jack
Ryan

1.3

5

Yazid

Male

Middle
Eastern

Muslim

adult, 20s

Jack
Ryan

1.3

5

Male

American

n/a

adult, 20s

Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan

1.3

5

Nonwhite
Arab

American

n/a

adult, 20s

5

Femal
e
Male

Yes

1.3

Victor
"Tombstone
"
"Riot Grrl"
Garcia
UAV Target

Middle No
Easter
n
Middle No
Easter
n
White No

Middle
Eastern
Middle
Eastern

Muslim

5

Femal
e
Femal
e

Arab

1.3

Mousa bin
Suleiman
Hanin
Suleiman
Sara

No

Syrian

Muslim

adult, 30s

1.3

5

Blanche
DuBois

Femal
e

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 40s
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Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan
Jack
Ryan

1.3

5

1.3

5

1.3

5

Jack
Ryan

1.3

5

Jack
Ryan

1.3

5

Stanley
Kowalski
Omer, Ali's
friend
Ibrahim,
techie
hipster
terrorist
Capt.
Sandrine
Arnaud
Uncle Fathi

Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 50s

Male

Arab

No

French

Muslim

adult, 40s

Male

Arab

No

Middle
Eastern

Muslim

adult, 30s

Femal
e

White

No

French

n/a

adult, 30s

Male

Arab

no

Middle
Eastern

Muslim

adult, 50s

Part 2
Ep

Character

1.1 Jack Ryan
1.1 Cathy
Mueller
1.1 James
Greer
1.1 Mousa
bin
Suleiman
1.1 Nathan
Singer
1.1 Hanin
Suleiman
1.1 Joe
Mueller
1.1 Teresa
1.1 Patrick
1.1 Tarek
1.1 Uncle
Fathi
1.1 Matice
1.1 Leader of
visiting
forces to
Suleiman
compoun
d
1.1 Ansore
1.2 Jack Ryan

Likea Gov
bility Official
4 Y

CIA
Agent
Y

Military
Y

UAV
Operator
N

Terrorist
N

Active/
Passive
n/a

UAV
Target
N

5 N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

3 Y

Y

Y

N

N

n/a

N

3 N

N

N

N

Y

Active

N

3 Y

Y

Y

N

N

n/a

N

5 N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

1
4
3
3

N
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

N
N
N
N

4 N
5 Y

N
Y

N
Y

N
N

Y
N

Passive
n/a

N
N

1 N
2 N
4 Y

N
N
Y

N
N
Y

N
N
N

Y
Y
N

Active
Active
n/a

N
N
N
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1.2 Cathy
Mueller
1.2 James
Greer
1.2 Mousa
bin
Suleiman
1.2 Nathan
Singer
1.2 Hanin
Suleiman
1.2 Noreen
1.2 Patrick
1.2 Tarek
1.2 Sara
1.2 Yazid
1.2 Matice
1.3 Jack Ryan
1.3 James
Greer
1.3 Mousa
bin
Suleiman
1.3 Hanin
Suleiman
1.3 Sara
1.3 Yazid
1.3 Victor
"Tombsto
ne"
1.3 "Riot
Grrl"
Garcia
1.3 UAV
Target
1.3 Blanche
DuBois
1.3 Stanley
Kowalski
1.3 Omer,
Ali's
friend
1.3 Ibrahim,
techie
hipster
terrorist

5 N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

4 Y

Y

Y

N

N

n/a

N

2 N

N

N

N

Y

Active

N

2 Y

Y

Y

N

N

n/a

N

4
5
4
4
5
0
5
5

N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y

N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Active
n/a
n/a

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

5 Y

Y

Y

N

N

n/a

N

2 N

N

N

N

Y

Active

N

5 N
5 N
0 N

N
N
N

N
N
N

N
N
N

N
N
Y

n/a
n/a
Active

N
N
Y

4 Y

N

Y

Y

N

n/a

N

5 Y

N

Y

Y

N

n/a

N

4 N

N

N

N

Y

Passive

Y

3 N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

2 N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

5 N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

2 N

N

N

N

Y

Passive

N
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1.3 Capt.
Sandrine
Arnaud
1.3 Uncle
Fathi

4 Y

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

5 N

N

N

N

Y

Passive

N
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bin
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1.1 Nathan
Singer
1.1 Hanin
Suleiman
1.1 Joe
Mueller
1.1 Teresa
1.1 Patrick
1.1 Tarek
1.1 Uncle
Fathi
1.1 Matice
1.1 Leader of
visiting
forces to
Suleiman
compoun
d
1.1 Ansore
1.2 Jack Ryan
1.2 Cathy
Mueller
1.2 James
Greer
1.2 Mousa
bin
Suleiman

Corrupt
N

Human
izing
Frame
Y

Criminal
izing
Frame
N

Sane
Y

Victim
N

Perpetr
ator
N

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
N
N

N
N
N
N

Y
N
N
N

Y
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
N

Y
N
N
N

Y
Y

N
N

N
N

Y
Y

N
N

Y
Y

N
N

Y
Y
Y

N
N
N

Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y

N
N
N

N
N
Y

Y
Y
N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Adept
Y
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1.2 Nathan
Singer
1.2 Hanin
Suleiman
1.2 Noreen
1.2 Patrick
1.2 Tarek
1.2 Sara
1.2 Yazid
1.2 Matice
1.3 Jack Ryan
1.3 James
Greer
1.3 Mousa
bin
Suleiman
1.3 Hanin
Suleiman
1.3 Sara
1.3 Yazid
1.3 Victor
"Tombsto
ne"
1.3 "Riot
Grrl"
Garcia
1.3 UAV
Target
1.3 Blanche
DuBois
1.3 Stanley
Kowalski
1.3 Omer,
Ali's
friend
1.3 Ibrahim,
techie
hipster
terrorist
1.3 Capt.
Sandrine
Arnaud
1.3 Uncle
Fathi

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N

N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N

Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y

N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N

N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
N

N
N
Y

Y
Y
N

N
N
Y

Y
Y
N

N
N
Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

N
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Jack Ryan Content Analysis: Adrien Halliez
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 1
For each episode, answer the following questions:
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
a. Jack Ryan, Jim Grear
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
a. Jack: Prototypical hero with past demons, a drive to follow his gut instincts,
brave, independent, a bit of an egghead, slightly awkward socially, workoholic,
lonely, can be scheming to get what he thinks is right as with Theresa, defiant of
hierarchical commands and a bit preppy-looking.
b. Jim: Antipathetic initially (I had written asshole and shithead…) but emotionally
hurt, depressed, work as a refuge, competent through anticipation, bossy but trusts
his team. A field person grounded in an office longing to return to the field.
Fighting spirit with tactical smarts.
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. Jack is sympathetic for his current personality + past trauma. Jim starts as the
least sympathetic but makes it up in the rest of the episode.
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
a. Suleiman: Smart. Very Prototypical life story for a terrorist in this kind of show.
Sympathetic for his attachment to Ali and drive despite his past. Strategic
mastermind.
b. Ali: Action person. A bit less sympathetic to me as a viewer because he is a
follower and because of the gory plan he executed. I suspect he might be easily
manipulated by Suleiman because of the debt he perceives he owes him.
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
a. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they
have chosen this life path?
b. Suleiman's backstory also makes him pretty sympathetic and we understand both
of their paths. I am more reserved about Ali.
6. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Split between backstories of victimhood and violent actions. The family portraits
in the Lebanon flashbacks humanize them greatly but the schemes and actions
they deploy at the military base male them bloodthirsty and ready to do whatever
it takes presumably to retaliate against the perceived invader.
7. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
a. N/a because we can only assume that some characters are Christian due to the fact
that they are Americans.
8. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? N/a
9. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? N/a
10. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
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a. Whites as generally depicted under a positive light. Most of them due to their role
on the 'hero' side of the story. Two characters are more negative: Joe Mueller, the
stereotypical wealthy guy indulging in splurging and putting his bling on display
and Matice Who is generally seen as nice but perhaps too nice, possibly deceiving
and overly proud of his Americanness (remember I am not American myself so
this may be more salient to me). The tower soldier also depicted as a cocky
asshole (jack ryan himself has a cocky aspect to him.) Most whites as
overconfident in this episode.
11. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Only Jim is a black character and his depiction is ambivalent but this has to do
more with his position and current mood due to life events than his race in my
perception. (+ the soldier who warns jack of Ali’s entrance who is a hero through
his valiant sacrifice)
12. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Muslims are shown as having normal family relations before being victims of
hardships which then lead them to act for retaliation.
13. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
a. I perceived strong dualism between the agents and the terrorists even despite the
terrorists backstory. There was something more visibly despicable in the terrorists'
means of action than in the ones used by the bombing planes in Lebanon.
14. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
15. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you
felt.
a. The flashback scenes to Ali and Suleiman's childhoods are moving. They made
me feel pity and I contemplated accepting their motivations as legitimate but the
rest of the episode counterbalances these feelings of forgiveness.
16. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
a. I think Suleiman is an intriguing character. Made me feel curious and anxious at
times. He’s the kind of mastermind acting from behind the scenes in cold-blood.
He’s the most genuinely moving character to me in this episode. Ali has even a
greater potential to be moving but for now I only felt strong disgust at the cadaver
and gun episode.
b. I also felt compassion for the glimpses of Jim’s story that I got in the episode.
Some pride/enthusiasm in seeing that he had followed up in his own way on
Jack’s red flags.
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 2
For each episode, answer the following questions:
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
a. Jack Ryan: Slight trauma, smart, irreverent to authority, Macho men (no pain),
obsessive.
b. Jim Grear: Straight-to-the-point., not buying it, Muslim
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c. Suleiman/Mousa: Grateful to his brother, strong family bonds, although risk of
Suleiman manipulating Ali and family?, religious zealot? Has followers who
seem devout,
d. Ali: Foot soldier for Mousa, blinded by his love for his brother?, reckless, driven
by his mission, blurred moral compass
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. Jack Ryan described as even more flawless than in the first episode but humble as
well (scene with the operative who offered him to bypass Jim)→ More
sympathetic in this episode also because of the love story with Cathy.
b. Jim: Interesting development in his life story with the discovery that he may be
Muslim. However, storyline not developed enough yet + very tough on Jack after
having sided with him. Only looks out for himself.
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
a. Suleiman, Ali, Yazid, and a few others whose role isn’t clear yet.
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. A bit less sympathy for Suleiman after this episode. Seems a bit manipulative. His
past might drive him but makes him insensitive to people who are dear to him in
the present.
b. Slightly more sympathy for Ali who could be the victim of that manipulation but
not clear yet. Still depicted mostly as a heartless perpetrator in the events in Paris.
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Most of them are violent in this episode except for the women back at Suleiman’s
headquarters. Difficult to say that the acts of the brothers are driven by their
religion for now.
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Opening of the episode pointing to Christianity as the enemy of Islam with the
stabbing of the priest. Not yet developed enough though.
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? n/a
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? n/a
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Whites in positions of command as a bit arrogant and losing sight of their main
duties. Jack Ryan as redeeming Whites of course by being the super hero who’s
incredibly smart, brave, and nice. Less cracks in his personality in this episode.
Losing sight of his potential trauma/PTSD.
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
a. A bit impulsive and limited. Good for action but not for command in the words of
the operative who talked to Jack. A pretty negative portrayal continued with the
French SWAT commander who is seen as a hurdle to Jack’s mission at the end.
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
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a. White women in the episode as all strong and benevolent (Cathy volunteering in
Africa, the French commander as strong-willed and unwilling to cave in to the
American team.)
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
a. More Manichean episode than the first one. No redeeming storyline for the
actions of the terrorists. Clash of civilizations mediated through religion.
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you
felt.
a. The scene with Sara and Yazid seems to be an attempt at moving the public but
the storyline needs more development for it to be really moving. We just got
introduced to both characters when Yazid starts his borderline sexual harassment.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
a. Suleiman’s wife as an interesting character. Made me feel empathetic and curious
about how the relationship is going to evolve. Seems strong-willed at times but
awestruck or fearful of her husband.
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 3
For each episode, answer the following questions:
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
a. Jack Ryan, Victor, Hanin, Mousa, Ali, Yazid, and Fatih
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
a. Hanin: Strong-willed, trying to escape, poor background, committed to her kids,
likeable character with determination.
b. Uncle Fatih: Generous, disinterested, aware of risk for Hanin but also obeying
Mousa’s orders. Dual allegiance although his family ties with Hanin seem to have
come first.
c. Mousa: Wary of Hanin, heartless, does not value human life outside of his own
relations, loves his wife, tries to keep her with him, went to war, moving story
accepted by his son not necessarily by his daughter, strong hold over his family
(soft tyrant). First time his character becomes that obviously evil. Manichean
figure.
d. Omer: Generous, not inquisitive, considerate neighbor for Ali, great person,
Innocent, dragged into it because of his good heart. Likeable character.
e. Ali: Drawing as making him more human, dreamer, artistic, emotional,
successful, smart, Opposite dynamics from Mousa Suleiman. More backstory =
more likeability whereas the first two episodes only showed him as a tool for his
brother who was ready to do anything.
f. Jack: More of a secondary character in this episode. Still showing signs of shock
of what he witnesses on the ground, but conversation with Sandrine implying that
he likes being on the frontlines. Connecting the dots quicker than his colleagues.
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g. Yazid: Foot soldier devoted to Mousa but also out for himself if the opportunity
arises. Gets his comeuppance at the end of the episode which is everything I
asked for as a viewer. Most unlikeable character in the series so far.
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have
chosen this life path?
a. Sympathy for Omer, Hanin, and Fatih for this episode. Omer as a wholesome
person. Prime example of integration in France and good heart. Hanin as the
dedicated mother who is aware of the danger that Mousa represents and is brave
enough to risk it all to escape. Fatih as an ambivalent character who seemed
committed to help but constrained by his allegiance to Mousa’s movement.
b. Very little change on the side of the “good” (police forces) in terms of sympathy.
Only Jim elicited a little bit more sympathy with his interactions at the mosque
but still an ambivalent character for now.
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
a. Mousa Suleiman and Yazid as pure villains. Ali as a villain provided with a little
bit of a backstory that rehabilitates him very slightly.
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
a. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they
have chosen this life path?
b. Yazid and Mousa depicted as very evil. Even though episodes one and two did
make me feel more sympathy for Ali than Mousa, this episode establishes Mousa
as the arch-villain in the series without a doubt. Very manipulative with Hanin
and his kids as well as Ali. Not sure that the brotherly bond seen in their
backstory in episodes 1 and 2 is reciprocal. Feeling like Ali is being fooled by
Mousa which made Ali himself a bit more sympathetic (although his backstory
led to clichés about integration in France that are egregious simplifications that
made me mad but that’s off topic.)
6. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Very negative image of male Muslims in general in this episode. Paternalistic and
male-dominated vision of Muslim private lives. A few references to Muslims as
impossible to integrate to the body politic in Western countries as long as they
retain their ‘Muslim allegiance’ (in Jack and Sandrine’s discussion in the car.)
Muslim women depicted as oppressed (embodied by Hanin and her daughters)
and falling prey to men’s predatory behavior. Need to escape that.
7. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? n/a
8. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? n/a
9. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Only a glimpse of a Hispanic character with Ava who is not really likeable so far
but nothing representing being Hispanic for now.
10. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Whites took a backseat in this episode except for the character of Victor. No
generalizable patterns about whites in this one. Victor’s character as a mess.
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Probably nothing to do with his race but epitomizes aimless characters who go
with the flow.
11. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Jim as again the only Black character. More likeable in this episode. Seems
spiritual when it comes to his Muslim faith.
12. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
a. Strong portrayal of women in this episode through Hanin and Sandrine. Strongwilled, not afraid to assert themselves in front of men (Sandrine) or to take the
steps necessary to escape their grip (Hanin). More agentic and positive than in
episode 1 and to a lesser extent 2.
13. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
a. This episode is much more dualistic/Manichean. Strong good v. evil dichotomy at
both the explicit and implicit level.
14. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
a. Implicit message about the need to free women from the yoke of Muslim
traditionalism. Simplistic account.
15. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you
felt.
a. The final scene to an extent. Yazid shooting Fatih and the drone strike on Yazid. I
wasn’t really moved because I don’t feel any attachment for the characters yet but
the tension was high and I was hoping to see a punishment for Yazid.
16. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
a. I felt anger at the prospect of Ali killing Omer and relief when I realized he did
not. Still feeling a lot of empathy for Hanin’s situation and she is the character I
would like to see achieve her goal most.
b. I felt strongly about a topic: As a Frenchman, I felt quite upset at some of the
quick discussions of minorities in France, especially the allusion to the benefits of
hyphenated identities in the US compared to our dichotomous acceptance v.
rejection of minorities in France. I feel like the whole discussion was very shortsighted and it was absolutely not necessary to develop the scenario.
Character Analysis: Adrien Halliez, Part 1
Ep
1.
1

Absorb
5

Character
Jack Ryan

Gend.
Male

Race
White

Hisp.
No

Nationality
American

Religion
n/a

Age
adult, 30s

Jim Grear
Suleiman

Male
Male

Black
White
(no
Census
category
for
middle
eastern)

No
No

American
Lebanese

n/a
Muslim
(assume
d)

adult, late 40s
adult, 30s
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1.
2

1.
2

3

5

Ali

Male

White

No

Lebanese

adult, late 20s

American

Muslim
(assume
d)
Muslim
(assume
d)
n/a

Suleiman'
s Wife

Femal
e

White

no

?

Cathy
Mueller
Joe
Mueller
Theresa

Femal
e
Male

White

No

White

no

American

n/a

adult, late 50s

Femal
e
Male

White

no

American

n/a

adult late 20s

White

no

American

n/a

adult 40s

Male

White

No

American

n/a

adult, 30s

Jim Grear
Ali

Male
Male

No
No

American
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n/a
Muslim

adult, late 40s
adult, late 20s

Mousa
Suleiman
Yazid

Male

Black
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Middle
Easterner
Middle
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No

Lebanese

Muslim

adult, 30s

No

?

adult, late 20s

Sara

Femal
e

Middle
No
Easterner

?

Cathy
Mueller
Sandrine
Arnaud
Jack Ryan

Femal
e
Femal
e
Male

White

No

American

Muslim
(assume
d)
Muslim
(assume
d)
n/a
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No

French

?

White

No

American

n/a

adult, early
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adult, 30s

Mousa
Suleiman
Hanin

Male

Middle
Easterner
Middle
Easterner
Middle
Easterner
Middle
Easterner

No

Lebanese

Muslim

adult, 30s

no

?

Muslim

adult, 30s

No

Lebanese

Muslim

adult, late 20s

No

French/Lebane
se

Muslim
(assume
d)
Muslim
(assume
d)
?

adult, early
50s

Matice
(?)
Jack Ryan

Male

Ali

Femal
e
Male

Omer

Male

Yazid

Male

Middle
No
Easterner

?

Victor

Male

White

American

No

adult, 30s

adult, 30s

teenager/adul
t, ~18-20
adult, 30s

adult, late 20s

adult, early
30s
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Fatih

Male

Jim Grear
Sandrine
Arnaud
Ava

Male
Femal
e
Femal
e

Middle
No
Easterner
Black
No
White
No

?

Muslim

adult, late 50s

American
French

Muslim
?

Hispanic

American

?

adult, late 40s
adult, early
40s
adult, late 20s

Yes
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Joe
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Jack
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Jim
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Suleima
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4
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e
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4

Gov
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CIA
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UAV
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Terrorist
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UAV
Target

Y

Y

Y

N

N
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N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

n/a

N

N
N

N
N

N
N

N
N

Y
Y
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Active

N
N

N

N

N

N

Y
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N

N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

N
Y

n
n

n
n

n
n

Y

n

unsure

n/a
n/a
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active

n
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Y

N
Y
unsu
re

Y

Y

Y

N

N

n/a

N

Y
N

Y
N

Y
N

N
N

N
Y
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Active

N
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N
N
N

N
N
N

N
N
N

N
N
N

Y
Y
N
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not sure
n/a

N
N
N

N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

Y

N

N

N

N

n/a

N

n
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Grear
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Y

Y

Y

N

N
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N
N
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N
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t
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Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y
Y

N
Y

N
Y

N
Y

N
N

Y
Y

N
Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y
Y

N
Y

N
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Y
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Y
N

Y
Y

Y
N

Y

N
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N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N
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Y
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Y
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Y
Y
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N
Y
N
N
N
Y
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N
N
N
N
N
N
Y

N
Y
N
N
N
N
N

Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y

N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
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N
N
N
N
N
N
Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y
Y

N
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N
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N

N
Y

N
N
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Appendix B: Surveys
Appendix B.1: Mechanical Turk Survey
1. Informed Consent
I.
Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this
study is to examine the effects of fictional media consumption on individual attitudes. You are
invited to participate because you are over the age of 18 and represent a portion of the adult
population. A total of 800 participants will be recruited for this study. Participation will require
around 30 to 40 minutes of your time for a single online session. II.
Procedures: If
you decide to participate, you will fill out a questionnaire. The survey will take approximately 30
to 40 minutes and the compensation for this time will be $2.00. III.
Risks: In this
study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. You should be
aware that data sent over the Internet may not be secure. As with any online study, data sent over
the Internet may not be secure even though the site is encrypted. You are free to discontinue
participation at any time without adverse consequence. IV.
Benefits: Participation in
this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how
individual consumption of and interaction with fictional media affects social and political
attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a
whole. V.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in research is
voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your
mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at
any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. VI.
Confidentiality We will keep your records private to the extent allowed
by law. The research team will have access to the information you provide. Information may also
be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review
Board, the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)). We will use a study number rather
than your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored in password- and
firewall-protected computers and encrypted USB drive. The key code used to identify subjects
will be stored separately from the data to protect privacy. Your name and other facts that might
point to you will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will
be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified
personally. VII.
Contact Persons: Contact Alexandra Pauley at apauley1@gsu.edu if
you have questions, concerns, or complaints about this study. You can also call if you think you
have been harmed by this study. Contact Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of
Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu if you want to talk to someone who is
not part of the study team. You can talk about questions, concerns, offer input, obtain
information, or suggestions about the study. You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have
questions or concerns about your rights in this study. VIII.
Copy of Consent Form to
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Subject: Each participant can print a copy of this consent form for his/her records.
If you
agree to participate in this research, please click “I Agree” to continue with the survey.
a. Yes, I agree to participate in this research. (1)
2. Please enter your MTurk user ID number below. At the conclusion of this study, you
will create a unique confirmation code to enter on the MTurk website. This confirmation
code will be necessary to receive payment.
________________________________________________________________
3. Are you 18 or older?
a. Yes (1)
b. No, I am under 18 (2)
4. Thank you for agreeing to participate in our survey. Your participation is very important
to the study, and we appreciate you taking the time to answer our questions. Please
answer each of the questions carefully and honestly. Your responses are anonymous.
There are three sections in this study. In the first section, you will be asked some
demographic questions. In the second section, you will be asked about some social and
political issues, then some about your background. If you are not sure about your
response, please make your best guess. In the final section, you will be asked about your
media consumption.
a. Continue to Section One (1)
5. What is your gender?
a. Male (1)
b. Female (2)
c. Nonbinary/Other (3)
6. What is your age?
________________________________________________________________
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7. What, if any, is your religious preference?
a. Catholic (1)
b. Protestant (2)
c. Muslim (3)
d. Hindu (4)
e. Jewish (5)
f. Pagan (6)
g. Other (7)
h. No preference (8)
i. Prefer not to say (9)
8. How important is your religious affiliation to you?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately imporant (6)
d. Slightly important (3)
e. Not at all important (4)
f. Don't know/Undecided (5)
9. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
a. Extremely likely (1)
b. Moderately likely (2)
c. Slightly likely (3)
d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
e. Slightly unlikely (5)
f. Moderately unlikely (6)
g. Extremely unlikely (7)
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
10. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
a. Elementary school (1)
b. Middle school (2)
c. High school/GED (3)
d. Some college (4)
e. Associate's degree (5)
f. Bachelor's degree (6)
g. Some graduate work (7)
h. Completed Master's or professional degree (8)
i. Advanced graduate work or Ph.D. (9)
11. Which of the following best describes your marital status?
a. Single, never married (1)
b. Married (2)
c. Divorced/separated (3)
d. Widowed (4)
e. Prefer not to say (5)
12. Have you traveled outside of the country in the past five years?
a. Yes (1)
b. No (2)
c. Prefer not to say (3)
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13. How would you describe yourself?
(Select all that apply)
a. American Indian or Alaska Native (1)
b. Asian (2)
c. Black or African American (3)
d. Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (4)
e. Middle Eastern or North African (8)
f. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (6)
g. White (5)
h. Other, please describe: (7)
________________________________________________
14. How would you best describe your current employment status?
a. Employed full-time (1)
b. Employed part-time (2)
c. Unemployed/looking for work (3)
d. Student (4)
e. Homemaker (5)
f. Retired (6)
15. What do you expect your 2019 family income to be before taxes (from all sources)?
a. Under $25,000 (1)
b. $25,000-$39,999 (2)
c. $40,000-$49,999 (3)
d. $50,000-$74,999 (4)
e. $75,000-$99,999 (5)
f. $100,000-$124,999 (6)
g. $125,000-$149,999 (7)
h. Over $150,000 (8)
16. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
a. Democrat (1)
b. Republican (2)
c. Independent (3)
d. Libertarian (4)
e. Other (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
17. How important is your political party affiliation to you?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately important (3)
d. Slightly important (4)
e. Not at all important (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
18. Do your parents associate with one of the following parties?
a. Democrat (1)
b. Republican (2)
c. Independent (3)
d. Different Parties (7)
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e. Libertarian (4)
f. Other (5)
g. Don't know/Undecided (6)
19. How important is your parents' political party affiliation to them?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately important (3)
d. Slightly important (4)
e. Not at all important (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
20. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (2)
c. About half the time (6)
d. Some of the time (7)
e. Never (8)
21. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
(Choose one)
a. Abortion (1)
b. National debt (2)
c. Environment and climate change (3)
d. Gay rights (4)
e. Gun control (5)
f. Health care (6)
g. Immigration (7)
h. Poverty (8)
i. Income inequality (9)
j. Unemployment (10)
k. Economic growth (11)
l. Military strength (12)
m. Morality and religion in society (13)
n. Racism (14)
o. Social security (15)
p. Taxes (16)
q. Women's rights (17)
r. Crime (18)
s. Foreign policy (19)
t. Education (20)
u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)
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22. What should be the priority for dealing with illegal immigration in the U.S.?
a. Better border security and stronger enforcement of our immigration laws (1)
b. Creating a way for immigrants already here illegally to become citizens if they
meet certain requirements (2)
c. Both should be given equal priority (3)
d. None of these (4)
e. Don't know/No opinion (5)
23. All in all, would you favor or oppose building a wall along the entire U.S. border with
Mexico?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (7)
c. Favor a little (8)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (9)
e. Oppose a little (10)
f. Oppose moderately (11)
g. Oppose a great deal (12)
24. Do you favor or oppose the current use of detention centers at the U.S. border with
Mexico?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (7)
c. Favor a little (8)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (9)
e. Oppose a little (10)
f. Oppose moderately (11)
g. Oppose a great deal (12)
25. Do you favor or oppose making it a crime to seek asylum at the U.S. border with
Mexico?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (7)
c. Favor a little (8)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (9)
e. Oppose a little (10)
f. Oppose moderately (11)
g. Oppose a great deal (12)
26. When it comes to asylum seekers coming to the U.S. which comes closer to your view—
even if neither is exactly right?
a. Asylum seekers usually come to this country legally and should have access to the
best social, legal, and health care possible (1)
b. Asylum seekers do not always come to the country legally and should not be
given special treatment at the expense of U.S. tax dollars (2)
27. When it comes to asylum seekers coming to the U.S. which comes closer to your view—
even if neither is exactly right?
a. In general asylum seekers should be treated with caution and some suspicion upon
entering this country (1)
b. In general asylum seekers should be taken at their word and assumed innocent
upon entering this country (2)
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28. When it comes to undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. which comes closer
to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
a. Undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. are more likely than American
citizens to commit serious crimes (1)
b. Undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. are NO more likely than American
citizens to commit serious crimes (2)
29. When it comes to undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. which comes closer
to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
a. Undocumented immigrants mostly fill jobs that American citizens would like to
have (1)
b. Undocumented immigrants mostly fill jobs American citizens don't want (2)
30. When it comes to undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. which comes closer
to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
a. In general undocumented immigrants are as honest and hardworking as American
citizens (1)
b. In general undocumented immigrants are not as honest and hardworking as
American citizens (2)
31. Should the number of people who are allowed to legally move to the United States to live
and work be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now?
a. Increased a lot (1)
b. Increased a moderate amount (2)
c. Increased a little (3)
d. Kept the same (4)
e. Decreased a little (5)
f. Decreased a moderate amount (6)
g. Decreased a lot (7)
32. When people from other countries legally move to the United States to live and work, is
this generally good for the U.S., generally bad for the U.S., or neither good or bad?
a. Extremely good (1)
b. Moderately good (2)
c. A little good (3)
d. Neither good nor bad (4)
e. A little bad (5)
f. Moderately bad (6)
g. Extremely bad (7)
33. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents
(1)
b. Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing
and health care (2)
34. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near
future?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Slightly worried (3)
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d. Not at all worried (4)
35. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Moderately worried (3)
d. Slightly worried (4)
e. Not at all worried (5)
36. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of
the following groups in the near future?
(Select one answer for each group listed)
Neither
Extremel
Slightly likely
Slightly Moderately Extremely
Moderatel
y likely
likely
nor
unlikely unlikely
unlikely
y likely (2)
(1)
(3)
unlikely (5)
(6)
(7)
(4)
Blacks
(1)

Christian
s (4)

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

Left-wing
radicals
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Rightwing
radicals
(6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

Whites
(2)
Muslims
(3)

Russians
(7)
Chinese
(8)
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37. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
38. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
39. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from
terrorism (1)
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe
from terrorism (2)
40. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence
among its believers (1)
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (2)
41. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. The obstacles that once made it harder for women to get ahead are now largely
gone (1)
b. There are still significant obstacles that make it harder for women to get ahead
than men (2)
42. How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the
following groups?
(Select one answer for each group listed)
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A great deal
(1)
Blacks (1)
Hispanics (2)
Whites (3)
Gays &
lesbians (4)
Women (5)
Men (6)
Transgender
people (7)
Muslims (8)
Christians (9)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

A lot (2)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

A moderate
amount (3)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

A little (4)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

None at all
(5)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
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43. In general, does the federal government treat whites better than blacks, treat blacks
better than whites, or treat them both the same?
a. Treats whites much better (1)
b. Treats whites moderately better (2)
c. Treats whites a little better (3)
d. Treats both the same (4)
e. Treats blacks a little better (5)
f. Treats blacks moderately better (6)
g. Treats blacks much better (7)
44. In general, do the the police treat whites better than blacks, treat blacks better than
whites, or treat them both the same?
a. Police treat whites much better (1)
b. Police treat whites moderately better (2)
c. Police treat whites a little better (3)
d. Police treat both the same (4)
e. Police treat blacks a little better (5)
f. Police treat blacks moderately better (6)
g. Police treat blacks much better (7)
45. Should federal spending on crime be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
a. Increased a great deal (1)
b. Increased a moderate amount (2)
c. Increased a little (3)
d. Kept the same (4)
e. Decreased a little (5)
f. Decreased a moderate amount (6)
g. Decreased a great deal (7)
46. Do you favor or oppose using private, for-profit prisons in the U.S.?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (4)
c. Favor a little (5)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (6)
e. Oppose a little (7)
f. Oppose moderately (8)
g. Oppose a great deal (9)
47. Do you favor or oppose reforming the criminal justice system to reduce the number of
people incarcerated in the U.S.?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (4)
c. Favor a little (5)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (6)
e. Oppose a little (7)
f. Oppose moderately (8)
g. Oppose a great deal (9)
48. Do you favor or oppose having the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
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c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
49. Who is the current Secretary of State?
a. Mike Pompeo (1)
b. John Kerry (2)
c. Rex Tillerson (3)
d. Scott Pruitt (4)
e. Don't know (5)
50. Who is the current President of France?
a. Emmanuel Macron (1)
b. Justin Trudeau (2)
c. Malcolm Turnbull (3)
d. Theresa May (4)
e. Don't know (5)
51. Neil Gorsuch is...
a. a Senator (1)
b. the Solicitor General (2)
c. a Supreme Court Justice (3)
d. the head of the EPA (4)
e. Don't know (5)
52. Who is led the Justice Department's investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016
election?
a. James Comey (1)
b. Sean Spicer (2)
c. Sally Yates (3)
d. Robert Mueller (4)
e. Don't know (5)
53. The tap water in Flint, Michigan is unsafe because it contains too much...
a. Lead (1)
b. Arsenic (2)
c. Asbestos (3)
d. Mold (4)
e. Don't know (5)
54. Many conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives are members of which
of the following groups?
a. The Tuesday Group (1)
b. The Lincoln Group (2)
c. The Freedom Caucus (3)
d. The Blue Dogs (4)
e. Don't know (5)
55. Which of the following countries has officially started the process of leaving the
European Union?
a. Greece (1)
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b. Germany (2)
c. Hungary (3)
d. The United Kingdom (4)
e. Don't know (5)
56. Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
a. Paul Ryan (1)
b. Nancy Pelosi (2)
c. Jason Chaffetz (3)
d. Mitch McConnell (4)
e. Don't know (5)
57. The national unemployment rate as reported by the government is currently closer to...
a. 4% (1)
b. 7% (2)
c. 12% (3)
d. 17% (4)
e. Don't know (5)
58. How much would you say you agree with the following statement?
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
a. Strongly agree (1)
b. Agree (2)
c. Somewhat agree (3)
d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)
e. Somewhat disagree (5)
f. Disagree (6)
g. Strongly disagree (7)
59. How much would you say you trust the federal government?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
60. How much would you say you trust Congress?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
61. How much would you say you trust the court system?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
62. How much would you say you trust law enforcement?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)

224
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
63. How much would you say you trust the executive branch?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
64. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
a. Approve (1)
b. Disapprove (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
65. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?
a. Very strongly (1)
b. Not so strongly (2)
c. Don't know (3)
66. Do you disapprove very strongly, or not so strongly?
a. Very strongly (1)
b. Not so strongly (2)
c. Don't know (3)
67. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country
today?
a. Satisfied (1)
b. Dissatisfied (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
68. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
a. Very favorable (1)
b. Mostly favorable (2)
c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
d. Very unfavorable (4)
e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
69. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
a. Very favorable (1)
b. Mostly favorable (2)
c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
d. Very unfavorable (4)
e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
70. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer
services, or a bigger government providing more services?
a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)
b. Bigger government, more services (2)
c. Depends (3)
d. Don't know/No opinion (4)
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71. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)
72. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)
73. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on TV,
radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
74. How much attention do you pay to news about national politics on TV, radio, printed
newspapers, or the Internet?
a. A great deal (1)
b. A lot (2)
c. A moderate amount (3)
d. A little (4)
e. None at all (5)
75. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to NON-news on
TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
76. During a typical week, how many days do you engage with social media?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
77. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a
crime or legal drama, like Law & Order or CSI?
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a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
78. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a
medical drama, like Grey's Anatomy?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
79. During a typical week, how many days do you watch unscripted dramas, often called
reality shows?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
80. Which genres do you typically choose when you watch shows or films?
(Choose up to three)
a. Action/Adventure (1)
b. Comedy (2)
c. Sci-fi/Fantasy (3)
d. Suspense (4)
e. Based on comic books (5)
f. Animation (6)
g. Horror (7)
h. Drama (8)
i. Romantic comedy (9)
j. Kids & family (10)
k. Romance (11)
l. Re-releases (12)
m. Musicals (13)
n. Art house/Indie (14)
81. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
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a. I prefer to watch shows as they air on television—watching one episode per week.
(1)
b. I prefer to wait and binge-watch shows after they have aired—watching many
episodes in one sitting. (2)
How much have you watched of the show 24: Legacy (Fox)?
c. Never watched (1)
d. 1-3 episodes (2)
e. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
f. At least 1 season (4)
82. How much have you watched of the show Allegiance (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
83. How much have you watched of the show American Crime (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
84. How much have you watched of the show Bodyguard (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
85. How much have you watched of the show Containment (The CW)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
86. How much have you watched of the show Crisis (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
87. How much have you watched of the show Designated Survivor (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
88. How much have you watched of the show FBI (CBS)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
89. How much have you watched of the show Gang Related (Fox)?
a. Never watched (1)
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b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
90. How much have you watched of the show Homeland (HBO)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
91. How much have you watched of the show House of Cards (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
92. How much have you watched of the show Hostages (CBS)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
93. How much have you watched of the show Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
94. How much have you watched of the show Jane the Virgin (The CW)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
95. How much have you watched of the show Madam Secretary (CBS)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
96. How much have you watched of the show Mr. Robot (USA)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
97. How much have you watched of the show Odyssey (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
98. How much have you watched of the show Orange is the New Black (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)

229
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
99. How much have you watched of the show Ozark (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
100.
How much have you watched of the show Power (Starz)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
101.
How much have you watched of the show Quantico (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
102.
How much have you watched of the show Scandal (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
103.
How much have you watched of the show Seven Seconds (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
104.
How much have you watched of the show Shades of Blue (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
105.
How much have you watched of the show Shots Fired (Fox)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
106.
How much have you watched of the show State of Affairs (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
107.
How much have you watched of the show Taken (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
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108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

115.

d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show The Americans (FX)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show The Crossing (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show The Informer (Amazon Prime)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show The Night Of (HBO)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show The Passage (Fox)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
How much have you watched of the show Valor (The CW)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

116.
We are interested in whether you actually take the time to read directions; if not,
some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show
that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about your favorite
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color and choose yellow as your answer. Again, please answer the question as we have
instructed rather than choosing your favorite color.
What is your favorite color?
a. Red (1)
b. Pink (2)
c. Orange (3)
d. Yellow (4)
e. Green (5)
f. Blue (6)
g. Purple (7)
h. None of the above (8)
117.
Finally, to confirm you have completed the survey, please enter a confirmation
code of your choosing in the text box below. It should include the term PAWS and a
number (for example: "PAWS1234"). You will need to also enter the same code in the
box on the Mechanical Turk HIT. We will use this code to verify that you have
completed the survey and approve your payment. Your answers will not be linked with
your personal information in any way.
Thank you for participating in our survey!
________________________________________________________________
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Appendix B.2: Experiment Surveys
Pre-treatment Survey
1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number so that you may be compensated:
________________________________________________________________
2. Are you 18 or older?
a. Yes (1)
b. No, I am under 18 (2)
3. Please review the following Informed Consent information before continuing to the rest
of the survey.
Introduction and Key Information You are invited to take part in a research study. It is
up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. The purpose of this study
is to examine the effects of fictional media consumption on individual attitudes. Your
role in the study will last approximately 4.5 hours over the span of 5 weeks. You will be
asked to do the following: 1) Take a pre-treatment survey; 2) Watch three episodes of a
popular dramatic show by EITHER attending one long session that lasts 4 hours OR
attending three sessions that last approximately 1 hour each; 3) Take a post-treatment
survey; and 4) Take a follow-up survey in the fifth and final week of the study.
Participating in this study will not expose you to any more risks than you would
experience in a typical day. However, please be aware that some episodes may contain
adult content. This study is not designed to benefit you. Overall, we hope to gain
information about how interaction with fictional media affects social and political
attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a whole. If you do
not wish to take part in this study, you may choose another study available to the Political
Science Research Pool through the SONA system. Purpose The purpose of the study is
to learn how binge-watching a show and watching it weekly affect long-term individual
attitudes differently, if at all. You are invited to take part in this research study because
you are taking an introductory political science class and are therefore part of the Political
Science Research Pool. A total of 240 people will be invited to take part in this study.
Procedures If you decide to take part, you will be asked to participate in several
research activities. First, you are asked to take the pre-test survey online. Next, you will
be asked to attend screenings of three episodes of a popular dramatic show. This will be
either a single screening of all three episodes in one day or three separate screenings of
each episode. After you have watched the episodes, you will be asked to take a post-test
survey to complete your in-person participation. Four weeks after the first session, you
will receive an email asking you to complete a follow-up survey for additional
compensation. You can expect to fill out all surveys online using a computer or
smartphone. For individuals who do not have a computer or smartphone available, you
can request a paper copy to fill out. Each screening session will take place on the GSU
campus. Future Research Researchers will remove information that may identify you
and may use your data for future research. If we do this, we will not ask for any
additional consent from you. Risks In this study, you will not have any more risks than
you would in a normal day of life. You will be asked to watch episodes from a dramatic
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show. Be aware that the show may contain adult content, including adult language,
violence, and sexual situations. Please know that you may discontinue your participation
at any time without adverse consequence. No injury is expected from this study, but if
you believe you have been harmed, contact the research team as soon as possible.
Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to compensate
for any injury. Benefits This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall,
we hope to gain information about how interaction with fictional media affects social and
political attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a whole.
Alternatives As part of the Political Science Research Pool, you have access to multiple
studies over the course of the semester. If you do not wish to participate in this study, you
may choose another.
Select CONTINUE to continue reading this document.
4. Please review the following Informed Consent information before continuing to the
rest of the survey. Compensation You may receive up to 3 points of extra credit and
$10 in the form of an Amazon digital gift card for participating in this study. However,
this compensation is based upon how long you stay in the study. Participants who only
complete the pre-test survey will only be eligible to receive 0.5 extra credit point on their
final grade. If you continue with the study, you will be compensated per episode.
Participants who only come in for episode 1 will be compensated with 1 extra credit point
total. Participants who come in for episodes 1-2 will be compensated with 2 extra credit
points total. Participants who come in for episodes 1-3 and complete the post-test
survey will be compensated with 3 extra credit points total and a $5 Amazon digital gift
card. Participants who come in for episodes 1-3, take the post-test survey, and take the
follow-up survey will be compensated with an additional $5 Amazon gift card, bringing
total compensation to 3 extra credit point and a $10 Amazon digital gift card.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal You do not have to be in this study. If you
decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any
time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. You may refuse to take
part in the study or stop at any time. This will not cause you to lose any benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled. You will be compensated for all participation up to that point
(see above compensation scale). Confidentiality We will keep your records private to
the extent allowed by law. The following people and entities will have access to the
information you provide:
Researchers Dr. Lakeyta Bonnette-Bailey and Alexandra
Pauley
GSU Institutional Review Board
Office for Human Research
Protection (OHRP) We will use a study number rather than your name on study
records. The information you provide will be stored in a locked cabinet (paper copies)
and password- and firewall-protected computers (electronic data). All paper copies will
have identifying information removed and replaced with the study number. A key of
study numbers will be stored separately from the data to protect privacy. When we
present or publish the results of this study, we will not use your name or other
information that may identify you. Contact Information Contact Alexandra Pauley at
apauley1@gsu.edu or 6788969488:
If you have questions about the study or
your part in it If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study The IRB
at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You
can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly
with the study. You can contact the IRB for questions, concerns, problems, information,
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input, or questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404413-3500 or irb@gsu.edu. Consent We recommend you print out a copy of this page
for your records. Upon request, we will give you a copy of this consent form to
keep.
If you agree to participate in this study, please select “I Agree” to continue
with the pre-test survey.
a. I Agree (1)
b. I do not wish to participate (2)
5. What is your gender?
a. Male (1)
b. Female (2)
c. Nonbinary/Other (3)
6. What is your age?
________________________________________________________________
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7. What, if any, is your religious preference?
a. Catholic (1)
b. Protestant (2)
c. Muslim (3)
d. Hindu (4)
e. Jewish (5)
f. Pagan (6)
g. Other (7)
h. No preference (8)
i. Prefer not to say (9)
8. How important is your religious affiliation to you?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately imporant (6)
d. Slightly important (3)
e. Not at all important (4)
f. Don't know/Undecided (5)
9. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
a. Extremely likely (1)
b. Moderately likely (2)
c. Slightly likely (3)
d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
e. Slightly unlikely (5)
f. Moderately unlikely (6)
g. Extremely unlikely (7)
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
10. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
a. Elementary school (1)
b. Middle school (2)
c. High school/GED (3)
d. Some college (4)
e. Associate's degree (5)
f. Bachelor's degree (6)
g. Some graduate work (7)
h. Completed Master's or professional degree (8)
i. Advanced graduate work or Ph.D. (9)
11. Which of the following best describes your marital status?
a. Single, never married (1)
b. Married (2)
c. Divorced/separated (3)
d. Widowed (4)
e. Prefer not to say (5)
12. Have you traveled outside of the country in the past five years?
a. Yes (1)
b. No (2)
c. Prefer not to say (3)
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13. How would you describe yourself?
(Select all that apply)
a. American Indian or Alaska Native (1)
b. Asian (2)
c. Black or African American (3)
d. Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (4)
e. Middle Eastern or North African (8)
f. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (6)
g. White (5)
h. Other, please describe: (7)
________________________________________________
14. How would you best describe your current employment status?
a. Employed full-time (1)
b. Employed part-time (2)
c. Unemployed/looking for work (3)
d. Student (4)
e. Homemaker (5)
f. Retired (6)
15. What do you expect your 2019 family income to be before taxes (from all sources)?
a. Under $25,000 (1)
b. $25,000-$39,999 (2)
c. $40,000-$49,999 (3)
d. $50,000-$74,999 (4)
e. $75,000-$99,999 (5)
f. $100,000-$124,999 (6)
g. $125,000-$149,999 (7)
h. Over $150,000 (8)
16. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
a. Democrat (1)
b. Republican (2)
c. Independent (3)
d. Libertarian (4)
e. Other (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
17. How important is your political party affiliation to you?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately important (3)
d. Slightly important (4)
e. Not at all important (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
18. Do your parents associate with one of the following parties?
a. Democrat (1)
b. Republican (2)
c. Independent (3)
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d. Different Parties (7)
e. Libertarian (4)
f. Other (5)
g. Don't know/Undecided (6)
19. How important is your parents' political party affiliation to them?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately important (3)
d. Slightly important (4)
e. Not at all important (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
20. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (2)
c. About half the time (6)
d. Some of the time (7)
e. Never (8)
21. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
(Choose one)
a. Abortion (1)
b. National debt (2)
c. Environment and climate change (3)
d. Gay rights (4)
e. Gun control (5)
f. Health care (6)
g. Immigration (7)
h. Poverty (8)
i. Income inequality (9)
j. Unemployment (10)
k. Economic growth (11)
l. Military strength (12)
m. Morality and religion in society (13)
n. Racism (14)
o. Social security (15)
p. Taxes (16)
q. Women's rights (17)
r. Crime (18)
s. Foreign policy (19)
t. Education (20)
u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)
22. Who is the current Secretary of State?
a. Mike Pompeo (1)
b. John Kerry (2)
c. Rex Tillerson (3)
d. Scott Pruitt (4)
e. Don't know (5)
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23. Who is the current President of France?
a. Emmanuel Macron (1)
b. Justin Trudeau (2)
c. Malcolm Turnbull (3)
d. Theresa May (4)
e. Don't know (5)
24. Brett Kavanaugh is...
a. a Senator (1)
b. the Solicitor General (2)
c. a Supreme Court Justice (3)
d. the head of the EPA (4)
e. Don't know (5)
25. Who led the Justice Department's investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016
election?
a. James Comey (1)
b. Sean Spicer (2)
c. Sally Yates (3)
d. Robert Mueller (4)
e. Don't know (5)
26. The tap water in Flint, Michigan is unsafe because it contains too much...
a. Lead (1)
b. Arsenic (2)
c. Asbestos (3)
d. Mold (4)
e. Don't know (5)
27. Many conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives are members of which
of the following groups?
a. The Tuesday Group (1)
b. The Lincoln Group (2)
c. The Freedom Caucus (3)
d. The Blue Dogs (4)
e. Don't know (5)
28. Which of the following countries has officially started the process of leaving the
European Union?
a. Greece (1)
b. Germany (2)
c. Hungary (3)
d. The United Kingdom (4)
e. Don't know (5)
29. Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
a. Paul Ryan (1)
b. Nancy Pelosi (2)
c. Jason Chaffetz (3)
d. Mitch McConnell (4)
e. Don't know (5)
30. The national unemployment rate as reported by the government is currently closer to...
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a. 4% (1)
b. 7% (2)
c. 12% (3)
d. 17% (4)
e. Don't know (5)
31. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near
future?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Slightly worried (3)
d. Not at all worried (4)
32. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Moderately worried (3)
d. Slightly worried (4)
e. Not at all worried (5)
33. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of
the following groups in the near future?
(Select one answer for each group listed)
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34. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
35. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
36. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other
countries?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
37. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from
terrorism (1)
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe
from terrorism (2)
38. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence
among its believers (0)
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (1)
39. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (0)
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe
(1)
40. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on TV,
radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
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c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
41. How much attention do you pay to news about national politics on TV, radio, printed
newspapers, or the Internet?
a. A great deal (1)
b. A lot (2)
c. A moderate amount (3)
d. A little (4)
e. None at all (5)
42. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to NON-news on
TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
43. During a typical week, how many days do you engage with social media?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
44. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a
crime or legal drama, like Law & Order or CSI?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
45. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a
medical drama, like Grey's Anatomy?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
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c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
46. During a typical week, how many days do you watch unscripted dramas, often called
reality shows?
a. None (1)
b. One day (2)
c. Two days (3)
d. Three days (4)
e. Four days (5)
f. Five days (6)
g. Six days (7)
h. Seven days (8)
47. Which genres do you typically choose when you watch shows or films?
(Choose up to three)
a. Action/Adventure (1)
b. Comedy (2)
c. Sci-fi/Fantasy (3)
d. Suspense (4)
e. Based on comic books (5)
f. Animation (6)
g. Horror (7)
h. Drama (8)
i. Romantic comedy (9)
j. Kids & family (10)
k. Romance (11)
l. Re-releases (12)
m. Musicals (13)
n. Art house/Indie (14)
48. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. I prefer to watch shows as they air on television—watching one episode per week.
(1)
b. I prefer to wait and binge-watch shows after they have aired—watching many
episodes in one sitting. (2)
49. How much have you watched of the show 24: Legacy (Fox)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
50. How much have you watched of the show Allegiance (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
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c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
51. How much have you watched of the show American Crime (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
52. How much have you watched of the show Bodyguard (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
53. How much have you watched of the show Containment (The CW)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
54. How much have you watched of the show Crisis (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
55. How much have you watched of the show Designated Survivor (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
56. How much have you watched of the show FBI (CBS)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
57. How much have you watched of the show Gang Related (Fox)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
58. How much have you watched of the show Homeland (HBO)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
59. How much have you watched of the show House of Cards (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
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d. At least 1 season (4)
60. How much have you watched of the show Hostages (CBS)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
61. How much have you watched of the show Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
62. How much have you watched of the show Jane the Virgin (The CW)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
63. How much have you watched of the show Madam Secretary (CBS)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
64. How much have you watched of the show Mr. Robot (USA)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
65. How much have you watched of the show Odyssey (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
66. How much have you watched of the show Orange is the New Black (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
67. How much have you watched of the show Ozark (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
68. How much have you watched of the show Power (Starz)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
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69. How much have you watched of the show Quantico (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
70. How much have you watched of the show Scandal (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
71. How much have you watched of the show Seven Seconds (Netflix)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
72. How much have you watched of the show Shades of Blue (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
73. How much have you watched of the show Shots Fired (Fox)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
74. How much have you watched of the show State of Affairs (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
75. How much have you watched of the show Taken (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
76. How much have you watched of the show The Americans (FX)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
77. How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist (NBC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
78. How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)?
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a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
79. How much have you watched of the show The Crossing (ABC)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
80. How much have you watched of the show The Informer (Amazon Prime)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
81. How much have you watched of the show The Night Of (HBO)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
82. How much have you watched of the show The Passage (Fox)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
83. How much have you watched of the show Valor (The CW)?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)
Thank you for participating! Remember to sign up for PART 2 of this study in SONA. Once
you sign up, you will receive an email by Wednesday 2/12 with further instructions about your
participation.
Please continue to submit your survey.
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6.

Post-treatment Survey: Control Groups
Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number:
____________________________________________________________
How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
a. Extremely likely (1)
b. Moderately likely (2)
c. Slightly likely (3)
d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
e. Slightly unlikely (5)
f. Moderately unlikely (6)
g. Extremely unlikely (7)
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
a. Democrat (1)
b. Republican (2)
c. Independent (3)
d. Libertarian (4)
e. Other (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
How important is your political party affiliation to you?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately important (3)
d. Slightly important (4)
e. Not at all important (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (2)
c. About half the time (6)
d. Some of the time (7)
e. Never (8)
What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
(Choose one)
a. Abortion (1)
b. National debt (2)
c. Environment and climate change (3)
d. Gay rights (4)
e. Gun control (5)
f. Health care (6)
g. Immigration (7)
h. Poverty (8)
i. Income inequality (9)
j. Unemployment (10)
k. Economic growth (11)
l. Military strength (12)
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m. Morality and religion in society (13)
n. Racism (14)
o. Social security (15)
p. Taxes (16)
q. Women's rights (17)
r. Crime (18)
s. Foreign policy (19)
t. Education (20)
u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)
7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near
future?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Slightly worried (3)
d. Not at all worried (4)
8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Moderately worried (3)
d. Slightly worried (4)
e. Not at all worried (5)
9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of
the following groups in the near future?
(Select one answer for each group listed)
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10. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other
countries?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from
terrorism (1)
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe
from terrorism (2)
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence
among its believers (1)
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (2)
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (2)
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe
(3)
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement?
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
a. Strongly agree (1)
b. Agree (2)
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c. Somewhat agree (3)
d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)
e. Somewhat disagree (5)
f. Disagree (6)
g. Strongly disagree (7)
17. How much would you say you trust the federal government?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
18. How much would you say you trust Congress?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
19. How much would you say you trust the court system?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
20. How much would you say you trust law enforcement?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
21. How much would you say you trust the executive branch?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
a. Approve (1)
b. Disapprove (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?
a. Very strongly (1)
b. Not so strongly (2)
c. Don't know (3)
24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country
today?
a. Satisfied (1)
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b. Dissatisfied (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
a. Very favorable (1)
b. Mostly favorable (2)
c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
d. Very unfavorable (4)
e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
a. Very favorable (1)
b. Mostly favorable (2)
c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
d. Very unfavorable (4)
e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer
services, or a bigger government providing more services?
a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)
b. Bigger government, more services (2)
c. Depends (3)
d. Don't know/No opinion (4)
28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)
29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)
30. While you were watching the show, how interested did you feel about what was going
on?
a. Very interested (1)
b. Somewhat interested (2)
c. A little interested (3)
d. Not at all interested (4)
31. Q196 How absorbed/"sucked in" did you feel by the show?
a. Very absorbed (1)
b. Somewhat absorbed (2)
c. A little absorbed (3)
d. Not at all absorbed (4)
32. Did you feel like the show was realistic?
a. Very realistic (1)
b. Somewhat realistic (2)
c. A little realistic (3)
d. Not at all realistic (4)
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33. Were there any characters that you felt you identified with while watching the show?
This could mean you personally identify with the character, you want to be more like the
character, you could see yourself being friends with the character, or you just generally
like the character.
a. Yes, I identified with at least one character (1)
b. No, I didn't identify with any of the characters (3)
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Post-treatment Survey: Treatment Groups
Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number:
____________________________________________________________
How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
a. Extremely likely (1)
b. Moderately likely (2)
c. Slightly likely (3)
d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
e. Slightly unlikely (5)
f. Moderately unlikely (6)
g. Extremely unlikely (7)
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
a. Democrat (1)
b. Republican (2)
c. Independent (3)
d. Libertarian (4)
e. Other (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
How important is your political party affiliation to you?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately important (3)
d. Slightly important (4)
e. Not at all important (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (2)
c. About half the time (6)
d. Some of the time (7)
e. Never (8)
What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
(Choose one)
a. Abortion (1)
b. National debt (2)
c. Environment and climate change (3)
d. Gay rights (4)
e. Gun control (5)
f. Health care (6)
g. Immigration (7)
h. Poverty (8)
i. Income inequality (9)
j. Unemployment (10)
k. Economic growth (11)
l. Military strength (12)

256
m. Morality and religion in society (13)
n. Racism (14)
o. Social security (15)
p. Taxes (16)
q. Women's rights (17)
r. Crime (18)
s. Foreign policy (19)
t. Education (20)
u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)
7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near
future?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Slightly worried (3)
d. Not at all worried (4)
8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Moderately worried (3)
d. Slightly worried (4)
e. Not at all worried (5)
9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of
the following groups in the near future? (Select one answer for each group listed)
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10. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other
countries?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from
terrorism (1)
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe
from terrorism (2)
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence
among its believers (1)
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (2)
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (2)
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe
(3)
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement?
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
a. Strongly agree (1)
b. Agree (2)
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c. Somewhat agree (3)
d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)
e. Somewhat disagree (5)
f. Disagree (6)
g. Strongly disagree (7)
17. How much would you say you trust the federal government?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
18. How much would you say you trust Congress?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
19. How much would you say you trust the court system?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
20. How much would you say you trust law enforcement?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
21. How much would you say you trust the executive branch?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
a. Approve (1)
b. Disapprove (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?
a. Very strongly (1)
b. Not so strongly (2)
c. Don't know (3)
24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country
today?
a. Satisfied (1)
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b. Dissatisfied (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
f. Very favorable (1)
g. Mostly favorable (2)
h. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
i. Very unfavorable (4)
j. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
a. Very favorable (1)
b. Mostly favorable (2)
c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
d. Very unfavorable (4)
e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer
services, or a bigger government providing more services?
a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)
b. Bigger government, more services (2)
c. Depends (3)
d. Don't know/No opinion (4)
28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)
29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)
30. While you were watching the show, how interested did you feel about what was going
on?
a. Very interested (1)
b. Somewhat interested (2)
c. A little interested (3)
d. Not at all interested (4)
31. Q196 How absorbed/"sucked in" did you feel by the show?
a. Very absorbed (1)
b. Somewhat absorbed (2)
c. A little absorbed (3)
d. Not at all absorbed (4)
32. Did you feel like the show was realistic?
a. Very realistic (1)
b. Somewhat realistic (2)
c. A little realistic (3)
d. Not at all realistic (4)
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33. Abbas al-Fathi
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
34. Ali bin Suleiman
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
35. Dr. Cathy Mueller
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
36. Hanin
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
37. Jack Ryan
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
38. James Greer
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
39. Victor Polizzi
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
40. Sandrine Arnaud
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
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d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
41. Mousa bin Suleiman
a. I I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
42. Yazid
a. I personally identify with this character (1)
b. I want to be more like this character (2)
c. I could be friends with this character (3)
d. I do NOT like this character (4)
e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
43. Were there any other characters that you felt you identified with other than those already
mentioned?
a. Yes (1)
b. No (4)
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1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Follow-up Survey
Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number:
__________________________________________________________
How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
a. Extremely likely (1)
b. Moderately likely (2)
c. Slightly likely (3)
d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
e. Slightly unlikely (5)
f. Moderately unlikely (6)
g. Extremely unlikely (7)
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
a. Democrat (1)
b. Republican (2)
c. Independent (3)
d. Libertarian (4)
e. Other (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
How important is your political party affiliation to you?
a. Extremely important (1)
b. Very important (2)
c. Moderately important (3)
d. Slightly important (4)
e. Not at all important (5)
f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (2)
c. About half the time (6)
d. Some of the time (7)
e. Never (8)
What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
(Choose one)
a. Abortion (1)
b. National debt (2)
c. Environment and climate change (3)
d. Gay rights (4)
e. Gun control (5)
f. Health care (6)
g. Immigration (7)
h. Poverty (8)
i. Income inequality (9)
j. Unemployment (10)
k. Economic growth (11)
l. Military strength (12)
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m. Morality and religion in society (13)
n. Racism (14)
o. Social security (15)
p. Taxes (16)
q. Women's rights (17)
r. Crime (18)
s. Foreign policy (19)
t. Education (20)
u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)
7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near
future?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Slightly worried (3)
d. Not at all worried (4)
8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
a. Extremely worried (1)
b. Very worried (2)
c. Moderately worried (3)
d. Slightly worried (4)
e. Not at all worried (5)
9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of
the following groups in the near future?
(Select one answer for each group listed)
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Extremel
y likely
(1)
Blacks
(1)

Moderatel
y likely (2)

Neither
Slightly likely
Slightly Moderately Extremely
likely
nor
unlikely unlikely
unlikely
(3)
unlikely (5)
(6)
(7)
(4)

Christian
s (4)

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

Left-wing
radicals
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Rightwing
radicals
(6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

Whites
(2)
Muslims
(3)

Russians
(7)
Chinese
(8)
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10. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other
countries?
a. Favor a great deal (1)
b. Favor moderately (2)
c. Favor a little (3)
d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
e. Oppose a little (5)
f. Oppose moderately (6)
g. Oppose a great deal (7)
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from
terrorism (1)
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe
from terrorism (2)
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence
among its believers (1)
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (2)
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (2)
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe
(3)
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement?
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
a. Strongly agree (1)
b. Agree (2)
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c. Somewhat agree (3)
d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)
e. Somewhat disagree (5)
f. Disagree (6)
g. Strongly disagree (7)
17. How much would you say you trust the federal government?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
18. How much would you say you trust Congress?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
19. How much would you say you trust the court system?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
20. How much would you say you trust law enforcement?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
21. How much would you say you trust the executive branch?
a. Always (1)
b. Most of the time (8)
c. Some of the time (9)
d. Rarely (2)
e. Never (3)
22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
a. Approve (1)
b. Disapprove (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?
a. Very strongly (1)
b. Not so strongly (2)
c. Don't know (3)
24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country
today?
a. Satisfied (1)
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b. Dissatisfied (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)
25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
a. Very favorable (1)
b. Mostly favorable (2)
c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
d. Very unfavorable (4)
e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
a. Very favorable (1)
b. Mostly favorable (2)
c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
d. Very unfavorable (4)
e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)
27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer
services, or a bigger government providing more services?
a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)
b. Bigger government, more services (2)
c. Depends (3)
d. Don't know/No opinion (4)
28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)
29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is
exactly right?
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)
30. Which show were you assigned to watch in this study?
a. Jack Ryan (Amazon) (1)
b. This is Us (NBC) (2)
31. Had you seen that show BEFORE this study?
a. Yes (1)
b. No (2)
32. Did you watch any more episodes of that show AFTER this study?
Remember, this survey is anonymous, and your honesty is important.
a. Yes (1)
b. No (2)
33. How much have you watched of the show Jack Ryan in total?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (7)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (8)
d. At least 1 season (9)
34. How much have you watched of the show This is Us in total?
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a.
b.
c.
d.

Never watched (1)
1-3 episodes (7)
At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (8)
At least 1 season (9)
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Appendix C: Additional Models
Appendix C.1: Chapter 5 Models
The following models compare raw data from specific questions measuring IVs.
Believe Islam More Likely to Promote Violence than Other Religions
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
MT Stereotype
0.003
0.002
1.54
0.124
White
0.047
0.032
1.46
0.144
Female
-0.081
0.029
-2.74
0.006
Education
-0.001
0.010
-0.09
0.925
Pol
0.117
0.018
6.57
0.000
ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
-0.017
0.006
-2.88
0.004
Travel Outside
0.047
0.030
1.57
0.117
US
constant
0.403
0.079
5.12
0.000

Believe Islam More Likely to Promote Violence than Other Religions
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
MT Stereotype
0.012
0.008
1.52
0.128
White
0.198
0.142
1.40
0.162
Female
-0.348
0.129
-2.71
0.007
Education
-0.002
0.045
-0.04
0.968
Pol ID/Republican 0.502
0.079
6.38
0.000
Pol Knowledge
-0.075
0.026
-2.86
0.004
Travel Outside US 0.202
0.132
1.53
0.127
constant
-0.415
0.344
-1.21
0.227
Log likelihood = -697.27569

MT Stereotype
White
Female
Education
Pol ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
Travel Outside US
Constant

Believe a Muslim Terrorist Attack on the US is Likely in the Near Future
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.015
0.007
2.26
0.024
-0.063
0.121
-0.52
0.604
0.045
0.110
0.41
0.684
-0.113
0.038
-2.94
0.003
0.211
0.066
3.18
0.002
0.022
0.022
1.01
0.313
-0.143
0.111
-1.29
0.196
0.492
0.294
1.67
0.095
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Public Policy Beliefs
Send Troops to
Accept Syrian
MidEast
Refugees
0.058 (0.006)***
0.037 (0.006)***
-0.115 (-0.113)
-0.441 (0.113)***
0.129 (0.103)
0.214 (0.103)*
-0.032 (0.036)
0.135 (0.036)***
0.152 (0.062)*
-0.503 (0.062)***

MT Stereotype
White
Female
Education
Pol
ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
-0.028 (0.021)
0.011 (0.021)
Travel Outside
0.268 (0.104)**
0.209 (0.103)*
US
Constant
-0.257 (0.277)
0.577 (0.275)*
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

MT Stereotype
White
Female
Education
Pol
ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
Travel Outside
US
Constant

Level of Discrimination in US Against Muslims
Coefficient Std. Error z-score
p-value
-0.015
0.004
-3.49
0.001
-0.092
0.078
-1.18
0.239
0.096
0.071
1.35
0.178
-0.010
0.025
-0.41
0.685
-0.312
0.043
-7.28
0.000
0.041
-0.112

0.014
0.071

2.83
-1.57

0.005
0.116

3.06

0.191

16.05

0.000

Social Perceptions
Terrorist Attack Discrimination
0.022 (0.010)*
-0.025 (0.007)***
-0.058 (0.121)
-0.105 (0.078)
0.045 (0.110)
0.092 (0.071)
-0.113 (0.038)* -0.009 (0.025)
0.210 (0.066)** -0.309 (0.043)***

Policy Attitudes
Send Troops
Accept Refugees
0.085 (0.010)***
0.055 (0.009)***
-0.099 (0.114)
-0.429 (0.113)***
0.131 (0.103)
0.216 (0.103)*
-0.032 (0.036)
0.135 (0.036)***
0.150 (0.062)*
-0.504 (0.062)***

MT Antagonist
White
Female
Education
Pol
ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
0.024 (0.022)
0.038 (0.014)**
-0.023 (0.021)
0.014 (0.021)
Travel Outside
-0.144 (0.111)
-0.105 (0.071)
0.268 (0.104)**
0.208 (0.103)*
US
Constant
0.503 (0.294)
3.062 (0.190)***
-0.214 (0.277)
0.601 (0.275)*
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001
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Likely Muslim
Likely Muslim
Terror Attack
Terror Attack
Muslim Protagonist 0.034 (0.017)*
No Muslim Protagonist 0.023 (0.01)*
White
-0.07 (0.121)
White
-0.069 (0.12)
Female
0.031 (0.109)
Female
0.049 (0.11)
Education
-0.109 (0.038)** Education
-0.113 (0.039)**
Pol ID/Republican
0.214 (0.066)*** Pol ID/Republican
0.213 (0.066)***
Pol Knowledge
0.021 (0.022)
Pol Knowledge
0.022 (0.022)
Travel Outside US
-0.134 (0.11)
Travel Outside US
-0.139 (0.11)
Constant
0.513 (0.294)
Constant
0.496 (0.294)
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

Regression 1

Discrimination Regression 2
Against Muslims
-0.026 (0.011)*
No Muslim Protagonist

Discrimination
Against Muslims
Muslim
-0.025
Protagonist
(0.007)***
White
-0.072 (0.078)
White
-0.092 (0.077)
Female
0.112 (0.071)
Female
0.088 (0.071)
Education
-0.016 (0.025)
Education
-0.008 (0.025)
Pol ID/Republican -0.319
Pol ID/Republican
-0.311
(0.043)***
(0.043)***
Pol Knowledge
0.043 (0.012)**
Pol Knowledge
0.04 (0.014)**
Travel Outside US -0.133 (0.071)
Travel Outside US
-0.109 (0.071)
Constant
3.02 (0.191)***
Constant
3.07 (0.19)***
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

The following models compare different versions of combined DV measurements.
Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
MT Stereotype
-0.056
0.025
-2.28
White
0.034
0.011
3.21
Female
0.008
0.010
0.78
Education
-0.010
0.003
-3.01
Pol
0.019
0.006
3.26
ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
0.007
0.002
3.42
Travel Outside
-0.016
0.010
-1.66
US
Constant
0.507
0.026
19.68

p-value
0.023
0.001
0.425
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.097
0.000
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MT Antagonist
White
Female
Education
Pol
ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
Travel Outside
US
Constant

Muslim
Protagonist
White
Female
Education
Pol ID/Republican
Pol Knowledge
Travel Outside US
Constant

Coefficient
-0.064
0.032
0.007
-0.010
0.019

Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.024
-2.66
0.008
0.011
3.04
0.002
0.010
0.73
0.467
0.003
-2.95
0.003
0.006
3.33
0.001

0.006
-0.015

0.002
0.010

3.30
-1.56

0.001
0.120

0.508

0.026

19.75

0.000

Coefficient
-0.041
0.035
0.009
-0.011
0.019
0.007
-0.017
0.505

Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.022
-1.87
0.062
0.011
0.010
0.003
0.006
0.002
0.010
0.026

3.31
0.92
-3.14
3.20
3.51
-1.79
19.61

0.001
0.360
0.002
0.001
0.000
0.074
0.000
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Appendix C.2: Chapter 6 Models
The following are linear regressions on the DV measuring association of Muslims with terrorism.
Pre-treatment Survey Results
Control
Treatment
(n=68)
(n=76)
Bias*
Mean
4.104
3.579
Std. deviation
(1.793)
(1.723)
Troops
Mean
-0.338
-0.039
Std. deviation
(1.617)
(1.677)
Refugees
Mean
1.015
1.697
Std. deviation
(1.511)
(1.244)
Drones
Mean
-0.338
-0.342
Std. deviation
(1.681)
(1.621)
*For this variable, the control group n=67.
Variable

Post-treatment Survey Results
Variable
Control
Treatment
(n=68)
(n=76)
Bias*
Mean
3.881
3.618
Std. deviation
(2.033)
(1.736)
Troops
Mean
-0.059
0.066
Std. deviation
(1.185)
(1.561)
Refugees
Mean
1.015
1.474
Std. deviation
(1.321)
(1.428)
Drones
Mean
-0.397
0.158
Std. deviation
(1.631)
(1.759)
*For this variable, the control group n=67.

Variable
Bias
Troops
Refugees
Drones

Mean
Std. deviation
Mean
Std. deviation
Mean
Std. deviation
Mean
Std. deviation

Follow-up Survey Results
Control
Treatment
(n=55)
(n=57)
3.455
3.526
(1.698)
(1.582)
-0.182
-0.175
(1.657)
(1.453)
1.018
1.509
(1.269)
(1.377)
-0.4
-0.193
(1.791)
(1.737)

t-value

Probability

1.786

0.076

-1.085

0.280

-2.971

0.004

0.014

0.989

t-value

Probability

0.832

0.407

-0.489

0.625

-1.994

0.048

-1.956

0.052

t-value

Probability

-0.232

0.817

-0.022

0.983

-1.958

0.053

-0.621

0.536

I created a more complex measure of social bias toward Muslims using responses to three survey
questions. First, I created a variable comparing participants’ beliefs on how likely it is that a Muslim will
commit a terrorist attack on the U.S. to that of all groups included on the survey. Responses to eight
groups were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely.” I took
the difference between the average of their answer for all eight groups and their answer for Muslims and

275
then converted it into a percentage of the spectrum of responses. This produced a preliminary bias
variable. Second, I combined this preliminary variable with responses to two dichotomous questions that
inquire whether Islam is more likely than other religions to promote violence and whether jihadists are a
good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe. I again converted this combined response to
a percentage of the spectrum of responses, which produced my social bias dependent variable.

Binge Treatment
Binge Control
Weekly Treatment
Weekly Control

Pre-Treatment
0.246
0.302
0.290
0.289

Post-Treatment
0.294
0.322
0.298
0.335

Follow-up
0.185
0.235
0.208
0.215

The next two tables include the responses of all 144 participants for the pre-treatment and post-treatment
measures.
Pre-Treatment
Post-Treatment
Follow-up
Treatment Groups
3.592
3.498
3.676
Control Groups
3.765
3.572
3.475
*Groups: Blacks, Whites, Muslims, Christians, Right-wing Activists, Left-wing Activists, Russians,
Chinese

Treatment Groups
Control Groups

Pre-Treatment
1.158
1.206

Post-Treatment
1
1.029

Follow-up
0.786
0.855

I broke down identification by the category of character with which participants identified, and I sorted
the lead characters into three categories: agent fighting terrorism, Muslim protagonist, and Muslim
terrorist character. While several of the lead characters could be seen as falling into more than one
category (for example, Jim Greer is both an agent fighting terrorism and a Muslim) I sorted the characters
according to how identification may induce the greatest affect. I sorted the characters as follows—Agents:
Jack Ryan, Victor Polizzi, and Sandrine Arnaud; Muslim Protagonists: Jim Greer, Hanin Ali, and Fathi
al-Abbas; and Muslim terrorists: Mousa bin Suleiman, Ali bin Suleiman, and Yazid. None of these
identification categories significantly correlated with the social bias dependent variable. Again, the
treatment seems to have had little to no effect on social bias.

Pretest Bias
Christian
Agent
Muslim
Protagonist
Muslim Terrorist
Constant

Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
0.515
0.100
5.18
1.050
0.412
2.55
0.305
1.490
-0.20
0.938
0.773
1.21

p-value
0.000
0.013
0.839
0.229

-0.200
1.00

0.601
0.559

0.380
1.704

-0.53
0.59
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Pretest Bias
Christian
Jack Ryan
Victor Polizzi
Sandrine Arnaud
Jim Greer
Hanin Ali
Fathi al-Abbas
Ali bin Suleiman
Mousa bin Suleiman
Yazid
Constant

Pretest Favor
Agent
Muslim
Protagonist
Muslim Terrorist
Constant

Pretest Favor
Christian
Jack Ryan
Victor Polizzi
Sandrine Arnaud
Jim Greer
Hanin Ali
Fathi al-Abbas
Ali bin Suleiman
Mousa bin Suleiman
Yazid
Constant

Pretest Favor
Christian
Agent
Muslim
Protagonist
Muslim Terrorist
Constant

Coefficient
0.521
1.127
0.222
0.181
0.200
0.201
-0.153
0.107
-0.068
0.317
-1.115
1.076

Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.100
5.21
0.000
0.431
2.32
0.011
0.228
0.97
0.335
0.141
1.28
0.204
0.168
1.19
0.237
0.187
1.08
0.285
0.182
-0.84
0.404
0.175
0.61
0.544
0.197
-0.34
0.732
0.274
1.16
0.252
0.652
-1.71
0.092
0.785
1.37
0.176

Posttest Favor Toward Sending U.S. Troops to Fight Islamic Militants
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.546
0.095
5.74
0.000
0.298
1.310
0.23
0.821
1.003
0.701
1.43
0.157
-0.463
-1.003

Coefficient
0.542
0.375
0.496
0.101
-0.207
-0.034
0.320
0.342
-0.430
-0.212
-0.802
-0.825

0.337
1.473

-1.38
-0.68

0.173
0.498

Posttest Favor Toward Sending U.S. Troops
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.098
5.56
0.000
0.410
0.91
0.364
0.916
0.54
0.590
0.338
0.30
0.765
0.382
-0.54
0.589
0.402
-0.08
0.933
0.730
0.44
0.662
0.457
0.75
0.456
0.409
-1.05
0.297
0.653
-0.33
0.746
1.076
-0.75
0.459
0.807
-1.02
0.311

Posttest Favor Toward Accepting Syrian Refugees to the U.S.
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.749
0.103
7.25
0.000
0.766
0.292
2.63
0.011
-0.013
1.066
-0.01
0.991
-0.201
0.553
-0.36
0.717
0.046
0.201

0.274
1.179

0.17
0.17

0.868
0.865
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Pretest Favor
Christian
Agent
Muslim
Protagonist
Muslim Terrorist
Constant

Posttest Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists
Coefficient
Standard Error
z-score
p-value
0.638
0.107
5.97
0.000
-0.500
0.342
-1.46
0.148
1.007
1.456
0.69
0.492
1.132
0.762
1.48
0.142
-0.434
-1.270

0.370
1.677

-1.17
-0.76

0.245
0.452

The following is a pairwise comparison for treatment groups split by consumption type from a repeated
measures two-way ANOVA model on the drone strikes DV.

Weekly Group
Pretest & Posttest
Posttest & Follow-up
Pretest & Follow-up
Binge Group
Pretest & Posttest
Posttest & Follow-up
Pretest & Follow-up

Mean Difference

Standard Error

p-value

0.200
-0.029
0.171

0.192
0.146
0.169

0.912
1.000
0.951

0.190
0.143
0.333

0.220
0.203
0.298

1.000
1.000
0.836

In reviewing the within-subjects simple effects of the more defined models, both pass Mauchly’s test of
sphericity at p=0.392 (weekly) and p=0.456 (binge). However, the only statistically significant
interaction occurs for weekly watchers who identify with Yazid.
Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists
p-value
F-value
df
Weekly Treatment Group
Time Period
Time*Christian
Time*Victor
Time*Yazid
Time*Ali
Error
Binge Treatment Group
Time Period
Time*Christian
Time*Victor
Time*Yazid
Time*Ali
Error

0.143
0.435
0.583
0.071
0.492

2.009
0.843
0.544
2.770
0.718

2
2
2
2
2
60

0.309
0.752
0.218

1.219
0.288
1.600

0.715

0.340

2
2
2
0
2
32

The remaining models are linear regressions that use change as the dependent variable.
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Change from Pretest to Posttest for Bias DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.217

0.449

-0.48

0.630

Democrat

-0.632

0.434

-1.46

0.150

White

0.130

0.602

0.22

0.830

Christian

-0.291

0.483

-0.60

0.550

Travel

0.028

0.451

0.06

0.951

Constant

0.258

0.507

0.51

0.612

N=66, Prob>F=0.7244, R-sq=0.0452

Change from Prettest to Follow-up for Bias DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

0.024

0.479

0.05

0.960

Democrat

-0.896

0.474

-1.89

0.065

White

0.508

0.666

0.76

0.449

Christian

-0.040

0.515

-0.08

0.938

Travel

-0.117

0.503

-0.23

0.817

Constant

-0.199

0.565

-0.35

0.726

N=54, Prob>F=0.4512, R-sq=0.0910

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Bias DV (CT Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.229

0.390

-0.59

0.559

Democrat

-0.285

0.410

-0.69

0.489

White

-0.351

0.514

-0.68

0.497

Christian

1.263

0.475

2.66

0.010

Travel

0.210

0.412

0.51

0.612

Constant

-0.024

0.484

-0.05

0.960

N=76, Prob<F=0.1456, R-sq=0.1084
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Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Bias DV (CT only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

0.246

0.499

0.49

0.624

Democrat

-0.416

0.506

-0.82

0.415

White

-0.622

0.669

-0.93

0.357

Christian

1.015

0.559

1.82

0.075

Travel

-0.718

0.532

-1.35

0.183

Constant

0.446

0.591

0.75

0.455

N=57, Prob>F=0.3295, R-sq=0.1041

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Troops DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

0.361

0.387

0.93

0.354

Democrat

0.093

0.372

0.25

0.802

White

-0.277

0.524

-0.53

0.599

Christian

-0.235

0.419

-0.68

0.498

Travel

-0.034

0.392

-0.09

0.930

Constant
N=68, Prob>F=0.8871, R-sq=0.0266

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Troops DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

0.132

0.474

0.28

0.782

Democrat

-0.045

0.469

-0.10

0.924

White

0.624

0.660

0.09

0.925

Christian

-0.446

0.512

-0.87

0.387

Travel

-0.168

0.499

-0.34

0.738

Constant

0.233

0.561

0.41

0.680

N=55, Prob>F=0.9648, R-sq=0.0191
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Change from Pretest to Posttest for Troops DV (CT Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.532

0.352

-1.51

0.135

Democrat

-0.003

0.370

-0.01

0.994

White

-0.254

0.464

-0.55

0.586

Christian

0.269

0.428

0.63

0.532

Travel

0.342

0.372

0.92

0.360

Constant

0.228

0.436

0.27

0.788

N=76, Prob>F=0.5360, R-sq=0.0557

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Troops DV (CT Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.156

0.432

-0.36

0.720

Democrat

0.155

0.439

0.35

0.726

White

-0.789

0.581

-1.36

0.180

Christian

0.928

0.485

0.06

0.954

Travel

0.771

0.462

1.67

0.101

Constant

-0.579

0.513

-1.13

0.264

N=57, Prob>F=0.4210, R-sq=0.0902

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Refugees DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.095

0.291

-0.33

0.745

Democrat

-0.535

0.280

-1.92

0.060

White

-0.400

0.394

-1.02

0.314

Christian

-0.075

0.315

-0.24

0.812

Travel

0.117

0.295

0.40

0.694

Constant

0.310

0.331

0.94

0.352

N=68, Prob>F=0.4234, R-sq=0.0749
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Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Refugees DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

0.020

0.276

-0.07

0.941

Democrat

-0.516

0.273

-1.85

0.070

White

-0.663

0.383

-1.73

0.090

Christian

-0.556

0.297

-1.87

0.067

Travel

0.145

0.291

0.50

0.621

Constant

0.428

0.326

1.31

0.196

N=55, Prob>F=0.0831, R-sq=0.1755

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Refugees DV (CT Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.130

0.240

-0.54

0.590

Democrat

-0.389

0.253

-1.54

0.129

White

-0.302

0.317

-0.95

0.343

Christian

0.790

0.293

2.70

0.009

Travel

-0.373

0.254

-1.47

0.147

Constant

0.206

0.298

0.69

0.492

N=76, Prob>F=0.0688, R-sq=0.1335

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Refugees DV (CT Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.091

0.320

-0.28

0.777

Democrat

-0.331

0.325

-1.02

0.313

White

-0.707

0.430

-1.65

0.106

Christian

0.241

0.359

0.67

0.506

Travel

-0.379

0.342

-1.11

0.273

Constant

0.341

0.380

0.90

0.373

N=57, Prob>F=0.4236, R-sq=0.0898
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Change from Pretest to Posttest for Drones DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.075

0.364

-0.21

0.838

Democrat

-0.096

0.350

-0.27

0.785

White

0.142

0.493

0.29

0.775

Christian

0.400

0.394

1.01

0.314

Travel

0.492

0.369

1.61

0.113

Constant

-0.486

0.414

-1.17

0.246

N=68, Prob>F=0.5983, R-sq=0.0561

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Drones DV (Tolerance Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.187

0.382

-0.49

0.627

Democrat

0.030

0.377

0.08

0.937

White

-0.091

0.531

-0.17

0.864

Christian

0.321

0.411

0.78

0.438

Travel

0.339

0.402

0.84

0.403

Constant

-0.436

0.452

-0.97

0.339

N=55, Prob>F=0.9238, R-sq=0.0274

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Drones DV (CT Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.808

0.372

-2.17

0.033

Democrat

-0.205

0.391

-0.52

0.602

White

0.328

0.491

0.67

0.506

Christian

0.261

0.453

0.57

0.567

Travel

-0.004

0.393

-0.01

0.992

Constant

0.888

0.462

1.92

0.059

N=76, Prob>F=0.2992, R-sq=0.0814
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Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Drones DV (CT Only)
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-value

p-value

Binge

-0.445

0.398

-1.12

0.269

Democrat

-0.127

0.404

-0.31

0.755

White

-0.489

0.534

-0.92

0.364

Christian

0.577

0.446

1.29

0.201

Travel

0.266

0.425

0.63

0.533

Constant

0.171

0.472

0.36

0.718

N=57, Prob>F=0.5509, R-sq=0.0732

